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A corporate bankruptcy proceeding-i.e., the government's
interference in a firm's course of financial deterioration, which
expropriates from a firm and from its shareholders the power to make
decisions regarding redeployment of the firm's assets-must
simultaneously accomplish two tasks: redeployment of the assets of the
financially-distressed firm; and distribution of the proceeds generated to
claimants. Of the two tasks, redeployment is, from an economic point of
view, the more important decision and has been the subject of much
scholarly interest in recent decades. Indeed, optimal redeployment
maximizes the wealth of the firm's claimants and, hence, also optimizes
social wealth.' Law and economics scholars unanimously agree that when
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1. Maximizing the value of the pool of assets reduces the costs of debt capital (the
costs of credit), because creditors recover a higher percentage of their debt; which in turn
permits firms to fund, ex ante, more good projects with positive net present value (NPV).
See, e.g., Mehnaz Safavian & Siddharth Sharma, When Do Creditor Rights Work?, 35 J.
COMP. ECON. 484 (2007) (concluding that firms have more access to bank credit in countries
with better creditor rights and a more efficient court system). In addition, reducing the costs
of debt capital creates better incentives to maximize value and therefore maximizes social
wealth. Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theoty Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE
L.J. 1807, 1812-14 (1998). There is also an ex post effect: To the extent that a wrong
redeployment decision is made, the value of the firm's assets is reduced, which becomes a
social cost since society as a whole bears the loss when assets are not put to their highest
valued use. Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment
Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1161 (1994) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects].
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redeployment is concerned, there should be no a priori bias toward
preserving any set of assets within the boundaries of a single firm.2 An
optimal bankruptcy procedure should therefore attempt to discern
financially-distressed-but-economically-viable firms from financially-and-
economically-distressed firms.3 While the former should continue to
operate as a going concern, and perhaps undergo a restructuring of its
capital 4 for that purpose; the latter should be shut down, and its assets
should be redeployed elsewhere in the economy.
Conventional wisdom has thus far recognized two models to govern
corporate bankruptcy decision-making.6 The first model, which I will refer
to as the "Administrative Model," is based on a process of making a
collective decision regarding redeployment, under the supervision of the
bankruptcy court. From the viewpoint of efficiency, the most important
characteristic of this model is an increased judicial involvement in making
2. The idea of fresh start, which is perhaps the basis for the bankruptcy of individuals,
is irrelevant in corporate bankruptcy, since one can always replace one corporate charter
with another. Even the preservation of some unique value embedded in a defined set of
assets, the "going concern value" of a business, need not be accomplished within a
particular company. See Randal C. Picker, Voluntary Petitions and the Creditors' Bargain,
61 U. CiN. L. REV. 519, 521 (1992) (explaining the difference in goals for individuals and
business entities in bankruptcy).
3. An economically distressed firm is characterized as a firm for which operating
expenses exceed operating revenues, thus inefficiently draining the economy. Michelle J.
White, Corporate Bankruptcy, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 483, 486 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
4. A restructuring of the firm's capital means either postponement of debt payments,
cancellation of debt, conversion of debt into equity interests, or any combination of the
three. See MARK J. ROE, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION AND BANKRUPTCY 78-79 (2000).
5. Bankruptcy systems try to minimize the number of type-I errors, which occur when
inefficient firms are saved, and the number of type-Il errors, which occur when efficient
firms are shut down. See Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device:
Chapter 11 Reorganizations and Out-Of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
268, 269 (1994) (describing why type-I and type-II errors inevitably occur); Michelle J.
White, Does Chapter 11 Save Economically Inefficient Firms?, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1319,
1319 (1994) [hereinafter M. White, Does Chapter 11] (describing the difficulty of
determining which firms are economically inefficient).
6. This Article's point of origin is the assumption that the government's intervention in
the process of a firm's deterioration towards insolvency-an intervention that goes hand in
hand with expropriation of a firm's autonomous decision-making power-is necessary.
Such an assumption rejects the argument that the ex ante allocation of control rights over the
assets of the firm among its investors is sufficient to assure that redeployment decisions are
optimal. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55
STAN. L. REV. 751, 778 (2002) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, The End] (arguing that if
control rights are given to investors correctly, the decision to shutdown will be in the hands
of those with the best information and incentives to make the decision). This need for a
carefully designed arrangement for the allocation of control rights is adopted as a starting
point. Thus, the question to be answered is how to devise, within the confines of the
collective procedure, an optimal decision-making mechanism to accomplish the
redeployment task.
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the redeployment decision. This involvement is often criticized as
contaminating the decision-making process, since the bankruptcy judge is
not a market agent. Corporate bankruptcy literature describes a second
market-oriented model, the "Residual Owner Model," which bases
decision-making on tracking down-or according to several variations of
this model, even "creating"-the firm's residual owner, and trusting him
with the power to make any decisions regarding the redeployment of the
assets of the firm. This description of the two decision-making models is
universal: legal systems around the world seem to employ either the
Administrative Model or the Residual Owner Model, or a variation of the
two.
In this Article, I will introduce a third approach to the redeployment
decision, which is based upon the following reasoning: the purpose of the
government's corporate bankruptcy expropriation of shareholders'
decision-making power regarding a firm's assets could be viewed as an
attempt to transfer this power to a unique decision-maker. The designated
decision-maker is a market agent whose improved position relative to other
agents-his comparative advantage-renders him a superior decision-
maker. I will refer to him as "the Better Positioned Agent" ("BPA"). This
new approach calls for the BPA to be conferred with the power to decide
what to do with the firm's capital and human assets. The only problem
with assigning such an agent this task is that, like all other agents involved
in the corporate bankruptcy event, his incentives are not properly aligned to
maximize overall wealth; this is why corporate bankruptcy law needs to
interfere. The BPA approach reflects an attempt to incorporate important
insights from the two existing models, the Administrative Model and the
Residual Owner Model, in order to construct an improved decision-making
process. While the new approach assumes that decision-making occurs
within a basically administrative setting-a mandatory collective procedure
run by a bankruptcy court-it nevertheless suggests a way to allocate
decision-making power to the market.
The BPA approach is innovative in several respects as a decision-
making mechanism for corporate bankruptcy settings. First, the new
approach treats corporate bankruptcy decision-making as a process that
stretches over time rather than a single event in time. Thus, corporate
bankruptcy decision-making consists of several relevant phases during
which lawmakers can intervene. Moreover, the new approach
demonstrates that corporate bankruptcy's redeployment decision-making
can start prior to the initiation of a formal bankruptcy procedure. Second,
the new approach acknowledges that achieving optimal allocation of the
distressed firm's assets requires the fulfillment of several different tasks
during the various decision-making phases. Thus, several market agents
should be sequentially involved in promoting the efficient deployment of
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the firm's assets. Finally, the new approach emphasizes greater reliance
upon market mechanisms not only to dominate formal bankruptcy efforts to
cope with corporate financial distress, but also to altogether reduce the role
played by formal bankruptcy procedures-whether these procedures
employ market mechanisms or not-in overcoming problems of corporate
financial distress.
7
The new approach, much like the two prevailing models that precede
it, is of course only an imperfect solution. Yet acknowledging its existence
could, and should, introduce corporate bankruptcy lawmakers to the
problem of which model of three-rather than which model of two-is the
best solution. Moreover, acknowledging the existence of the new approach
fully exposes some of corporate bankruptcy's actual trade-offs. For
example, lawmakers need not compare only the costs of entrusting a judge
with the redeployment decision-the Administrative Model-against the
costs of auctioning the firm-the Residual Owner Model; but may also add
to the comparison the agency costs engendered when utilizing a better
positioned market agent.
I will demonstrate the feasibility of the new approach in the context of
a dominant secured creditor of a small- to medium-sized firm as a better
positioned agent during the period of time prior to the commencement of
the formal bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, this Article offers several new
insights concerning the treatment of secured creditors in corporate
bankruptcy settings and the efficiency rationale justifying erosion of their
absolute priority over other creditors. Current literature has already
recognized the importance of creating incentives to drive dominant secured
creditors to take wealth-increasing actions when maintaining a borrowing
relationship with the firm; in general and on the eve of bankruptcy in
particular.' Literature has also recognized an efficiency rationale for
eroding the secured creditor's full priority over unsecured creditors in cases
of the borrowing firm's bankruptcy. 9 It has been argued that eroding the
secured creditor's full priority will, among other things, induce more
monitoring of firm behavior. Still, current literature has failed to fully
identify the exact way in which a secured creditor, with certain superior
skills, can improve efficiency in corporate bankruptcy settings. Thus, this
Article suggests that dominant secured creditors of small- to medium-sized
firms should, more than anything, be encouraged to curtail the length of
7. The Better Positioned Agent approach is demonstrated in one particular context,
leaving attempts to theorize about other contexts to future research. The adoption of the
new approach is advocated in a context which considers the secured creditor as a BPA and
concerns the period of time prior to the firm's default. This context is unique because
applying the new theory at this context can comfortably fit either a pure "Administrative"
Modeled bankruptcy procedure or any market-oriented alternative.
8. See infra Part IV.B. 1.
9. See id.
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any future formal bankruptcy procedure by gathering information and
inducing a turnaround process.
More importantly, notwithstanding the exact task to be performed by
the secured creditor, current literature has thus far failed to recognize that a
problem of asymmetric information exists between the secured creditor-
suspected to have been a better positioned agent and to have possessed
superior skills-and any social planner attempting to stimulate proficient
secured creditors to take wealth-increasing action. Introducing this new
insight sheds light upon the efficiency considerations that affect wealth
when dominant secured creditors are encouraged to enhance their
monitoring activity, or to increase their influence over the behavior of the
borrowing-firm. Simply put, in the bankruptcy world in which only two
types of secured creditors exist-those who, by the time a formal
bankruptcy procedure commences, have generated a BPA surplus, and
those who, by the time a formal bankruptcy procedure commences, have
not generated any BPA surplus-it is impossible to ascertain ex post
facto-by the time a formal bankruptcy procedure commences and the
secured creditor's behavior should be sanctioned-whether a particular
secured creditor in any given case belongs to the former type or to the latter
type. Indeed, sometimes secured creditors are not equipped to take wealth-
increasing action, and sometimes there is simply no surplus to be generated
by their action. But sometimes secured creditors are well equipped, and a
possible surplus does exist, but secured creditors do not have the
appropriate incentive to invest in generating the surplus. Being unable to
discern between the two types of secured creditors when a formal
bankruptcy commences and secured creditors' actions should have already
been taken becomes a burden on efficiency, both from an ex post
perspective and from an ex ante perspective. The social engineer-or other
creditors, if bankruptcy is considered in a contractual framework-cannot
appropriately appreciate efforts by secured creditors to generate a possible
BPA surplus, cannot contract in advance with secured creditors to generate
any possible BPA surplus, and hence cannot induce secured creditors to
create any possible BPA surplus. The result is, in asymmetric information
terms, "a lemon's market," in which only non-BPAs inhabit the market.
In this context of utilizing secured creditors against the backdrop of an
asymmetric information problem, this Article suggests that the law can and
should offer a screening mechanism to overcome this problem. To be sure,
screening secured creditors in order to distinguish between secured
creditors who, with regard to any particular firm, have taken action to
increase overall wealth from secured creditors who have not done so,
enables the carving of a legal rule that induces only efficient secured
creditor action. Such a rule thus addresses problems of over- and under-
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investment by secured creditors in fulfilling the BPA task.'0 In addition,
being able to separate BPAs from non-BPAs minimizes the adverse ex ante
effects attributed to any erosion of secured creditors' full priority, as certain
secured creditors-BPAs--can actually minimize the erosion of their full
priority. And obviously, once screening of secured creditors' types-as
BPAs or non-BPAs-becomes obtainable, contracting in advance about
this contingency-i.e., the generation of a BPA surplus-also follows.
How is screening of secured creditors who are BPAs from secured
creditors who are non-BPAs to be accomplished? Simply put, the required
screening mechanism is created as a result of eroding the secured creditor's
full priority during the corporate bankruptcy proceeding. In a seminal
work which advocated a regime of partial priority for secured claims,
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have suggested-without addressing the
problem raised here of asymmetric information or the need for a screening
mechanism-two prototype partial priority rules to replace the
conventional full priority rule." First, a "fixed-fraction priority rule,"
which dictates that a pre-determined fixed fraction of the collateral backing
a secured claim-for example, 10%-would be made available to pay the
claims of unsecured creditors. Second, an "adjustable-priority" rule, which
orders that secured claims be accorded priority only over claims of certain
creditors, such as "non-adjusting creditors,"'12 or creditors who have
explicitly agreed to be subordinated. Note that any partial priority rule
applied in bankruptcy only creates a certain screening effect, albeit an
inaccurate one, because applying partial priority rules induces certain
secured creditors to attempt an escape from the partial-priority bankruptcy
regime. Several capable secured creditors-that is, secured creditors who
are BPAs in the sense that they can easily prevent a formal bankruptcy
procedure-can escape the adverse effects of such a procedure in this way.
Yet the screening accomplished by the partial priority rules suggested so
far in literature is not optimal. This Article thus proceeds to introduce a
new, third prototype partial priority rule for bankruptcy procedures-a
10. These problems are generated when lawmakers cannot adapt the legal rule-i.e., set
the exact extent to which full priority is to be eroded-to fit the exact type of secured
creditor.
I1. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried,
Uneasy Case]. See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and A Reply to Critics, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1321 (1997) [hereinafter Bebchuck & Fried, Further Thoughts]
(discussing possible partial priority rules).
12. "Non-adjusting creditors" have been defined as creditors that do not adjust the
terms of their loans to reflect the effect on them of security interests which, under a full
priority regime, completely subordinate the non-adjusting creditors' claims in bankruptcy.
See Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts, supra note 11, at 1295-1304.
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"self-dependent priority rule." This partial priority rule is derived from a
new rationale for eroding secured creditors' priority in a formal bankruptcy
procedure. According to the "self-dependent priority rule," the extent to
which a secured claim is accorded full priority or not depends solely upon
the actions of the secured creditor himself. Indeed, it is argued that instead
of arbitrarily eroding a fixed percentage of the secured creditor's full
priority-and instead of resorting to any other method of full-priority
erosion-the law should focus upon eliminating the protections usually
awarded to secured creditors during a formal bankruptcy procedure.
Corporate bankruptcy law conditions the stay order against the secured
creditor's efforts to foreclose the collateral upon that creditor being
awarded two separate protections by the court: "Adequate Protection"
against an economic or physical depreciation of the collateral, as a result of
risks materializing during the reorganization, such as a fire which erupts
and consumes the collateral, or a change in market value;13 and protection
against temporal or financial depreciation of the collateral-a loss of
interest reflecting the time value of money during the time in which the
collateral is not liquidated.14 Denying secured creditors these protections
13. See 1 I U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (imposing an automatic stay); 1 I
U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (allowing secured creditors relief from the stay to the extent they are
denied "adequate protection of an interest in property .. "); 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2000)
(illustrating the meaning of providing "adequate protection"). Secured creditors have
contracted with the firm to provide it with capital in exchange for a superior entitlement
compared to other claimants in case the firm defaults, and are promised the benefit of
foreclosing and taking away a particular asset of the firm-the collateral-in case such
default occurs. The mere commencement of a formal bankruptcy procedure expropriates
from the secured creditor the right to determine the exact format upon which to withdraw
his claim from the firm, leaving him with a diluted entitlement. This already diluted
entitlement, however, needs to be preserved during reorganization attempts. Because
extending the secured creditor adequate protection is a pre-condition for moving on with a
reorganization, the specific format of the protection-whether by cash payments, by
granting the secured creditor an additional or replacement lien in another asset, or
otherwise-is determined either at the time reorganization is initially undertaken or when
the secured creditor raises such request. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2000). See also I I U.S.C. §
507(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (providing the secured creditor a priority with regard to the
part of the secured claim that ex post turned out to be inadequately protected).
14. Corporate bankruptcy law makes, in this context, a distinction between over-
secured and under-secured creditors. Under-secured creditors are to be denied post-petition
interest, despite the fact that the stay prevents these creditors from foreclosing on the
collateral and reinvesting the proceeds elsewhere. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (holding that an under-secured creditor is
not entitled to compensation for the delay imposed upon him by the stay, which prohibits
him from foreclosing on the collateral as soon as a reorganization procedure commences).
The reasoning for the Court's conclusion in United Savings was not economic. The Court
held that the under-secured creditor owns an "interest in property," but that interest does not
include the right to immediate foreclosure on the collateral. Id. This ruling was subject to
immense criticism, because of the perverse incentives created when only nominal, rather
than real, values of secured claims are protected. Basically, not only does it encourage
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during attempts to reorganize the firm 5 becomes a perfectly accurate
screening mechanism, as the secured creditor's ability to escape the effects
of such a hostile regime becomes directly related to the actions the secured
creditor undertakes in order to curb the length of the formal bankruptcy
procedure. Since time is a variable in both the secured creditor's erosion-
of-priority function and society's loss function, reducing the length of time
the formal bankruptcy procedure requires to come to its completion
decreases the extent to which the secured creditor's priority is eroded, and
also--in immediate direct correlation-society's lOSS. 16 Moreover, under
the terms specified by the "self-dependent priority rule," the secured
creditor can compare the marginal cost of "preventing" another time unit-
for example, an additional day-of the formal bankruptcy procedure with
the marginal benefit of doing so. Thus, this Article offers a contribution to
the ongoing debate regarding the efficiency improvements embedded in
eroding secured creditors' full priority in bankruptcy.
The discussion in this Article accordingly unfolds in two concentric
circles. First, the erosion of secured creditors' protections in bankruptcy is
used to demonstrate a new approach to corporate bankruptcy decision-
making, the Better Positioned Agent (BPA) approach. Second, the Article
agents to push for a collective procedure in order to attain the benefit of an interest-free use
of assets, but it also distorts future-facing investment decisions (in other words, the decision
on how to redeploy the assets of the firm). See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.
Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A
Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
97 (1984); Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditors' Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-
Concern Surplus in Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 287, 347-49
(2003). In contrast to the under-secured creditor, an over-secured creditor is entitled to post-
petition interest on his secured claim as provided by the loan contract between that creditor
and the firm; and up to the value of the collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2000 & Supp. V
2005).
15. In practice, notwithstanding the arguments raised here, bankruptcy courts do not
always award secured creditors the protection against physical depreciation of the collateral.
Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case, supra note 11, at 911-13; James J. White, Death and
Resurrection of Secured Credit, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 139, 143 (2004) [hereinafter
J. White, Death]. First, bankruptcy courts do not always adhere to petitions by secured
creditors to be awarded adequate protection. Second, since awarding adequate protection
relies on estimates made by the bankruptcy court-for example, the probability that a
particular asset serving as collateral shall depreciate in value over time-the court can
produce biased or manipulative estimates, the result of which is abstention from any kind of
ruling that conditions the progress of the reorganization process upon the secured claim
being adequately protected. Notwithstanding the reasons driving it, is this practice
efficient? I will argue in this Article that at least sometimes the practice of denying secured
creditors all protections during a formal bankruptcy proceeding is efficient, as it
corresponds to an opportunity to improve the redeployment of assets of certain financially
distressed firms.
16. Note that any protection the secured creditor enjoys in bankruptcy is paid by lower-
ranking claimants and that society's loss also includes the undesirable effects of a long,
formal bankruptcy procedure upon various agents.
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offers a contribution to the ongoing debate regarding the efficiency
improvements embedded in eroding secured creditors' full priority in
bankruptcy.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the relevant
theoretical framework, as it depicts two possible decision-making models
for corporate bankruptcy settings. First, the Administrative decision-
making Model, currently serving as the prevailing instrument in most
countries, is presented with a discussion of the arguments both for and
against reliance upon this model. Second, the Residual Owner decision-
making model is presented with arguments for and against reliance upon
this model. Part III introduces the contours of a third new approach to
striking the redeployment decision. The new approach assigns the
bankruptcy court with the ability to allocate decision-making power to
several agents, according to each agent's comparative advantage during
different periods in time. The advantages of the Better Positioned Agent
model are then briefly surveyed. Part IV demonstrates the feasibility of the
Better Positioned Agent approach in one context, that which concerns a
dominant secured creditor's ability to dominate the redeployment of assets
of a small- to medium-sized firm prior to the commencement of a
collective bankruptcy procedure. This Part begins with a depiction of the
relevant economic background. Then, the focus shifts to utilizing the
secured creditor as a better positioned agent. Previous attempts by scholars
to describe the secured creditor as a superior decision-maker, as well as
prior arguments concerning the idea that the secured creditor's full priority
should be eroded for that end, are reviewed. Having defined a new task for
the secured creditor, which is relevant to enhancing the efficiency of
corporate bankruptcy decision-making, three impediments to employing
the secured creditor to accomplish that task are discussed: first, the
inherent problem of asymmetric information that burdens the utilization of
the secured creditor as a BPA, along the screening solution which
lawmakers can adopt to solve the problem; second, the prospect of
employing a secured creditor of financially distressed firms as a BPA; and
third, the ex post and ex ante costs of employing the secured creditor as a
BPA and eroding its priority in bankruptcy.
II. Two PREVAILING REDEPLOYMENT MODELS
A. Administrative Decision-Making
1. The Model
The most prevalent model of a mandatory redeployment decision-
making mechanism is the court-supervised corporate bankruptcy
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reorganization procedure. The classic example is the American Chapter
11, the most celebrated administrative bankruptcy procedure. The
Administrative Model's roots are found in a bankruptcy model of purely
administrative nature, according to which one person alone, the bankruptcy
judge, makes all relevant decisions, including those regarding the
redeployment of the firm's assets. In its more modem form, the model
focuses on a process for obtaining a redeployment decision, which is
initiated either voluntarily or involuntarily, 7 and managed under the
auspices of a stay imposed on all claimants' individual collection efforts
against the firm.' 8 According to the Administrative Model, the initiation of
a bankruptcy procedure marks the commencement of an interim period
during which the redeployment decision is contemplated. The luxury of
this time period is sometimes made possible by an injection of new
financing that allows the firm to continue operating its business. A court-
appointed agent, either incumbent management1 9 or a trustee, manages the
firm's business.2 0 But, most importantly, during this interim time period,
the bankruptcy court may enable and encourage structured bargaining
among classes 21 of the firm's claimants.2 2  Such bargaining is meant to
produce a decision regarding the redeployment of the firm's assets; but, as
17. Voluntary initiation of bankruptcy originates in the firm. In the United States
involuntary petitions of bankruptcy are discouraged in various ways. As a result, few cases
are initiated involuntarily. See Michelle J. White, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A
U.S.-European Comparison, in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 467, 469 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss eds., 1996) [hereinafter
M. White, Costs].
18. Under the terms of Chapter 11, the stay is automatic. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005). In other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, the bankruptcy judge
enjoys discretion to impose a stay or not. See Insolvency Act, 1986 § 8(1). In this respect
alone, the latter regime is more vulnerable to weaknesses to be immediately specified.
19. Chapter 11 usually entrusts the formulation of a reorganization plan for cases which
are not "small business" solely in the hands of the debtor in possession for a period of 120
days, followed by an additional 60 day period designated to allow the debtor in possession
to obtain claimants' acceptance of the plan, and then further extensions if deemed necessary.
This is the "exclusivity period." See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). A trustee is
appointed to replace incumbent management only in cases of fraud, dishonesty,
incompetence or gross mismanagement by these managers, or when the interests of creditors
and equity holders mandate such an appointment. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000).
Nevertheless, when sent to liquidation under Chapter 7, a trustee is appointed, although he
might hire the old managers. See 11 U.S.C. § 721 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
20. Under the terms of Chapter 11, incumbent management is usually left to run the
firm, and is called a "debtor in possession." See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1107 (2000).
21. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
22. For example, one requirement for reorganization is that at least one class of
impaired claimants accepts the reorganization plan. See II U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2000).
Fulfillment of this requirement indicates that some "give and take" occurred among
claimants. See David T. Brown, Claimholder Incentive Conflicts in Reorganization: The
Role of Bankruptcy Law, 2 REv. FIN. STUD. 109 (1989) (providing a more formal treatment
of the reorganization game).
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reality dictates, bargaining also concerns the question of distribution of
existing and future-generated value expected to be derived from the new
redeployment decision. The negotiated scheme combines a decision
regarding redeployment and a capital restructuring decision, and is then put
forward as "a reorganization plan." A typical scheme reflects a painful
capital restructuring decision: most classes of claimants are to receive only
a fraction of their claims. Thus, under the terms of the Administrative
Model, reorganization, rather than liquidation alone,23 of the financially
distressed firm is permitted by the court; but it is conditioned upon
acceptance of the reorganization plan by each class of the firm's claimants
in a supermajority vote.2 4 In other words, the firm's claimants collectively,
and roughly, refine a redeployment decision. 5
Judicial intervention is an important component of the model and is
exercised throughout the process of running the collective procedure.26
Special mechanisms are implemented in order to increase chances that a
good decision will be made by the judge;27 nevertheless, it is ultimately the
judge's decision. For example, the final decision on whether or not to
allow reorganization is entrusted solely to the bankruptcy judge, who can
convert a Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 case.28 Consider another example:
at the end of the process, under certain conditions, the court possesses the
power to either disqualify a reorganization plan, if the plan had been
23. The existence of a liquidation path is undisputable, and indeed all countries have a
liquidation alternative, which means the firm is sold for cash, either as an ongoing concern
or piecemeal. In the United States, liquidation is usually carried out under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The only question troubling lawmakers around the world is whether
another alternative should exist besides liquidation, i.e., reorganization.
24. For example, Chapter 11 requires approval by each class of creditors by a majority
of holders of at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed
claims. Shareholders need to approve the plan in a majority of two-thirds of the shares. A
class left unimpaired under a plan, and each of its members, are presumed to have accepted
the plan. A class of creditors is deemed not to have accepted a plan if such plan provides
that the class receives no value whatsoever. See II U.S.C. § 1126 (2000).
25. Each claimant's estimate of what a good redeployment would constitute, which is
based on the information he holds, contributes to a collective decision; however, the process
is manipulated by those holding the right to propose a reorganization plan. The more
complicated it is to construct a plan, the more "take it or leave it" the plan becomes.
Changing details within a plan would delay the process, and thus increase its costs.
26. Cf Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 356 (2001) (discussing why having a bankruptcy judge control the
reorganization process is not ideal).
27. For example, the judge is required to make sure that secured creditors, whose
individual collection efforts against the secured assets are stayed in order to allow a
reorganization to succeed, are awarded "adequate protection". See supra notes 14-15 and
accompanying text. Protecting the true value of the securities is a mechanism that assures
that only firms which need to be maintained as a going concern would enter the process of
reorganization.
28. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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rejected by some of the firm's impaired claimants,29 or confirm a plan
despite overflowing objection.30 An example of the first category, which
mandates exclusion of a proposed plan and is found in the Chapter 1 1 case,
is established in case a plan is rejected by a class of creditors that is made
worse off under the terms of the plan compared to the result of a
hypothetical liquidation of the firm's assets.3' Another statutory cause for
non-confirmation of a plan under Chapter 11 emerges when a proposed
plan "freezes out" a non-consenting class of creditors. A reorganization
plan "freezes out" an impaired class of creditors that voted to reject it when
the plan does not adhere to the absolute priority rule; value is extended
according to the plan to a lower-ranking class, despite the fact that the
opposing higher-ranking class is not being paid 
in full.3 2
On the other hand, the court can use a variety of means to bring about
the approval of a plan despite eminent objections to it. A "cram down" on
a class of objecting creditors is an option.
33 In other jurisdictions, the good
faith requirement of a claimant's vote, for example, can serve to squash a
single creditor's objection to a plan. Finally, courts possess informal
means. For example, they can manipulate the process of classification of
claimants for voting purposes and the judge's personality can significantly
affect the redeployment decision.3 4  Bankruptcy judges often consider
themselves captains of a periled ship, with navigation to the safe shore of
continuation of the firm's business being their ultimate goal.
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (discussing the conditions of when
claims are to be considered impaired).
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). The plan can of course be
unanimously confirmed. In other words, two plan confirmation paths are available: the first
is a unanimous consent path, and the second is a confirmation path called a "cram down."
31. This is the "best interests test." See 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(7) (2000) (creating
protection for individual dissenting claimants). Estimating what a liquidation of the firm
would generate requires the court to evaluate the firm's assets.
32. This is the "fair and equitable" requirement, satisfaction of which can enable the
court to "cram down" on a class of impaired creditors objecting to a proposed plan. See §§
1129(a)(8), 1129(b). Another important requirement under the bankruptcy code is the
feasibility of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). A requirement
(related to adherence to the absolute priority rule) which does not exist under the American
Bankruptcy code is that a senior class does not receive more than full payment of its debt
when lower classes are not paid in full.
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). See also Kenneth N. Klee, All
You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979).
34. See Jocelyn Evans, The Effect of Discretionary Actions on Small Firms' Ability to
Survive Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 115 (2003) (describing how some pro-
creditor decisions, especially a decision to reduce the exclusivity period, in the
reorganization of closely-held firms tend to decide the outcomes of an Administrative
Modeled bankruptcy). A judge's pro-creditor inclination was found to reduce the chances
of the firm to survive. Id.
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However, in the absence of unanimous claimants' consent on any
future step within bankruptcy, and in order to evoke or reject any grounds35
for judicial intervention either in the process of granting a non-automatic
stay or in the integrity of the bargaining process or the bargained plan, the
supervising court needs to conduct a very difficult, expensive, and error-
prone preliminary inquiry to determine the firm's value.36 The court needs
to evaluate, sometimes on an almost daily basis,37 the prospects of the firm.
This is the problem of judicial valuation.38 The difficulty in performing
such a task is explained:
Valuing a firm's assets is a tricky business. One must project
how much income can be derived from the assets in their current
use and alternative uses and discount all these to present value.
The value of assets may depend on much that is uncertain. It
may also depend on information that is hard to obtain. As a
result, third parties may underestimate a firm's chances for
success. On the other hand, they may overestimate them.39
Valuation is the key element in performing the task of judicial
supervision of the reorganization process, since the value attached to the
firm determines where, down the rank of claimants, it is necessary to stop
and wipe out all lower ranking claims.40 This seemingly simple decision,
which claim should be discharged and not survive the reorganization, lies
at the basis of every redeployment conflict among claimholders. Indeed, if
the firm were to be liquidated rather than reorganized, this conflict would
disappear because the revenues collected from selling the firm's assets to a
third-party buyer in liquidation would be distributed to the firm's claimants
35. Consider the requirement that the reorganization plan adhere to the absolute priority
rule. A reorganization plan might award shareholders of the firm shares in the reorganizing
firm, even though unsecured creditors receive nothing, in exchange for an infusion of new
value to the reorganizing firm. Indeed, sometimes shareholders' participation is a condition
for the added value of reorganization to be captured. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav.
Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999). Since non-bankruptcy rights need
to be preserved, and freeze-out of unsecured creditors is precluded, the court must engage in
evaluating the firm's worth in a liquidation scenario.
36. Knowing how much the firm is worth is necessary in order to also decide the value
of each creditor's claim against the firm; for example, to examine what a creditor would
receive in liquidation. See Royce De R. Barondes, Reorganizations and Stochastic
Collateral Value, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 193, 194-95 (2002).
37. When the stay is granted upon discretion, its length depends on the court's decision,
and hesitating courts might postpone their final redeployment decision by granting a stay for
the interim period, while waiting for further information and developments.
38. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 127, 143-44 (1986) [hereinafter Baird, The Uneasy Case] (describing a
valuation problem regarding intangibles).
39. Id. at 136.
40. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101
HARV. L. REV. 775, 778 (1988) [hereinafter Bebchuk, New Approach].
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according to the absolute priority rule, and holders of "underwater claims"
would receive nothing and be wiped out as a matter of course. Liquidation
thus supplies an objective number, that of the market, to represent the value
of the firm. Reorganization, the hypothetical sale of the firm to its
claimholders, necessitates either a bargained or a judicial subjective
decision regarding the firm's value, which in turn decides whose claim is
not to be exchanged for rights ("tickets") against the new reorganized
firM.
4 1
Also, even if no judicial involvement occurs, the difficulties of
valuing the firm manifest in the bargaining process. Even if all
claimholders have their interests aligned, they have to make a very difficult
redeployment decision together, which depends on their estimate of
whether the decline in the value of the firm and its cash flow is temporary,
in a manner solvable by capital restructuring, or permanent, in a manner
that requires a major change of operations including a possible complete
shut down.42  Matters are only made worse when the interests of the
negotiating parties are not aligned, as is often the case, and information and
agency problems encumber the process of making such a decision.
43 To
demonstrate the former problem, note that although firms in bankruptcy
must comply with certain disclosure requirements, they sometimes cease,
on the one hand, to supply investors with audited financial statements,
while on the other hand, managers have a clear incentive to supply only
positive information on the firm or interpret information in a positive
manner.
44
The American Chapter 11 is, as already mentioned, a classic example
for an Administrative decision-making Model. But a similar model is
commonly found in many Western countries as well, although it differs in
form and detail.
2. The Case against Administrative Decision-Making
Scholars have been arguing for over fifteen years about the
shortcomings of the Administrative Model. First of all, running an
administrative bankruptcy procedure has been shown to take too much
41. Id.
42. See Lawrence A. Weiss & Karen H. Wruck, Information Problems, Conflicts of
Interest, and Asset Stripping: Chapter 11 's Failure in the Case of Eastern Airlines, 48 J.
FIN. ECON. 55, 57 (1998).
43. See Karen Hopper Wruck, Financial Distress, Reorganization, and Organizational
Efficiency, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 419, 422-24 (1990). See also infra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text.
44. See Weiss & Wruck, supra note 42, at 57-58.
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time. 45  While reorganizing the firm might cut the time and expenses
needed to find buyers for the firm's assets,46 the reorganization process
itself requires significant time and expense.47 Bargaining among claimants
is conducted for two diverse issues: redeployment and distribution.4 ' The
issue of waiving special bankruptcy protections awarded by the court is
also subject to bargaining. 49 These features manifest in a lengthy and tiring
process of negotiations, which involves substantial dickering and
haggling-all derived from conflicting incentives°-resulting in immense
45. The average time spent by large, publicly-held firms in bankruptcy was found to be
18 months. See Edward I. Altman, Evaluating the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy-Reorganization
Process, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1993) (describing how smaller firms complete
the bankruptcy process quicker than larger firms). See also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble
with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 729, 744 n.65. (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki, Trouble].
46. See Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 38, at 140-41.
47. See Ulrich Hege, Workouts, Court-Supervised Reorganization and the Choice
Between Private and Public Debt, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 233, 254-55 (2003).
48. See Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & EcON. 633,634
(1993) [hereinafter Baird, Revisiting]. Some have argued that this failure of the
Administrative Model to separate the issues of how to reorganize and how much each claim
should be reduced is the main cause for a worldwide common dissatisfaction with
Administrative Model bankruptcy laws. See Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 858-61 (1994) [hereinafter
Aghion et al., Improving] (asserting that one of the biggest problems with bankruptcy laws
is that it miscalculates how the reorganization process should be conducted); Oliver Hart et
al., A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions, 41 EUR. ECON. REV. 461, 463
(1997) (arguing that the main reason for the worldwide dissatisfaction with bankruptcy laws
is the inability of the laws to separate issues of liquidation efficiency and distribution).
However, a different view of the bargaining process argues that the subject of negotiations
is not the question of whether to liquidate or reorganize, but rather, is only the question of
distributions. See Samuel L. Bufford, What is Right about Bankruptcy Law and What is
Wrong about Its Critics, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 844-45 (1994).
49. See Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 38, at 145 (noting that from an economic
viewpoint, bargaining over bankruptcy rights rather than substantive rights, is a total waste).
50. Shareholders have an incentive to argue that the firm is merely suffering from
temporary financial distress but is economically viable because they would like the agreed-
upon value of the firm to increase, thus enabling them to be part of the reorganization;
creditors would like to reorganize without the shareholders so they argue that the firm is
economically non-viable and of low value. Managers would side with the party less likely
to fire them. To illustrate, assume that before entering bankruptcy the firm owed $7 million
to secured creditors and $7 million to unsecured creditors. Assume further that the
suggested reorganization plan would include the issuance to claimants of equity in the new,
reorganizing firm in exchange for pre-bankruptcy debt. Secured creditors would like the
firm to be valued at $7 million or less (lines #1 or #2 in the table). At that value they would
obtain ownership over the entire reorganized firm. Unsecured creditors would like the firm
to be valued at exactly $14 million (line #4 in the table), thus enabling them to receive the
maximum of 50% of the shares of the reorganizing firm. Shareholders would like the firm
to be valued as high as possible (line #6 in the table). See, e.g., Wruck, supra note 43, at
422-24.
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time-dependent procedural costs. 5' Manipulation and game playing by the
negotiating parties are ubiquitous. 52 A severe agency problem manifests
itself when lawyers and other professionals, whose compensation increases
with the length of the collective procedure, have little incentive to push for
a swift process. 53  A recent study illustrating this problem revealed that
Chapter 7 cases last almost as long as Chapter 11 cases.
54
A survey conducted by the airline industry provides an interesting
indication of the poor performances of bankrupt firms involved in court-
supervised procedures.55 A sample of commercial aircraft transactions
conducted from 1978 to 1991, consisting of twenty-seven major United
States airlines, eight of which went bankrupt, showed that bankrupt airlines
sold assets at greater discounts-averaging between 14% and 46
0%--than
distressed but non-bankrupt carriers.5
6 Furthermore, in this context, no
significant differences were found in discounts offered within
reorganization proceedings compared to discounts offered within
liquidation proceedings. 57 This supports the contention that reorganization
is preferable to liquidation. One might argue then, that the firm's formal
# Firm Value (in Secured creditors' Unsecured Shareholders %
millions) % of reorganized creditors' % of of reorganized
firm reorganized firm firm
1 $3 100% 0% 0%
2 $7 100% 0% 0%
3 $10 70% 30% 0%
4 $14 50% 50% 0%
5 $16 43.75% 43.75% 12.5%
6 $20 35% 35% 30%
51. Indeed, as Professor Baird said, "The greatest weakness of a corporate
reorganization may be what is often advanced as its greatest strength-that it promotes
bargaining .... Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 38, at 145. See also Ben Branch,
Streamlining the Bankruptcy Process, 27 FIN. MGMT. 57, 57 (1998) (illustrating the
difficulties: "Anyone who has served on a creditors' committee in a large bankruptcy will
understand the contentious nature of the current process. The debtor is likely to be
suspicious of the creditors and reluctant to share nonpublic information. Different creditor
groups are suspicious of each other and the debtor. Lawyers are hired to check the work of
other lawyers. Accountants are hired to check the work of other accountants. Investment
bankers look over each other's shoulders. Everyone negotiates for maximum individual
advantage. Making the pie larger gets lost in the process of fighting over how to divide it.").
52. See Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 38, at 128.
53. Baird remarked that under current Chapter 11 law, the duties of those in control of
the firm are not adequately defined. See Baird, Revisiting, supra note 48, at 640-41, 645.
54. See Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7
Liquidation versus Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1301 (2006).
55. See Todd C. Pulvino, Effects of Bankruptcy Court Protection on Asset Sales, 52 J.
FIN. ECON. 151, 151-52 (1999).
56. See id. at 153, 155, 178-79.
57. See id. at 179.
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in-bankruptcy status by itself not only attracts opportunistic buyers with
"seductive" low offers, but might also influence the business judgment of
decision-makers.
Second, it had been argued that the Administrative Model is
inefficient because of its reliance on the subjective valuation of the firm. It
has been particularly argued that judges, who enjoy a great deal of
discretion58 and whose involvement is crucial,5 9 are relatively ill equipped
to cope with the question of valuation. In light of judges' immense
responsibility and their tremendous influence on the process of
redeployment in bankruptcy, one would expect most bankruptcy judges to
be experts in business strategy and valuation or be able to master evidence
from outside experts and the market.6" However, most judges are often
neither.6'
But the problem is deeper. Judges do not put their money at stake
when performing the valuation inquiry.6 2 Therefore, they lack the incentive
that drives a third-party buyer of the firm's assets who will bear all of the
consequences of value estimates. 61 Moreover, judges are not submitted to
the market's natural screening process that market agents are, where only
those making good decisions survive.64  Absent similar competitive
constraints, such as those imposed on market agents, judges are more likely
to underestimate risks. 65 Furthermore, "judges ... are considerably more
58. See In re Evans Prods. Co., 65 B.R. 870, 875-76 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (illustrating the
discretion judges have in evaluating a debtor's worth). See also William C. Whitford,
What's Right about Chapter 11, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379, 1402 (1994) (giving examples of
judges' discretions during a bankruptcy proceeding).
59. See Stuart C. Gilson, Edith S. Hotchkiss & Richard S. Ruback, Valuation of
Bankrupt Firms, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 43, 44 (2000) (indicating that "[i]n practice, both
valuation hearings and competing [reorganization] plans are relatively uncommon in large
public company bankruptcies. In general, the cash flow forecasts and the values they imply
arise from judicial weighting of competing economic interests.").
60. See Weiss & Wruck, supra note 42, at 59.
61. This problem worsens in countries whose judicial systems are inefficient or corrupt,
or whose bankruptcy laws are underdeveloped and vague. See Hart et al., supra note 48, at
463.
62. See Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 38, at 136-37.
63. See id. at 136.
64. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 26, at 366-67. See also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 100 (1991) ("Judges
are neither chosen for business acumen nor fired or subject to reductions in salary if they err
in assessing business situations.").
65. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 220-21
(1986). See also Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 38, at 137 n.14 (arguing that
bankruptcy judges have tended to overvalue firms in bankruptcy); Douglas G. Baird,
Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 587 n.40 (1998) (relying on the
Endowment Effect and cognitive psychology literature to support the argument). A debate
regarding judges' competence to implement bankruptcy policies also has taken the form of a
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susceptible to judgment errors in complex disclosure disputes, where the
allegedly misleading information is 'soft,' speculative, or predictive in
nature. 66  Sympathy towards claimants holding underwater claims
stimulates judges to overvalue firms.67  Finally, judges are compelled to
avoid actual events and sources of information, as they do not participate in
actual negotiations or converse privately with the parties.
68
Judges are therefore less likely than market agents-buyers or
shareholders-to value the firm "correctly." 69 Even if judges are assumed
to surpass feeding on information supplied to them by experts and
interested parties in an adversarial context, it is still hard to acknowledge
any kind of advantage enjoyed by judges, simply because it is possible that
these information sources themselves are not perfect.70
The inaccuracy of judicial valuation is enhanced by a problematic
supply of information, limited both in amount and quality, due to
deteriorating market involvement in its provision.71 For example, shares of
publicly-held firms in bankruptcy are often not traded during bankruptcy,
72
and equity analysts reduce their coverage of firms in formal bankruptcy.73
In a study exploring the relation between the market value of sixty-three
publicly traded firms emerging from Chapter 11, the dispersion of
valuation errors was found to be very wide-the sample ratio of estimated
value to market value varied from less than 20% to greater than 250%. 74 In
proceduralist versus traditionalist controversy. See Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in
Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIz. L. REV. 559 (2001).
66. Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1957 (2001). Even
impartial adjudicators may err in such contexts, having first to reconstruct and interpret the
often-technical language that attends such disclosures and then to assess the ultimate
accuracy of such statements long after the fact. These tasks are not easy for judges and
juries, who generally possess neither technical familiarity with the underlying issues nor any
direct knowledge of the actual context in which the initial disclosures were made. See
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 571, 572-76 (1998) (describing problems of hindsight bias that frequently plague
retrospective legal assessments on technical matters).
67. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate
Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 547-48 (1983).
68. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 26, at 367.
69. See Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
319, 326 (1991) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Efficiency] ("It is hard to believe that judges can
outguess the New York Stock Exchange regarding the value of distressed companies. If
they can, they are in the wrong line of work and should be stock traders.").
70. See id. For example, even if sources of information differ in reliability, the judge
cannot distinguish among them. Note, however, that this last argument might prove the
general case for preferring a market decision-making mechanism and not merely highlight
judges' shortcomings in valuing distressed firms.
71. See Gilson et al., supra note 59, at 45.
72. See id. at 60.
73. See id. at 61-63.
74. See id. at 44-45.
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other words, the valuation estimates of these firms were quite imprecise,
more like "a guess compounded by an estimate. 75
A third deficiency identified by scholars in administrative
bankruptcies is demonstrated by distributional tendencies, such as
violation of the absolute priority rule in reorganization plans approved by
courts.
77 The most observed violation occurs when equity holders receive
value according to the plan, despite the fact that more senior creditors are
not paid in full." Indeed, redistribution of wealth in bankruptcy is ever-
present. However, the efficiency of absolute priority rule violations, which
generally occur because the system encourages settlement, 9 is a source of
controversy. 80 Empirical analysis is inconclusive regarding whether the
involvement of bankruptcy judges in the process of reorganization
facilitates deviations from the absolute priority rule.8'
A fourth weakness purported by scholars emanates from the fact that,
in some legal systems' administrative procedures, a firm's management is
75. Lynn M. LoPucki, Comment: Stakeholder Interests and Bankruptcy, 43 U.
TORONTO L.J. 711, 712 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki, Comment].
76. See Thomas H. Jackson, Comment on Baird, "Revisiting Auctions In Chapter 11
36 J.L. & EcON. 655, 656-57 (1993).
77. See Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, Lessons from a Comparison of US and
UK Insolvency Codes, 8 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'v. 70, 79-80 (1992); Hege, supra note 47,
at 256-57; Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, 4 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 13, 29-31 (1991).
78. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate
Bankruptcy, 44 EUR. ECON. REV. 829, 833 (2000) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Using Options].
79. See Francesca Cornelli & Leonardo Felli, Ex-Ante Efficiency of Bankruptcy
Procedures, 41 EUR. ECON. REv. 475, 480-81 (1997) (discussing differences in this context
between Britain's bankruptcy system and America's Chapter 11 process). These systems
differ with regard to the identity of the person proposing the reorganization plan. Under the
terms of Chapter 11, junior claimholders may offer a plan to which senior claimholder can
agree or disagree. According to British law, however, senior claimholders make all offers,
to which junior claimholders can agree or disagree. Id.
80. See Aghion et al., Improving, supra note 48, at 853-54 (explaining the desirability
of absolute priority rules); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute
Priority in Bankruptcy, 57 J. FIN. 445 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuck, Ex Ante Costs]
(arguing that absolute priority rules have negative effects on decisions made by shareholders
ex ante). For example, deviating from the absolute priority rule might mitigate: (a) the
shareholder's incentive to delay the firm's entrance to the collective procedure and curb
redeployment; and (b) the impetus to gamble the firm's assets on the eve of bankruptcy. See
also Paul Povel, Optimal "Soft" or "Tough " Bankruptcy Procedures, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
659, 661, 679 (1999) (claiming that a bankruptcy law is optimal if it would replicate the
optimal contract between parties in a transaction-cost-free environment and that either tough
or soft procedures have potential to meet that condition, while noting that mixed procedures
might be worse than either of those pure processes).
81. See Evans, supra note 34, at 127 (showing how pro-creditor decisions made by
bankruptcy judges increased the likelihood of deviations from the absolute priority rule.
Pro-debtor decisions, on the other hand, were not found to impact the likelihood of such
deviations).
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retained when attempting to reorganize it.8 2  Supporters of this practice
argue that incumbent managers are already familiar with the intricacies of
the firm's production unit; making them better candidates to run the firm
while a proper redeployment path is determined, thereby increasing the
chances of a successful reorganization.83 Others contend, however, that
retained management might abuse creditors and misuse the protections
awarded by the court to make bad investment decisions8 4  Moreover,
managers inherently prefer reorganization of the firm to liquidation, since
reorganization allows them to retain their jobs and effectuate a wealth
transfer from creditors to the firm's shareholders." Furthermore, when
managers represent current shareholders-or when the owners of the firm
manage it-they have an incentive to take high risks and even gamble the
firm's assets8 6  The court's supervision can only slightly mitigate this
tendency.87 In addition, management's inclination to abuse the bankruptcy
procedure is sometimes supported by courts.88
Although management misbehavior should be relevant primarily to
publicly held companies whose ownership and control rights are divided, it
is also a factor that has been presented by Bradley and Rosenzweig as a
justification for a sweeping repeal of Chapter 1 8'9 To prove their point,
Bradley and Rosenzweig present data gathered on companies before and
82. In Chapter 11 terms, the firm's management becomes "debtor in possession". See
supra text accompanying note 19.
83. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case For Chapter 11,
101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1044 (1992); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate
Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 669, 694 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance].
84. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 83, at 1045; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Some
Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance: Bankruptcies and Take-overs, 3 BELL J.
ECON. MGMT. Sci. 458, 471-72, 480 (1972). See also Erica M. Ryland, Bracing for the
"Failure Boom ": Should a Revlon Auction Duty Arise in Chapter 11?, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2255, 2258-63 (1990) (describing the details of legal arrangements under Chapter 11 that
create management agency costs).
85. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 83, at 1045-46; Hege, supra note 47, at 258-59.
86. LoPucki, Trouble, supra note 45, at 732-34. When the firm is insolvent, its owners
stand to gain everything if their gamble succeeds and lose nothing if it fails, since their
shares are nearly worthless when the bet is made. Assume, for example, that the firm has $1
million in assets, and liabilities of $1.2 million. In that case it would be rational from the
owner's perspective to bet the firm's assets on a flip of a coin, even if such a bet were a bad
one from the firm's point of view.
87. Id. at 736-37. For example, the owners can try a new product or a new marketing
concept or fight a worker's union.
88. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11
(1991) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice]. Courts tend to be pro-
management whenever competition over venue of bankruptcy filing arises among
jurisdictions.
89. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 83.
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after Chapter 11 was introduced in 1978 to show that companies filing
under Chapter 11, although financially stronger than those that had filed for
bankruptcy before Chapter 11 was legislated,9" nevertheless demonstrated a
significantly higher percentage of equity losses and debt security value."
Some bankruptcy scholars were quick to respond to this provocative
argument and their reply was decisive: although driven by perverse
incentives to a certain extent, managers are hardly as powerful, or
necessarily as nefarious, as Bradley and Rosenzweig have described
them. 92 Moreover, bankruptcy scholars contend that not only do managers
of financially-distressed firms find no benefit from the reduction in creditor
and shareholder recoveries in Chapter 11 reorganizations;93 they actually
face an ever increasing danger of losing their jobs.94 The data presented by
Bradley and Rosenzweig suggests otherwise, of course, though their
methods of statistical analysis have been challenged.95 Another argument
against their assertions is that managers during bankruptcy are prone to
make poor decisions simply because of heavy conflicting pressures that
paralyze their thought processes, thus their suboptimal decisions do not
clearly evince selfish subterfuge of firm interests.96
90. The previous American bankruptcy regime was dictated by either Chapter X (for
public companies) or Chapter XI (for private companies) of the Chandler Act. Chapter X
required the appointment of a trustee to manage the firm and relied heavily on the Security
Exchange Commission (SEC) to oversee the process. Chapter XI allowed for incumbent
management to remain in office throughout the case, giving the SEC no role.
91. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 83, at 1063.
92. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to
Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REv. 79, 81, 94-97 (1992) [hereinafter
LoPucki, Strange Visions]; Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter
11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992).
93. LoPucki, Strange Visions, supra note 92, at 95.
94. Id. at 95-96 nn.52, 55 (containing a list of relevant studies empirically supporting
the "weak managers" proposition). See also Edith Shwalb Hotchkiss, Postbankruptcy
Performance and Management Turnover, 50 J. FIN. 3 (1995). In addition, new management
hired during reorganization to replace old management was found to align their interests
with those of creditors. See Whitford, supra note 58, at 1383-84.
95. One argument contended that the data presented by Bradley and Rosenzweig was
not only questionably assembled, but can also be explained by the fact that companies
reorganized after 1978 were more leveraged due to the contemporaneous emergence of the
"junk bond" era. See LoPucki, Strange Visions, supra note 92, at 80, 82-94.
96. Whitford, supra note 58, at 1385. Note, however, that once a trustee is appointed to
manage the firm in bankruptcy-or involuntary filing of bankruptcy is taken into
consideration, as the case is in many jurisdictions and sometimes under Chapter 11 -the set
of problems changes. Management misbehavior becomes less of a problem, but another
complication might emerge: that of controlling the trustee who becomes an agent of, at
least, junior creditors. Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 38, at 138. Unlike management,
however, the trustee's reputation might not be closely related to the success or failure of the
firm, rendering the disciplining effect of reputation not as powerful. See id.
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A fifth criticism of the Administrative-based Model concerns the fact
that this method of bankruptcy creates perverse incentives to managers and
claimants. This is because the ownership rights of claimants of an
insolvent firm are not defined by an administrative bankruptcy procedure. 97
This omission prevents an efficient redeployment decision by the residual
owner of the firm,98 notwithstanding the fact that the identity of the residual
owner is highly speculative because the value of the firm is basically
unknown.99 When redeployment is considered, junior claimants holding
"underwater claims" have a strong incentive to delay any possible shut
down of the business, even if it is efficient, since liquidation might leave
them with nothing.'00 In opposition to those parties are senior creditors-
those whose claims are to be paid no matter which course of action is
taken-who have an incentive to push for immediate liquidation.' 0' The
Coase Theorem does not solve these problems because a workout cannot be
accomplished. 102 Thus, agency problems arise when claimants support a
value that destroys reorganization as long as their own share within
reorganization exceeds that expected amount if another redeployment path
97. Comelli & Felli, supra note 79, at 476.
98. Id.
99. Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 38, at 137-38; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of
the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study (UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ. Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 3-11, 2003) [hereinafter LoPucki, The Myth].
100. Aghion et al., Improving, supra note 48, at 859-60. Consider the following
example: senior creditors are owed $100 and the liquidation value of the firm is $90.
Should things go well, reorganizing the firm would yield a value of $120. If things go
badly, however, the firm will be worth $40. The average of those disparate outcomes is
$80, which means that the value-maximizing decision is to liquidate, since $80 < $90.
However, junior creditors have an incentive to push for reorganization, since if things go
well they receive $20, while in liquidation they receive nothing. Thus, they have nothing to
lose from taking a chance on reorganization. A recent study documents this phenomenon.
101. Aghion et al., Improving, supra note 48, at 858-59. This conclusion holds even for
administrative procedures in which control rights are assigned to the secured creditor. See
Julian R. Franks & Kjell N. Nyborg, Control Rights, Debt Structure, and the Loss of Private
Benefits: The Case of the U.K. Insolvency Code, 9 REV. FIN. STUD. 1165, 1198 (1996).
Consider the following example to demonstrate the intuition: senior creditors are owed
$100 and the liquidation value of the firm is $90. Should things go well, reorganizing the
firm would yield a value of $180. But if things go badly, the firm will be worth $40. The
average of those disparate outcomes is $110, which means that the value-maximizing
decision is to reorganize, since $110 > $90. However, senior creditors have an incentive to
push for liquidation, since if things go well they receive $100, whereas if things go poorly
they gamer only $40 (the average being $70, which is less than $90). A recent study
documents the phenomenon.
102. Aghion et al., Improving, supra note 48, at 860-61. In the cases concerning large
firms, there are numerous claimants and negotiations are infected with free-rider and
holdout problems. The issue of information asymmetry among various claimants burdens
the process further. Indeed, the structured bargaining process mitigates the problems that
arise in open bargaining.
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is chosen. °3 Manipulative data released by interested parties, especially
shareholders, thwart the process of reaching a decision on proper
redeployment of the firm's assets. 10 4  When the question of the firm's
valuation is on the bargaining table, for the sake of deciding who should be
included in the distribution of proceeds and whose claims are destined to be
wiped out, contradicting estimates are frequently put forward. Recall that
senior claimants have an incentive to disingenuously underestimate the
firm's value in order to drive junior claimants away from receiving
ownership in the firm's assets, while junior claimants have an incentive to
overestimate the firm's value, thus securing themselves a slice of the
limited value pie. °5 Final valuation is highly dependent on factors such as
the relative bargaining power that the parties enjoy. 0 6 A deadlocked party
will sometimes adopt a valuation of the firm and a reorganization plan that
are unrealistic.'0 7 An illustration of the possible gaps in valuation estimates
is National Gypsum Company's 1993 reorganization, in which
management valued the company at $182 million, while junior claimants
valued the same company at $1 billion.' 8 In this way, adopting inefficient
capital structures generates costs in the post-bankruptcy phase, when the
firm operates under an incompatible capital structure. 0 9
A sixth impediment of administrative bankruptcies lies in the fact that
insolvency, measured objectively, is not always a prerequisite for the firm
to enter the collective procedure."0 As a result, the decision to file for
bankruptcy becomes more endogenous rather than exogenous."' Due to
the benefits supplied by the court, many companies are using
reorganization procedures to serve purposes beyond simple financial
restructuring. For example, they engage in controlled liquidation, which is
103. Weiss & Wruck, supra note 42, at 58.
104. Id.
105. Gilson et al., supra note 59, at 45.
106. Id. at 65-67.
107. Roe, supra note 67, at 539, 541-45. In game theory terms, the parties to the
bargaining resemble paratroopers who, having been lost after reaching the ground, finally
meet one another at the place most conspicuous on their maps, such as a mountain they
previously climbed together, although other, more appropriate rendezvous places exist. The
paratroopers choose the inferior meeting spot only because it seemed the most likely place
to which everyone will gather. In the firm context, the most likely meeting place for the
firm's claimants is something which resembles the old capital structure of the firm; but like
the mountain selected by the paratroopers, this familiar turf may not be the proper starting
point for a difficult journey.
108. Gilson et al., supra note 59, at 45. Other examples appear in appendix. See id at
app. 70-73. Note, however, that when examining public records of bankruptcy courts, one
can observe only cash flow projections.
109. Roe, supra note 67, at 549-58. For example, inferior investment decisions are made
when shareholders of the reorganized firm gamble with other people's money. Id. at 549.
110. See, e.g., Picker, supra note 2, at 519.
111. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 83, at 1045.
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the sale of the entire firm-or "parcels" of its assets-under the auspices of
the stay imposed on debt collection efforts, enabling the quiet, orderly, and
time-requiring sale of assets." 2 There is also a host of "creative uses" for
these proceedings, which is a catchall term for firms' use of bankruptcy to
discharge extremely burdening obligations;'
13 such as, enormous mass-tort
liability, 1 14 overwhelming judgments, 5 environmental liability, pension
liability, collective-bargaining contract liability,
1 6 or other long-term
obligations. Sometimes bankruptcy is filed strategically in response to
another party's decision that impinges upon the firm."
7 In addition, small
firms that own a single asset sometimes use bankruptcy to modify the terms
of a loan." 8 The opportunistic nature of such bankruptcy proceedings is
clear. Furthermore, firms whose managers and shareholders behaved so
outrageously might earn an opportunity to start fresh due to their
questionable dealings-perhaps even with a competitive advantage-a fact
that should cause one to question the process's inherent fairness.
Finally, opponents of the administrative bankruptcy procedure have
argued that it inefficiently burdens the process of allowing assets to be used
at their highest value." 9 The high proportion of reorganized firms that
112. See Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
69, 71-72 (2004) (rehearsing an argument Baird raised with Rasmussen in Baird &
Rasmussen, The End, supra note 6); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
597, 605-06 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns]; Whitford, supra note 58, at
1392.
113. Whitford, supra note 58, at 1395.
114. A classic example is Johns-Manville's 1982 declaration of bankruptcy in lieu of
catastrophic asbestos liability. See KEvlN J. DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY 60-81
(1992) (noting the public outrage at Johns-Manville's bankruptcy declaration due to a
perception that this maneuver was an attempt to escape liability to those its operations had
injured, a charge denied by the company's defenders who claim it had no choice given its
liability in excess of $2 billion).
115. A classic example is Texaco. In 1984 Pennzoil won a multibillion dollar judgment
against Texaco, who retaliated by filing for Chapter 11. The parties then settled the claim,
and Texaco subsequently left bankruptcy. See id. at 144-59.
116. A classic example is Continental Airlines. Upon filing for Chapter 11 in 1983,
Continental Airlines' management suspended all flights, locked the company's union
workers out, and resumed operations only after hiring nonunion workers. See DELANEY,
supra note 114, at 82-125.
117. Chicago Central Pacific Railroads, for example, claimed to be insolvent, with assets
exceeding liabilities, because one of its creditors changed the terms of a loan, significantly
affecting the railroad's operations. See Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical
Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747, 750 (1989).
118. See Brian S. Katz, Single-Asset Real Estate Cases and the Good Faith Requirement:
Why Reluctance to Ask Whether a Case Belongs in Bankruptcy May Lead to the Incorrect
Result, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 77 (1992).
119. For a generalization of the argument, see Michelle J. White, The Corporate
Bankruptcy Decision, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 129, 129-30 (1989) [hereinafter M. White,
Corporate Bankruptcy] (noting how firms are sometimes forced to liquidate when their
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suffer from post-bankruptcy poor performance and return to bankruptcy, as
well as the significantly low rate of confirmed reorganization plans, 2 °
supports this proposition.12' Administrative-like procedures tend to shield
non-viable firms from creditors. Creditors lack the information needed to
make quick and correct liquidation decisions."' The mis-deployment error
occurs when reorganization is preferred to a more efficient liquidation.'23
Recent empirical evidence suggests that the Administrative Model
procedures tend to "save" too many non-viable firms. 24 In this context,
resources would be more valuable in continued operation, while other times the firm
continues to operate even though the resources could best be used elsewhere). See also
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 83, at 1048-49 (demonstrating with empirical data that
existing bankruptcy law does not give managers enough incentives to allocate corporate
resources efficiently).
120. See Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penalty for Debtor and Creditor
Interests, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1088, 1089 (1992) (reporting the results of a study which
found a 10% rate of confirmation); M. White, Does Chapter 11, supra note 5, at 1319
(reporting that only one-sixth to one-fourth of small- and medium-size firms in Chapter 11
succeed in adopting a reorganization plan and remain in operation); Rasmussen, Efficiency,
supra note 69, at 322 (reporting a rehabilitation rate of 20%, after deducting cases ending in
plans for liquidation). But see LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 112, at 600-01
(reporting a 96% rate of confirmation in bankruptcies of large, publicly-held companies).
Nevertheless, this last finding is eroded by data reporting that within several years one-
eighth of these firms undergo either a private restructuring or a repeat reorganization. See
Hotchkiss, supra note 94, at 4; Matthias Kahl, Economic Distress, Financial Distress, and
Dynamic Liquidation, 57 J. FIN. 135, 135-36 (2002) (discussing the long-term financial
impact of debt restructuring).
121. See, e.g., Hotchkiss, supra note 94, at 4 (finding that in a sample of 197 public firms
emerging from Chapter 11 between the years 1979 and 1988, 40% continued to experience
losses and 32% had to undergo another restructuring). See also James W. Bowers,
Rehabilitation, Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence for Choosing Among
Bankruptcy Hypotheses, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 955, 963 (1994) (reporting that only 21% of
Chapter 11 "megabankruptcies" in the LoPucki and Whitford study have resulted in true
rehabilitation). But see Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice:
Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161, 189-90 (1997) (arguing that a
firm may rationally choose to remain highly leveraged after reorganizing. For example, in
order to increase monitoring of managers, repeat reorganizations should not be taken as
evidence that Chapter 11 produces inefficient capital structure).
122. Kahl, supra note 120.
123. Many studies discuss this point. See Jeremy I. Bulow & John B. Shoven, The
Bankruptcy Decision, 9 BELL J. ECON. 437, 438 (1978); M. White, Corporate Bankruptcy,
supra note 119, at 143-44, 147-48; Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of
Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189, 1213-14 (1991); Robert
Mooradian, The Effect of Bankruptcy Protection on Investment: Chapter 11 as a Screening
Device, 49 J. FIN. 1403 (1994).
124. See Timothy C.G. Fisher & Jocelyn Martel, Empirical Estimates of Filtering
Failure in Court-Supervised Reorganization, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 143 (2004)
(producing evidence from Canada to show that Type I errors are four times more likely to
occur than Type II errors). In other words, creditors and judges during an administrative
reorganization are four times more likely to accept proposals from nonviable firms than to
reject proposals from viable firms.
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some scholars point to studies that contradict the "high transaction costs
market hypothesis" offered by some advocates of the Administrative
Model.1 5 Indeed, one can find much empirical support for the claim that
bankruptcy reorganization procedures, such as the American Chapter 11,
are inefficient and costly. They impose higher transaction costs than the
market, 12 6 and only partially accomplish the rehabilitation 
target. 27
One famous example scholars cite is the case of Eastern Airlines, the
American airline that filed for bankruptcy in 1989.128 Upon entering
Chapter 11, Eastern Airlines' existence could easily be considered
economically unjustified. Besides having a bad reputation among
passengers, the company had a long tradition of investing in the wrong
projects, including propeller aircrafts. Although operating on the very
competitive East Coast in an already saturated industry, the company did
not have a unique market niche. In the years preceding its Chapter 11, the
company sold important assets, such as its right to operate between
Washington, D.C. and New York. Labor costs were high, since the
company was paying above-market wages to its employees, a fact that did
not prevent frequent management-employee conflicts. Despite having the
opportunity to liquidate the company in return for a reasonable dividend to
creditors, Eastern Airlines was kept alive under Chapter 11 for another
twenty-two months by a judge about whom Forbes magazine wrote an
article titled "A Bankrupt's Best Friend.'
2 9  This bankruptcy judge
announced his willingness to try to revive the airline for the sake of its
customers and employees. 30  The Judge allowed Eastern Airlines'
management to conduct "asset stripping" maneuvers, to use the company's
125. Bowers, supra note 121, at 960-61.
126. Id. at 961 (arguing that "Chapter 11 apparently discourages potential competition
among bidding firms and thus awards gains to bidders that exceed the normal competitive
return bidders earn in unobstructed markets. While in those markets, the target company's
shareholders capture the gains that result from the bidding, in Chapter 11, the bankrupt
firm's owners must share more of the gains with the bidder. In other words, the Chapter 11
process itself imposes higher transaction costs than the unobstructed market imposes").
127. For a useful analysis on transactional costs and Chapter 11, see LoPucki &
Whitford, Patterns, supra note 112.
128. The following description is based on Weiss & Wruck, supra note 42; Baird,
Revisiting, supra note 48, at 633.
129. Weiss & Wruck, supra note 42, at 62 (citing Seth Lubove, A Bankrupt's Friend,
FORBES, Apr. 1, 1991, at 99, 102 (describing the judge as one who "believes that when
Congress . . .reformed Chapter 11, it wanted to give high priority to keeping bankrupt
businesses going rather than having them liquidated for the benefit of creditors .... [The
Judge's] pro-debtor reputation is so widespread that companies which want to stiff their
creditors are known to 'forum shop' to get their cases before him.").
130. Id. at 56.
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assets13 1 to finance continued operations, for a considerable length of time.
The gloomy result was a further loss of about $1.3 billion and a decline in
value of about $2 billion, the equivalent of half of Eastern Airlines' original
value. 13' Facing such a poor outcome, Eastern Airlines terminated its
operations in 1991.
Many deficiencies of administrative bankruptcy are exacerbated by
general problems that reign in some jurisdictions, such as inefficient
judicial systems, vague laws, poor registration of property rights and
deficient accounting standards that make it difficult to sort out claims,
among others.
33
3. The Case for Administrative Decision-Making
Scholars have argued in favor of current Administrative-based Models
of bankruptcy and reorganization across the board. One argument favoring
a Chapter 11 model of bankruptcy procedure focuses on this model's
ability to increase the survival rate of firms, especially firms with ongoing
concern value. 134  A court-supervised procedure can better utilize firm-
specific assets, since assets are kept within their intended industry rather
than being sold for scraps. 35 The procedure rescues firms filing under its
terms and also firms not in a formal bankruptcy procedure but slightly
financially distressed. 36  When markets suffer from imperfections or
temporary downturns 137 that cause market sale of the firm's assets to be an
131. During attempts to reorganize, Eastern Airlines' management sold routes, gates,
planes, engines, and spare parts, for a total sum of $1.8 billion. Of that amount, $928.2
million was used to finance the company's ongoing operations. See id. at 65.
132. Id. at 56 (but see the exact explanation for this result). Note however, that the
Eastern Airlines case is not representative of a Chapter II proceeding for large public
companies. See Whitford, supra note 58, at 1386.
133. See Hart et al., supra note 48, at 463.
134. M. White, Costs, supra note 17, at 494. But see S. Abraham Ravid & Stefan
Sundgren, The Comparative Efficiency of Small-Firms Bankruptcies: A Study of the US and
Finnish Bankruptcy Codes, 27 FIN. MGMT. 28, 38 (1998) (concluding that an auction-only
regime did not lead to more liquidations than a regime with a Chapter 11 alternative).
135. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 83, at 1043-44. Often a firm's financial distress
is accompanied by an industry-wide downturn. Industry insiders, who can better evaluate
and use the assets of the firm, are thus more prone to be cash constrained. The inefficient
result occurs when firms left un-reorganized are sold to outsiders who put the assets to
lower-valued uses. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt
Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343, 1355-56 (1992).
136. Bufford, supra note 48, at 836-38 (describing Chapter 11 as a safety net for the
national economy based on a review of events surrounding the 1933 depression).
137. Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law for Productivity, 37 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 51, 78 (2002).
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unwarranted alternative, the opportunity to reorganize the firm becomes
more important.1
38
Some have argued that Chapter 11 was only able to endure because it
was efficient. 39  Moreover, the particular structure of Chapter 11 has
evolved over time for specific reasons. 40  This idea is supported by the
observation that Chapter 11 enables controlled liquidation of a firm's assets
when its results are superior to any other form of liquidation, such as a
straightforward auction.' 41  Creditors receive higher payoffs when
reorganization is allowed over liquidation. 42 There is empirical evidence
to support this argument, particularly in the case of small- and medium-
sized firms.' Indeed, similar considerations drove several countries
previously without reorganization alternatives to amend their bankruptcy
codes.'44 It has thus been argued that upon acceptance of the assumption of
imperfect markets, an administrative procedure is a better solution. 145 Even
when used by firms "opportunistically" to discharge a specific kind of
obligation, the Administrative Model is able, at least in some cases, to
reach socially desirable results.
146
For example, William Whitford reviewed empirical evidence to
support the continued existence of Chapter 1 1.14' He concluded that the
direct costs in Chapter 11 cases, i.e., fees paid to professionals
accompanying the procedure, were high for bankruptcies of small 
firms, 148
138. Hart et al., supra note 48, at 463; Bufford, supra note 48, at 846-47.
139. Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411,
413-14 (1990) ("Enduring legal institutions endure either because they are efficient or
because they redistribute wealth to concentrated, politically effective interest groups.").
Transfer of wealth, Easterbrook argues, is an implausible explanation for the current
bankruptcy regime, so efficiency is the only possible explanation. Id. at 414-15. See also
Tene, supra note 14, at 291-92.
140. See Charles J. Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REV. 791, 808 (1993).
141. Whitford, supra note 58, at 1394.
142. See, e.g., Ravid & Sundgren, supra note 134, at 38. A recent study indicates that
creditor recovery rates are much higher in Chapter 11 cases than in Chapter 7 cases.
143. Stefan Sundgren, Does a Reorganization Law Improve the Efficiency of the
Insolvency Law? The Finnish Experience, 6 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 177, 178 (1998) (presenting
evidence that creditors on average receive a significantly higher payoff in reorganizations
than in liquidations-between 10.7% and 15%).
144. See Ravid and Sungren, supra note 134, at 29-30. Such countries include Finland,
Sweden, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Britain.
145. Charles W. Adams, An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganizations, 20
HOFSTRA L. REv. 117, 142-48 (1991); Whitford, supra note 58, at 1379-80, 1395.
146. See Whitford, supra note 58, at 1395-98 (arguing that "creative uses" of bankruptcy
at least supplies a quick solution).
147. Whitford, supra note 58.
148. A study conducted on small firms in Finland indicated a different result, finding that
the direct costs of auctions were no less than the direct costs of reorganizations. See Ravid
& Sundgren, supra note 134, at 38. See also Sundgren, supra note 143, at 179.
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but relatively low for bankruptcies of large public firms. 149 Similarly, he
concluded that there were deviations from the absolute priority rule in
Chapter II cases, but they were relatively modest at about 10% of the
entire distributed value. 5° The classic example for a Chapter 11 case, if
one exists at all, 15' is not the travesty of Eastern Airlines, Whitford argued;
but rather a case in which a company with cash liquidity trouble and some
bad business decisions takes advantage of the stay imposed on its
unsecured creditors, maintains its business during the procedure, and
completes restructuring efforts that began before filing for bankruptcy.'52
Other scholars have suggested that certain adjustments should be
made to the existing Administrative Model, such as providing a non-
waivable application of the absolute priority rule-for those strictly
adhering to the absolute priority rule-and a mandatory termination of the
"exclusivity period" granted to incumbent management. 53  These
adjustments are intended to overcome the faults of the model, mainly
strategic behavior by players. 54  Adoption of regimes implemented in
149. See Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of
Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 286 (1990) (setting the direct costs of a sample of
large firms at an average of 3% of asset value); Whitford, supra note 58, at 1381. Whitford
argued that one must also take into account both the direct costs wasted on alternative
bankruptcy procedures, as well as the fact that if a formal bankruptcy is not initiated,
indirect costs, such as costs of monitoring by creditors, would replace direct costs, e.g.,
monitoring by professionals. See id. at 1382. See also Easterbrook, supra note 139, at 415
(comparing costs of administrative bankruptcy to the costs of going public with a
corporation).
150. Whitford, supra note 58, at 1382-83, n. 13.
151. Several scholars have argued that one needs to be very careful in the bankruptcy
context in choosing "representative" cases to illustrate arguments. Indeed, famous
bankruptcy cases of large publicly-held companies are often not reflective of the kind of
cases that occupy the courts' dockets which usually involve closely-held firms. See
Rasmussen, Efficiency, supra note 69, at 321-22.
152. See Whitford, supra note 58, at 1386-87 (describing the case of AM International, a
manufacturer and distributor of graphics equipment). The company filed for bankruptcy in
1982, with $500 million in assets. Its financial difficulties resulted from an inexpedient
expansion, which increased the company's debts. After replacing the management, the
company began to unload assets in order to repay debts, a process interrupted by unsecured
bank creditors' threats to repossess unless collateral was exchanged. Once in bankruptcy,
the company negotiated a reorganization plan, under which it borrowed money against its
assets in order to distribute cash to creditors, and shareholders retained 36% of the shares in
the reorganizing company. The plan was confirmed 28 months after the company had filed
for bankruptcy. Creditors were later able to trade the shares, which sold well in the stock
market, and receive full payment. The company returned to Chapter II in 1993, with a
prepackaged plan, but was again able to rise as a viable entity.
153. Jackson, supra note 76, at 663.
154. See id. See also Altman, supra note 45, at 4 (recommending a shorter exclusivity
period); J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 306 (1991)
(proposing ideas on how to improve the bargaining and valuation process); LoPucki &
Whitford, Venue Choice, supra note 88, at 48 (suggesting a reduction of judicial discretion
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specific countries, such as in Canada, has been suggested.'
55 Improving
decisions made by bankruptcy judges, and their role in the proceedings in
general, has also been advocated as a change that current legal regimes
should adopt. 56 Implementation of special procedures for small, closely-
held firms 57 as well as combining an Administrative Model with market-
based procedures, such as an auction, has also been suggested.'
58 Another
proposal was to automatically wipe out underwater claims, especially those
of shareholders.' 59 Appointing impartial examiners to assist in judicial
decision-making was also offered.1
60
It has also been contended that the idea of reforming bankruptcy laws
might be a mixed blessing. The economy's debt structure, whether market-
in extending periods of exclusivity, and limiting such periods to one year); Tabb, supra note
140, at 824 (listing all relevant reform proposals).
155. See George G. Triantis, The Interplay Between Liquidation and Reorganization in
Bankruptcy: The Role of Screens, Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
101, 104 (1996) (comparing the interplay of liquidation and reorganization bankruptcy
proceedings in Canada with those in the United States).
156. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 26, at 367-68. Nevertheless, arguments
supporting the current role of judges have also been made, such as requiring bankruptcy
judges specialize in a narrow field, thus becoming "experts." See Lynn M. LoPucki, Can
the Market Evaluate Legal Regimes? A Response to Professors Rasmussen, Thomas, and
Skeel, 54 VAND. L. REV. 331, 352 (2001) ("Congress has anointed bankruptcy judges as the
independent experts charged with evaluating plan feasibility.").
157. See Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining
Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1991) (advocating a selective
stay regime, under which a large financing creditor, a bank for example, better informed
than anyone else of the firm's prospects as an ongoing concern, would be the one to value
the firm and negotiate, when necessary, a bargain with the firm's owners). See David A.
Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L.
REV. 465, 510-17 (1993) (advocating certain changes in current Chapter 11 provisions as far
as closely-held firms are concerned). See also Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Small Business
Reorganization and the SABRE Proposals, 7 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 253 (2001)
(suggesting, among other reforms, a federal workout procedure for small firms, which can
be initiated only when at least a few unaffiliated creditors join the firm's petition for the
protection of the court). In 1994 the United States Bankruptcy Code was amended to
include a fast-track bankruptcy alternative for small firms. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e) (2000
& Supp. V 2005).
158. See Robert G. Hansen & Randall S. Thomas, Auctions in Bankruptcy: Theoretical
Analysis and Practical Guidance, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 159, 161-62 (1998) (advocating
the use of auctions in certain circumstances and traditional Chapter 11 proceedings in
others).
159. This reform was named a "preemptive cram down." See Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625 (1991). Upon
commencement of a bankruptcy case, a motion for eliminating the interests of equity
holders would be brought before the bankruptcy court. An order extinguishing such
interests would be issued after a hearing. Id. at 636-42.
160. See Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in
Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 ARIz. L. REV. 89, 135-38 (1992) (advocating the use of an
examiner who would be an independent fact-finder).
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based or bank-based,'16 is important in determining the overall efficiency of
a bankruptcy law. 162  Thus, it has been contended, for example, that
information acquisition technologies and the economy's primary method of
financing, whether bank-oriented or market-oriented, determine the need
for either a creditor-initiated bankruptcy procedure or a debtor-initiated
bankruptcy procedure. 63 Developed countries with bank-based systems,
like Germany, should have a creditor-initiated bankruptcy system, while
countries with market-based financing systems, like the United States, or
with underdeveloped economies should have a debtor-initiated chapter and
a creditor-initiated chapter in its bankruptcy law."6
The lesson to be learned is that the need for bankruptcy reform is
economy-dependent and reforms may not fit every jurisdiction. On the
other hand, because financial systems are likely to adapt themselves to a
given bankruptcy system, 65 the company itself can change in the face of a
relatively inefficient bankruptcy law by amending its sources of credit, for
example more bank loans, to facilitate out-of-court restructuring in the case
of insolvency, such as negotiating with fewer creditors. 66  However, in
countries with market-based credit systems, enhancing the efficiency of
formal bankruptcy laws seems to be a good idea overall. 67 These trends
explain the wave of reform proposals in the literature, most of which are
market-based.
161. In a market-based economy, most of the borrowing by firms is done through the
capital market. Creditors obtain information about the firm independently, from the market,
and do not depend on the firm or its managers to supply it. In a bank-based economy, most
of the borrowing is done from banks and financial institutions. See Franklin Allen &
Douglas Gale, A Welfare Comparison of Intermediaries and Financial Markets in Germany
and the U.S., 39 EUR. ECON. REV. 179 (1995).
162. See Elazar Berkovitch & Ronen Israel, Optimal Bankruptcy Laws Across Different
Economic Systems, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 347 (1999) [hereinafter Berkovitch & Israel, Optimal
Bankruptcy]. In a bank-based economy, but not in a market-based economy, managers can
guess rather successfully what creditors will know about the firm; when managers
understand that creditors do not know that the firm should be liquidated, managers can
continue to run an inefficient firm. In an under-developed economy, creditors have little or
no information on the firm since financial institutions and markets are not yet developed.
163. See id. at 349. In a creditor-initiated regime, a creditor alone can file for bankruptcy
liquidation, and once he does, management loses its control over the firm. In a debtor-
initiated regime, the debtor can file for bankruptcy and retain control of the firm.
164. Id.
165. See Hege, supra note 47, at 261. The intuitive explanation is that one should
always bare in mind the possibility for an out-of-court restructuring (a workout). But, as
already mentioned, workouts are unlikely to succeed when firms borrow from credit
markets rather than from banks because of a holdout problem.
166. Id. at 236. Bankruptcy reform is caught in a "trap" in light of the paradox being
created when making things worse (less efficient bankruptcy laws) actually might make
things better (more successful workouts).
167. Id.
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B. Market-Based Solutions: The Quest for the Residual Owner
Against the background of immense criticism over court-supervised
bankruptcy, proposals were put forward to substitute the Administrative
Model with a market-based decision-making mechanism. The driving
force of many reform proposals has been the proposals' contended ability
to pinpoint the firm's residual owner; be that the "true" residual owner of a
firm, who may be unknown, 168 or a "newly created" residual owner via a
sale of the assets, liability free, to a third-party buyer. Once located, the
residual owner would be chosen, as a matter of course, as the relevant
decision-maker to make the redeployment decision. Indeed, law and
economics theory assumes that the residual owner's incentives are perfectly
aligned with those of the firm because he or she stands to reap the firm's
marginal profit or suffer its marginal loss. Redeployment led by the
residual owner is considered optimal, simply because the residual owner
makes the redeployment decision while enjoying the benefits of making
good decisions and incurring the costs of making bad ones.
69 The problem
with the Residual Owner Model is how to identify who in fact is the
residual owner of any given firm in any given situation at any given time.
70
1. The Auction Solution
Douglas Baird, 7 ' Thomas Jackson,7 2 William Meckling,'
73 and
Michael Jensen'7 4 have separately offered to adopt a mandatory auction
168. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 14, at 108-09 (discussing the need to create
mechanisms that allow disparate owners to act as one, and emphasizing the advantages of
ensuring that decision-makers were residual owners who bore the costs and benefits of any
decision they made).
169. Of course, this is true only at first approximation. Any debt in a firm's capital
structure creates an overinvestment incentive. However, creditors can protect their interest
via price and contract terms.
170. The question of whether a residual owner in fact exists in financially distressed
firms is currently under debate. Compare LoPucki, The Myth, supra note 99 (arguing that
the residual owner approach to bankruptcy proceeding still exists), with Douglas G. Baird &
Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REv. 673, 694-97 (2003)
(discussing the lack of a residual owner in the financially distressed firm WebVan).
171. See Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 38.
172. See JACKSON, supra note 65, at 218-24.
173. See William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role
of the State, 41(4) LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 38 (1977) (arguing that "[a]s a result of
intensive research ... we now know a great deal about how the value of firms is determined
in financial markets. Most of us would have little faith that estimates derived by the SEC
staff would be superior to those that markets would generate. Why not use the market to
determine the value of the firm? Indeed, why not simply hold auctions for firms which go
into bankruptcy, or issue claims on firms in bankruptcy and use their value to fix the value
of the firm?").
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solution,175 or, in other words, an only-liquidation bankruptcy regime.
According to this proposed reform, the bankruptcy court, perhaps with the
aid of a trustee, would auction the firm's assets, accepting either bids for
only specific assets or for the entire going concern, and sell those assets
stripped of pre-bankruptcy liabilities to a third-party buyer at a price that
would reflect the "true" market value of the firm. 17 6 The "pot of cash"
generated from the sale would be distributed to the pre-bankruptcy
claimants according to the absolute priority rule. Even if the assets are sold
only as a single complex firm as a whole, the buyer can dismantle the
assets.
Baird has argued that an auction is cheaper. 77 He reasons that since
the auction can be accomplished quickly, it reduces procedure costs-the
direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy-induces parties to reveal
information,'78 and keeps the task of redeployment separate from that of
distribution. 7 9 Assets can thus be transferred immediately to their highest-
valued use, 8° and distributional impulses such as deviations from the
absolute priority rule can be prevented. 8' The change of ownership of the
firm, which entrusts the firm with a new and thus certain residual owner,
182
174. See Jensen, supra note 77, at 31-32.
175. The requirement for a mandatory auction derives from several problems, such as an
adverse selection problem that might burden the process of selling good firms to third-party
buyers. See Baird, Revisiting, supra note 48, at 646-47.
176. See Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 38, at 139; Baird, Revisiting, supra note
48; Ryland, supra note 84, at 2271 ("With the recent development of a deeper-and
therefore more efficient-market for higher risk securities . . . and the growth in 'vulture
funds' (investment managers specializing in securities of troubled firms), it makes sense to
reconsider the market auction mechanism in bankruptcy reorganizations.") (footnotes
omitted). Baird's auction solution is offered mainly for large, publicly-held companies.
177. Investment bankers are quite proficient in auctioning even large firms. An offering
of stocks can cost between 4% of total proceeds in underwriter compensation and other
expenses, and 15%, if small offerings less than $2 million are the issue. See Clifford W.
Smith, Jr., Alternative Methods for Raising Capital: Rights Versus Underwritten Offerings,
5 J. FIN. ECON. 273 (1977) (examining why firms choose underwritten offerings rather than
rights offerings when finance theory suggests rights offerings should be used to raise equity
capital).
178. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 26, at 368-70. See also Ryland, supra note 84, at
2271-72 (describing an auction duty imposed on incumbent managers as a method to reduce
agency costs created under a Chapter 11 governance regime).
179. See Baird, Revisiting, supra note 48, at 634, 638-39.
180. See Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Acquisitions as a Means of
Restructuring Firms in Chapter 11, 7 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 240, 244, 260-61 (1998)
[hereinafter Hotchkiss & Mooradian, Acquisitions]. The post-bankruptcy performance of
firms acquired in a bankruptcy procedure was found to be better than that of independently
reorganized firms due to reduction in operating expenses and employment costs. But the
authors noted that the effects of imposing a mandatory auction, rather than a voluntary one,
are yet unclear.
181. See Jackson, supra note 76, at 658.
182. See Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra note 1, at 1202.
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who may also change strategy and management, can generate significant
value. 1
8 3
Auctioning the firm's assets can remove the bias towards
reorganization often observed in administrative bankruptcy 
procedures. 18 4
Nevertheless, an auction can still preserve firm-specific skills or ongoing
concern value since the assets can be sold as a unit. For example, if
employing managers of a closely-held firm is crucial for the firm's survival
as an ongoing concern, or can create the added value which is not available
in piecemeal sale of the assets, the buyer of the firm in the auction can
bargain with the managers and obtain their services even in exchange for
shares in the firm, if management participation is for some reason
conditioned upon receiving equity."i 5 When publicly-held companies are
the subject matter, it is reasonable to assume that owners of the company
seldom place a special value over the market value on the assets, as do
owners of closely-held companies; those that do place such a value can bid
at the auction.1
86
A well-known example of a documented, successful auction was the
case of Financial News Network (FNN), which entered Chapter 11 in
1991.187 FNN's managers signed an agreement to sell the company for $90
million; but subsequently, the bankruptcy court auctioned the firm for $146
million, 188 a fact that also enabled later conflicts between creditors to be
resolved without impeding the redeployment of the assets. 89 Similarly, the
Baltimore Orioles baseball team was auctioned and sold in 1993, within a
period of only three months, for $173 million, instead of $145 million as its
owners intended to do just prior to filing for bankruptcy. 90
Criticism over the auction solution suggests that despite the fact that
auctioning a firm may sometimes prove to be efficient, it may also be too
costly in other occasions-for example, when auctioning large firms.'
9'
183. See Hansen & Thomas, supra note 158, at 164 (comparing auctions to hostile
takeovers, which generate a premium for shareholders of 30% above market price). Firms
sold in a bankruptcy auction resemble firms being taken over because of existing potential
to improve the firm's performance.
184. See M. White, Costs, supra note 17, at 495; Hansen & Thomas, supra note 158, at
164-65 (arguing that auctioning bankrupt firms' assets increases efficiency).
185. Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 38, at 139-40 (arguing that the new owners of
the firm are in a bargaining position with management).
186. See id. at 141-42 (discussing potential efficiencies of a forced sale of assets to the
original owners).
187. Hansen & Thomas, supra note 158, at 160.
188. Id.
189. Baird, Revisiting, supra note 48, at 634.
190. Hansen & Thomas, supra note 158, at 160.
191. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 320 (1993) (discussing the direct and indirect costs of
auctions). See also LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 83, at 765
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A second problem is that of "fire sales," which result in loss of
value. 92 Sometimes distressed firms' assets are better sold in a controlled
manner, over a period of time, and in parcels of assets instead of a single
unit. 9 3  Indeed, evidence indicates that even in a competitive auction,
prices paid for bankrupt firms are at substantial discounts,'94 which result in
considerably lower payoffs for creditors.'95 The market would like to
observe the firm's post-filing performance before valuing the firm
properly. 
96
Another related problem arises from lack of suitable bidders in the
auction. This is particularly problematic, as financial distress often strikes
entire industries in a manner that could prevent those who value the firm
the most from participating in the auction. 97  Still, bidders might be
competitors of the auctioned firm, interested only in reducing competition
in the market, or those who are interested in buying the assets in order to
sell them later, when economic conditions improve. '" The costs of
evaluating the firm's assets, including the costs of acquiring sufficient
information for that purpose, might be high enough to deter many
bidders.' 99 Informational asymmetry may impede acquisitions of distressed
(arguing that auctioning a large firm can be more expensive than reorganizing under
Chapter 11); Adams, supra note 145, at 142-48 (arguing for less expensive alternatives to
liquidation); Easterbrook, supra note 139, at 415 (explaining how auctions of firms may end
up costing more than IPOs). But see Hansen & Thomas, supra note 158, at 166-68 (arguing
that Easterbrook's calculation of IPO costs is too low).
192. See Branch, supra note 51, at 60 (indicating that "[B]ankrupt firms are damaged
merchandise. Sale of damaged goods under pressure rarely results in the best price.").
193. See Whitford, supra note 58, at 1393 (discussing potential benefits of allowing
buyers to repackage the firm's assets); LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra
note 83, at 758-65 (discussing scarcity of potential bidders). The more complex the firm's
capital structure, the less likely the firm is to be acquired. See Hotchkiss & Mooradian,
Acquisitions, supra note 180, at 260.
194. Hotchkiss & Mooradian, Acquisitions, supra note 180, at 260 (arguing that complex
negotiations in bankruptcy make firms less desirable for acquisition).
195. See Ravid & Sundgren, supra note 134, at 38 (comparing payoffs to creditors in
auctions and in reorganizations).
196. Branch, supra note 5 1, at 60 (arguing that quick sale of assets from bankrupt
company will result in market discount).
197. See Baird, Revisiting, supra note 48, at 648 (discussing that industry distress may
prevent firms from bidding). Evidence suggests that buyers of assets from firms in
bankruptcy tend to be of the same industry. See LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate
Governance, supra note 83, at 764 (generalizing examples of bidders existing only from
same line of business); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 135, at 1355-56 (arguing that money
outside the given industry is insufficient to remove illiquidity).
198. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 135, at 1356. Assets might not spend time in the
hands of those who value them the most and can make the best out of them.
199. See Adler, supra note 191, at 320-21 (discussing the indirect costs of investigating
prospective acquisition targets); Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart & John Moore, The
Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 523, 527-28 (1992) [hereinafter
Aghion et al., Economics] (discussing transaction costs of obtaining investment); LoPucki &
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firms when out-of-industry buyers are uninformed not only about the firm
value, but also about the best use of the firm's assets. 00 Cash-constrained
bidders are also withheld from participating in the auction even though they
might value the firm the highest and know best how to utilize its assets.
Bidders might also be unfamiliar with the firm, a fact that might require a
period of adjustment, and necessitate a process very similar to that
conducted under a formal lengthy bankruptcy procedure.2"' The firm's
atypical activity on the eve of auction aggravates this problem.
0 2
A third problem associated with auctions concerns pre-bankruptcy
incentives. For example, management of the firm might be driven to either
delay the process of bankruptcy and reorganization, or misuse the firm's
assets on the eve of bankruptcy, thus creating incentives to deploy the
assets improperly.2 3 In a mandatory auction regime, managers also have a
strong incentive to invest in projects-not necessarily good ones-as long
as these projects give them private information, in order to assure that they
are retained after the auction.20 4
Fourth, the auction solution does not solve the problem of needing a
judge-made valuation. Even when distributing the proceeds of an auction
according to the absolute priority rule, one still needs to value the secured
creditor's collateral, apart from the overall market value of the firm, in
order to determine that creditor's priority over lower-ranking creditors.0 5
One also needs to value the claims.20 6
Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 83, at 761-63 (discussing need for delay and
costs of sale); Skeel, supra note 157, at 478 n.42 (arguing that potential losses from
unsuccessful bidding may discourage bidders).
200. A "lemons problem" might be created when "good" firms will choose to reorganize
rather than attempt a sale, in a market pooled with "bad" firms offered at low prices. See
Hotchkiss & Mooradian, Acquisitions, supra note 180, at 242-43 (describing Gertner and
Picker's argument and finding empirical support for this argument).
201. This argument was similarly put forward by Robert Gertner and Randal Picker. See
Baird, Revisiting,, supra note 48, at 650-51 (arguing that Chapter 11 can give time to learn
more about the firm's assets).
202. See Skeel, supra note 157, at 479 (arguing that management is more opportunistic
immediately before bankruptcy).
203. See LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 83, at 756-58
(discussing management incentive to prolong bankruptcy); Karin S. Thorbum, Bankruptcy
Auctions: Costs, Debt Recovery, and Firm Survival, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 337, 339 (2000)
(discussing conflicts between owner-managers and debt holders); M. White, Corporate
Bankruptcy, supra note 119, at 148-49 (discussing management incentives to waste assets
and take risks on eve of bankruptcy).
204. Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra note 1, at 1203.
205. See Adler, supra note 191, at 321 (discussing difficulty in bidding against informed
bidders); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A New Approach to Valuing Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2388, 2406-07 (2001) [hereinafter Bebchuk &
Fried, New Approach] (arguing that in auctions valuation will still occur to determine the
value of assets with security interest); Hansen & Thomas, supra note 158, at 172-74
(discussing secured interest in property that loses value during bankruptcy); Jackson, supra
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Fifth, the auction mechanism in the bankruptcy context might also be
a source of inefficiencies. Bidders are likely to fear the "winner's curse"
that would have them pay too much. °7 Unless a specific auction method is
mandated, conflicts might arise between claimants.0 8 Studies have shown
that the more uncertainty that exists regarding the value of the firm's assets,
the lower the proceeds of the sale.20 9 More importantly, evidence exists
showing inefficient allocation of resources emanating from auctions
conducted when one bidder also has an initial stake in the auctioned
assets.2 ' ° The case of managers forming a coalition with creditors to bid in
bankruptcy auctions is quite common in this context.2 ' Such a coalition,
acting-in Chapter 1 1 cases when incumbent management is retained as a
debtor in possession-as both the seller and bidder, has an incentive to
overbid above the coalition's own evaluation of the firm in order to induce
a higher counteroffer. 12  Such a counteroffer would benefit the bidding
coalition, generating more value for their pre-bankruptcy claims, but it can
also deter the other bidders from participating in the auction. 2 3 Although,
it was argued that allowing management to choose a voluntary auction
rather than mandate such an auction might mitigate the problem.2 4
note 76, at 666-67 (discussing the difficulty in valuing patents and other intellectual
property outside the firm as a whole). Indeed, the secured creditor's priority over junior
creditors depends on the value of his collateral. When distributing even a "pot of cash," the
bankruptcy court needs to know who gets what.
206. Easterbrook, supra note 139, at 416 (contrasting judicial and market valuations).
For example, the court needs to value contingent claims held by injured persons or the costs
of cleaning up toxic waste.
207. Skeel, supra note 157, at 478 n.43.
208. See Sugato Bhattacharyya & Rajdeep Singh, The Resolution of Bankruptcy By
Auction: Allocating the Residual Right of Design, 54 J. FIN. ECON. 269, 271-72 (1999)
(discussing conflicting sales preferences between senior and junior creditors). For example,
senior claimants have a strong preference for the use of a first-price sealed-bid auction over
an ascending-bid auction, but junior claimants have the opposite preference.
209. Hansen & Thomas, supra note 158, at 168-70.
210. Edith S. Hotchkiss and Robert M. Mooradian, Auctions in Bankruptcy, 9 J. CORP.
FIN. 555, 556-57 (2003) [hereinafter Hotchkiss & Mooradian, Auctions].
211. Id. at557n.4.
212. Id.
213. Id. The authors concluded that the overbidding problem depends on the structure of
the firm's claims.
214. Id. at 558. In a bankruptcy system that permits auctions rather than mandates them,
management's choice to seek a buyer to bid in an auction coveys information to potential
bidders. To be sure, such a choice sends a message that management thinks that the
valuation of the firm is relatively low (and will bid low). The probability that a second
bidder will enter the auction increases. The likelihood of a competitive auction increases
also.
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Current administrative bankruptcy regimes allow an auction of the
firm, even as a whole, to take place.2 " Evidence exists of efficient auctions
conducted, for example, in Chapter 11 proceedings.2!1 6 Sales of firms in an
administrative bankruptcy procedure seem to occur with increasing
frequency in recent years.21 7 But often, courts do not resort to auctioning
the firm.218  Private workouts do not include an auction,
2' 9 and neither
corporate charters nor debt covenants integrate an auction alternative as an
ex ante contractual solution to the firm's insolvency. Perhaps the reason is
that an auction is not always the best solution.
220
An interesting line of inquiry relates to countries entertaining-at least
effectively-an auction-only bankruptcy regime such as the United States
(Chapter 7), Sweden (before 1996), Finland (before 1993), Germany
(before 1999), Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Evidence found
in these countries is inconclusive regarding the superiority of an auction-
only regime. 22' On one hand, a study conducted in closely-held firms in
Sweden found that real life auctions actually resemble reorganization, since
quick sales of assets are avoided by a restructuring of the firm's capital.
This restructuring occurs when the previous owner of the firm bids in the
auction and negotiates a deal with a creditor bank that finances the bid.
222
Other problems arising from auction-only regimes include conflicts of
interest among claimants, which lead to inefficient continuation and
deviations from the absolute priority rule.
223 Another recent study revealed
that an auction might not be as cheap or as time saving as one would
think.224
On the other hand, evidence for the superiority of auctions was found
in another study indicating a 75% rate of going-concern survival in a
sample of closely-held firms.225  This rate resembles the rate of survival
215. Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code is basically an auction solution.
See Whitford, supra note 58, at 1402 (indicating that appointing a trustee in Chapter 11
should also trigger an auction solution).
216. Hotchkiss & Mooradian, Auctions, supra note 210, at 556.
217. Id.
218. Hansen & Thomas, supra note 158, at 183 (arguing that courts are afraid of a failure
of the auction, and are unaware of the relative ease with which auctions could be
successfully accomplished).
219. Easterbrook, supra note 139, at 413.
220. See generally Hansen & Thomas, supra note 158 (concluding that auction does not
always dominate an Administrative Model of bankruptcy).
22 1. See Ravid & Sundgren, supra note 134, at 38.
222. See Per Str6mberg, Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy
Auctions: Theory and Tests, 55 J. FIN. 2641, 2644, 2683 (2000).
223. Id. at 2683.
224. See Ning Zhu, Is Cash Auction Procedure a Bargain? Evidence From U.S.
Bankruptcy Courts (Yale Int'l Center for Fin., Working Paper No. 03-13, 2003).
225. See Thorburn, supra note 203, at 339, 351-54 (noting that the more intangible the
assets, the more chances it had to be sold as a going concern).
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found in Chapter 11 firms, refuting the notion that auctions eliminate
efficient firms. The same study also found that direct costs of auctions
were similar to the direct costs of Chapter 1 1 reorganizations.226 However,
indirect costs were found to be much lower due to the short time an auction
takes-two months from filing to completion of sale-as compared to the
time spent by firms in a Chapter 11 procedure-between two and three
years. 227  This study also revealed that in going-concern auctions debt
recovery rates for creditors were similar to rates found in Chapter 11
reorganizations. 228 Another study found firms that survive an auction-only
bankruptcy regime are more likely to emerge as healthy enterprises with
post-bankruptcy performance on par with industry rivals; Chapter 11 firms,
in contrast, systematically under-perform compared to their peers. 229 This
study also concluded that even the absence of absolute priority violations
from auction sales does not create a problem as proponents of such
violations might argue, due to CEO countervailing activity, which mitigates
any eve-of-bankruptcy "going for broke" attempts by shareholders.230
Baird's solution prompted several other proposals for reforms, which
basically rehearsed his mandatory auction procedure but offered to modify
specific aspects in it. For example, Robert Hansen and Randall Thomas
have argued for a combination of the existing bankruptcy regime with an
auction as a default, to be executed immediately upon rejection of a
reorganization plan by claimants. 21  Elazar Berkovitch, Ronen Israel, and
Jaime Zender have suggested the use of a restricted auction mechanism.
According to this mechanism, once the firm files for bankruptcy, if the
creditor refuses to renegotiate the original loan terms, the court strictly
enforces the pre-bankruptcy contracts made by the firm. If the creditor
agrees to a formal bankruptcy procedure, the firm is auctioned but the
creditor does not participate.232 Their proposal effectively increases the
firm's bargaining power when reorganization is the efficient outcome.
226. Nevertheless, when liquidated or sold as a going concern following a pre-pack,
auctioned firms demonstrated lower direct costs. See id. at 366.
227. Id. at 339-40, 354-60.
228. Id. at 340, 360-65 (indicating that overall, claimants recover 35% of the face value
of their claims, with a 27% mean recovery rate for piecemeal liquidations and 39% recovery
for going concern sales. The median overall recovery found in reorganizations is 41%; this
is similar to firms auctioned as going concerns).
229. See B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn, Control Benefits and CEO Discipline in
Automatic Bankruptcy Auctions, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 227, 229 (2003).
230. Id. at 228-30.
231. See Hansen & Thomas, supra note 158, at 178-82 (claiming that the auctions should
be conducted in a similar manner to the auctioning of solvent firms, e.g., with the help of
investment bankers).
232. Elazar Berkovitch, Ronen Israel & Jaime F. Zender, The Design of Bankruptcy
Law: A Case for Management Bias in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 33 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 441, 453-55 (1998).
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Francesca Cornelli and Leonardo Felli have proposed to auction only a
control stake of the firm-50% of the shares plus one-thus enabling the
buyer of the control stake to accept a reorganization plan that would
maintain the firm as an ongoing concern.
233
Another important suggestion was made by Mark Roe, who pioneered
a proposed reform of bankruptcy laws in 1983. The purpose of these
reforms was to divert decisions made within the collective procedure of
large, publicly-traded firms to the market.
23 4  Roe had suggested the
adoption of a simple all-common-stock capital structure for any
reorganizing firm by selling a slice of the reorganizing firm's stock-for
example, 10% of the stock-to the market, which would provide an
extrapolation of the firm's entire value.
23 The market's valuation would
subsequently be adopted by the court and the remaining stock be
distributed to claimants according to the absolute priority rule. Adopting
such a reform would significantly cut out procedural costs and increase the
accuracy of the value attached to the reorganizing firm depending on the
market's price efficiency,
23 6 and lack of imperfections.
237
The auction solution has been criticized as being based on false
assumptions of perfect capital markets and zero, or near zero, transaction
costs. 238 It has been argued that this description of an optimal world, made
by efficient market advocates, is inaccurate due to serious market
imperfections such as the market response to time-pressured sales of
"illiquid" assets in offering prices below "market" value,
239 asymmetric
information, 240 and significant transaction costs, such as difficulties in
communicating and coordinating the actions of many claimants.
24 1
233. See Cornelli & Felli, supra note 79, at 478.
234. See Roe, supra note 67, at 529, 559.
235. Id. Roe assumes that markets have a homogenous view of risk. But see
Rasmussen, Efficiency, supra note 69, at 326 n.26 (questioning Roe's view on the market's
view of risk).
236. A market is price-efficient to the extent it can quickly and accurately reflects public
information in stock prices.
237. See Roe, supra note 67, at 530-31, 559-62 (indicating the market's effectiveness in
assessing a variety of traded securities under different conditions; direct evidence regarding
bankrupt or post-bankruptcy firms is scarce).
238. See LoPucki, Strange Visions, supra note 92, at 80, 97-106; Skeel, supra note 157,
at 480-81.
239. See LoPucki, Strange Visions, supra note 92, at 100 (presenting supportive
evidence).
240. See Adams, supra note 145, at 153-55.
241. See LoPucki, Strange Visions, supra note 92, at 101-03.
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2. Auctions in Imperfect Markets
The auction solution might work well when markets operate perfectly.
But a line of reform proposals assumed as its baseline assumption, the
existence of imperfect markets in which transaction costs are high since
cash is sometimes hard to raise242 and competition among bidders is
scarce,2 43 and problems of asymmetric information exist as firms in
financial distress are often undervalued. These proposals have tried to
overcome the imperfect markets predicament.
In a seminal article from 1988, Lucian Bebchuk suggested an "options
approach.244 Starting at the end, the old capital structure of the firm is
cancelled, and the reorganized company ("RC") is declared to have a
simple capital structure of 100 equal units a. 2 4  The value of 100 RC units is,
of course, the question, to be decided by implementing the following
scheme. 46 The basic principle is that claimants are awarded options for the
firm's securities; the exercise of which will result in a distribution of these
securities among claimants according to the true estimates held by
claimants of the firm's value.
For an initial period of time, the 100 units of RC would be retained by
the company or a clearing agent and each senior creditor would receive a
type-A right which the company can redeem by paying that creditor his
debt in full. If not redeemed, however, each senior creditor will receive RC
units in a pro-rata distribution according to the size of his claim against the
firm. Junior creditors would receive type-B rights, which again would be
redeemed by the company in exchange for the junior creditors' debt being
paid in full. If not redeemed by the company, however, holders of type-B
rights have the option to buy units of RC. Each unit would be available at a
242. See Aghion et al., Economics, supra note 199, at 527-28; Aghion et al., Improving,
supra note 48, at 855-56, n.17 (finding empirical support for this conclusion in evidence
from initial public offerings (IPO's), workouts, and takeovers. For example, assume the
bankrupt firm (the authors offer IBM) has an expected value of $100 billion. Small bidders
do not have that kind of money, "going public" will consume time, and a small group of
wealthy investors will bid in discount in light of the immense risk undertaken by them
should they decide to bid (the total sum of bids for specific assets can be higher than a bid
for the entire firm). The natural group to approach as bidders is that of the former claimants
of the firm).
243. See Aghion et al., Economics, supra note 199, at 528 (noting that not all potential
bidders will participate in an auction, since preparing bids is costly. Only the winner in the
auction would retrieve his expenses, thus an entry deterrent is created).
244. See Bebchuk, New Approach, supra note 40. See also Bebchuk, Using Options,
supra note 78, at 840 (relating the options approach to the Black-Scholes characterization of
any corporate security as an option with respect to the firm's assets).
245. See Bebchuk, Using Options, supra note 78, at 834 (noting that a superior capital
structure might be adopted at the end of the process, when the new owners of RC are
defined).
246. In other words, the value of the firm is not verifiable by courts.
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price equal to the senior creditors' debt divided by 100. The shareholder
would receive type-C rights which cannot be redeemed by the company,
but award its holder the option to purchase RC units at an exercise price
equal to both senior and junior creditors' debt divided by 100. If type-C
holders wished to exercise their option, they would buy 100 units of RC
equivalent to the ownership in the reorganized company, in return for a
sum of money which the company would use to redeem type-A and type-B
rights, which would pay off the debts of both senior and junior creditors).
If type-C holders do not wish to exercise their option but type-B holders
would like to exercise theirs, type-B holders would buy RC in exchange for
a sum of money equal to the debt owed to type-A holders, which the
company will use to redeem type-A rights. If no type-C and type-B options
were exercised, type-A holders would receive the units of RC and would
become owners of the reorganized company. The scheme also allows for a
fraction of each group to exercise the option given to it.
247
Bebchuk's options approach results in a new, simple capital structure
for the firm, and renders redeployment of its assets easy enough where the
new owners-the holders of the RC units at the end of the process-will
decide the fate of the finn.248 As in the auction solution, the redeployment
decision is separated from the distribution decision. This sophisticated
scheme also distributes the proceeds of the hypothetical sale in accordance
with the absolute priority rule,249 and makes each claimant unable to
complain. 250  It is also quick in rescuing firms from bankruptcy.
251
Moreover, the scheme is decentralized and does not require coordination
among claimants.252 Most importantly, Bebchuk's proposed reform does
not depend on the market to accurately value the firm or to facilitate the
options process.
253
On the other hand, Bebchuk's procedure suffers from several
important problems. First, junior claimants need to invest additional
capital, rendering cash constrained claimants unavailable to participate in
the scheme.254 Second, in order to participate, claimants need to know a lot
247. See Bebchuk, New Approach, supra note 40, at 787-88.
248. See Bebchuk, Using Options, supra note 78, at 837.
249. Notice, however, that other distribution schemes are also possible under the options
approach. See id. at 834.
250. See Bebchuk, New Approach, supra note 40, at 790-92 (noting that each claimant is
either being paid in full or receiving shares in the reorganized company, when-as a matter
of objective reality-there is nothing more to give).
251. See Bebchuk, Using Options, supra note 78, at 842 (noting that the scheme
improves ex post efficiency and requires only a short timeline to implement).
252. Id. at 839.
253. See Bebchuk, New Approach, supra note 40, at 789-90.
254. See Bebchuk, Using Options, supra note 78, at 839 (arguing that when public
companies are the subject matter, claimants usually hold only small fractions of the
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about the firm and its prospects. Although trading options in the market
can reveal information, there is no bargaining among claimants that, as the
current bankruptcy regime proves, might be a source for information
exchanges. 255 Third, participants in the scheme should be sophisticated
enough. However, sometimes participants, especially junior creditors, are
not very sophisticated and they may be unwilling to become
shareholders.25 6
Bebchuk's proposed reform was subject to several modifications.
Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, and John Moore have suggested that firms
solicit cash and non-cash bids,257 or offer reorganization plans before the
claimants exercise their options. These actions were supposed to increase
the information available to claimants and the chance that they would make
a better decision. 258  They have also suggested replacing the mechanism
advocated by Bebchuk with the simpler decision-making process of an
investment banker, deciding how much the firm is truly worth according to
bids solicited.
Ben Branch suggested setting the expiration date of the options
extended to creditors to more than a year after the bankruptcy procedure is
initiated. This would allow the market to observe the post-bankruptcy
performance of the firm, including audited information, and to assess the
firm's ongoing concern value.259
Oliver Hart, Rafael La Porta Drago, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and
John Moore have suggested a multiple auctions procedure designed to
work even in inefficient markets.260 Once a collective procedure is
initiated, 100 units of common security called "Reorganization Rights"
(RRs), which reflect ownership in the firm, are issued to senior creditors
pro-rata. RRs can be redeemed by lower-ranking creditors for an amount
investments in the reorganized company; that claimants can borrow money using their
options as collateral; and that claimants can sell their options in the market).
255. See Bebchuk, Using Options, supra note 78, at 840.
256. Jochen Bigus, Bankruptcy Law, Asset Substitution Problem, and Creditor Conflicts,
22 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 109, 128 (2002).
257. In a non-cash bid, the bidder offers securities in the reorganized firm instead of
cash. See Aghion et al., Improving, supra note 48, at 862. However, soliciting non-cash
bids could be a source for inefficiencies. See Matthew Rhodes-Kropf & S. Viswanathan,
Corporate Reorganizations and Non-Cash Auctions, 55 J. FIN. 1807 (2000).
258. Aghion et al., Economics, supra note 199, at 532-36. Their proposal was carved
initially for Eastern European countries. See id. at 543-45. See also OLIVER HART, FIRMS,
CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 169-83 (1995).
259. Branch, supra note 51, at 60-62. His reform includes additional changes, such as in
the governance structure of the reorganized firm. See id. at 62.
260. Hart et al., supra note 48. Their procedure is designed to overcome a situation
where capital markets cannot be relied on to objectively evaluate-and rank-
reorganization plans, which are based on cash and non-cash securities. The procedure
therefore can serve countries with developing economies or economies in transition.
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which pays the senior creditors' debt and may be redeemed again by even
lower ranking claimants, and so on. Once this stage is completed, a public
auction is conducted, and outsiders can bid for the RRs and buy them from
claimants who currently hold them. Finally, RR holders collectively decide
the fate of the firm, including the possibility of liquidation. The initial
inside auction is conducted in order to prevent outsiders from bidding a
false value for the RRs.26 '
Barry Adler and Ian Ayers have suggested a dilution mechanism to
derive a market valuation of the firm.2 6 2 According to their scheme, the
court would issue 100 shares of the reorganized firm to senior creditors,
and then solicit schedules of offers to buy or sell the shares at a fixed price
of $1 per share. 263  However, the offers would be conditioned upon a
particular number of additional shares being issued to the junior creditors.
The court would first issue shares to junior creditors up until demand was
less than or equal to supply. Afterward, they would carry out sales of the
reorganized firm's shares from senior to junior creditors. For example,
assume the classic valuation conflict: senior creditors argue that the
reorganized firm's shares are worth $90, but the true share value is $150.
At a fixed price of $1 per share, junior creditors would have an incentive to
draw a demand schedule that offers to buy 100% of the senior creditors'
shares, as long as the junior claimants are issued less than fifty dilution
shares.264 Conversely, senior creditors would have an incentive to draw a
supply schedule that offers to sell all of their shares, as long as more than
fifty diluting shares are issued.265 The equilibrium created reflects the true
value of the firm.
3. Criticism on Reform Proposals for Imperfect Markets
The ingenious reform proposals discussed above are not free from
difficulties. First, critics argue that the residual owner's incentives are not
always perfectly aligned with those of the firm. For example, an unsecured
creditor who is a supplier of the firm might be interested in an inefficient
continuance of the firm simply in order to guarantee his future income.
Thus, attempting to entrust the important redeployment decision to
individuals whose initial interests were not identical to those of the residual
owner can be dangerous. Secondly, it has been argued, and empirically
261. Hart et al., supra note 48, at 466-67.
262. Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in
Bankruptcy, 111 YALE L.J. 83 (2001).
263. Id. at 101.
264. Id. at 104. When there are fewer than fifty diluting shares, every share is worth
more than $1 (firm value of $150 divided by the total number of shares).
265. Id. at 105. When there are more than fifty diluting shares, every share is worth less
than $1 and senior creditors have an incentive to sell their shares.
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corroborated, that once the firm is financially distressed, a single and
identifiable class of residual owners does not always exist. 266 Indeed, when
the value of the firm is uncertain and volatile, the likelihood that the range
of possible values will stretch across different layers of claimants is great.
Notwithstanding the theoretical argument, the solutions offered to
improve the auction mechanism are imperfect. For example, it has been
argued that in a debate over the need for an early shutdown, these proposals
also entrust the decision to the hands of unskilled players and create
incentives for players to withhold information from decision-makers.267
Another example lies with honoring the absolute priority rule. As much as
deviations from absolute priority are beneficial, the reform proposals aimed
at avoiding such deviations miss the point. Yet another argument
addressed the fact that reforms proposed do not solve vexing problems such
as the need to value a secured creditor's collateral in order to implement the
scheme.268
One must acknowledge that even market-based reforms generate
costs. For example, studies conducted in other contexts show that market
offerings carry significant costs in underwriter compensation and other
administrative expenses.2 69 Indeed, one cannot assume that potential
buyers have a priori sufficient information about the firm. Thus, a
preliminary inquiry by such prospective buyers is inevitable. For example,
the ex ante costs created by reform proposals may not ultimately prove to
be lower than the same costs as incurred under current Administrative
Models.27°
Finally, and most importantly, schemes such as the options approach
or the dilution mechanism do not solve situations in which claimants are
cash-constrained27' or unsophisticated investors.7  Replacement of such
266. LoPucki, The Myth, supra note 99, at 16. LoPucki found in his study that in 62% of
large public company reorganizations, a single class of residual owners could not be
identified. Instead, two or more classes of claimants with conflicting interests, as far as the
firm's investment policy is concerned, shared the marginal dollar of gain or loss. Id. at 22.
267. Baird & Morrison, supra note 26, at 370-71.
268. Bebchuk & Fried, New Approach, supra note 205, at 2408-09. But see the reform
proposed by the authors at 2409.
269. See Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 343, 354-
57(1997).
270. See Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra note 1, at 1164.
271. Adler & Ayres, supra note 262, at 104 n.49, 119; LoPucki, Comment, supra note
75, at 713. To illustrate, imagine a public corporation with 20,800 shareholders, as in the
case of Manville. Assume that according to the Bebchuk scheme, a notice would be sent to
each of Manville's shareholders, notifying them that they have two choices. First, they may
pay their pro rata share of the firm's debt, totaling $2.8 billion, meaning each share needs to
contribute $129,000. Alternatively, they could lose their equity interest in the firm, which
upon confirmation would be worth $1,000. LoPucki would ask us to imagine our own
mother, living on social security, as one of the shareholders, and her reflection on whether to
take a huge loan to invest in a bankrupt company.
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claimants is difficult due to transaction costs,2 73 and because often one's
valuation of the firm strongly depends on his or her identity: "insiders"
attach higher values than "outsiders. 274
III. INTRODUCING THE BETTER POSITIONED AGENT
A. Mission Statement
Each of the two models discussed above suffers from shortcomings
that curtail their ability to guarantee optimal redeployment of a financially-
distressed firm's assets. Obviously, the Residual Owner Model poses a real
challenge to bankruptcy lawmakers, as harnessing it would generate the
advantages of making market-influenced decisions. The following
discussion will introduce a new approach to corporate bankruptcy decision-
making that builds upon an important insight developed by the Residual
Owner Model's proponents: allocating decision-making power to market
agents. This method introduces a new ideology as its driving force,
redistributing, albeit selectively, value from one agent to another. It will be
argued that carefully crafted redistribution-a change in pre-bankruptcy
entitlements-can uniquely improve the outcomes of any given bankruptcy
procedure and exposing redistribution as an essential and indispensable
component of any corporate bankruptcy intervention.
This new approach assumes that the redeployment decision is actually
split into several redeployment decisions along a timeline. In other words,
redeployment does not consist of one decision, but of several decisions
made at different points in time. The role of the Bankruptcy Court should
be to allocate these redeployment decisions upon each occurrence to a
different market agent, according to that agent's comparative advantage
over other possible decision-makers. For example, during the period of
time prior to the commencement of a bankruptcy procedure, the agent
better positioned to control redeployment might be-as Part III of the
Article shall demonstrate-a dominant secured creditor who is able to
monitor the firm and intervene in its deterioration towards insolvency. The
secured creditor could, for example, accelerate the date of a formal
bankruptcy proceeding against the wishes of the management of the firm.
Indeed, the commencement of a corporate bankruptcy proceeding marks
the beginning of a series of actions by the Bankruptcy Court to allocate
redeployment decisions, respectively, to several better positioned agents.
272. Adams, supra note 145, at 155-56. However, Adler and Ayres have offered to
combine their solution within an Administrative Model, in a way that would overcome such
difficulties. See Adler & Ayres, supra note 262, at 140-48.
273. Adams, supra note 145, at 156.
274. See Adler & Ayres, supra note 262, at 143.
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The first action of the Bankruptcy Court should, according to this new
approach, consider the fact that by the time the bankruptcy proceeding is
initiated, the firm's dominant secured creditor should have already made
his move and that if the secured creditor did not rise to expectations, he
should be "punished." Is it a possible approach? The next section of this
Article will argue that this approach is possible, despite a problem of
asymmetric information that burdens any attempt to thus consider the
dominant secured creditor.
Of course, a dominant secured creditor of a small- or medium-sized
firm during the time prior to the commencement of a formal bankruptcy
proceeding is not the only BPA. For example, other BPAs-regarding a
decision as whether to continue a reorganization effort-or the
owner/shareholder of the firm-in a decision whether to sell the firm to an
outsider-could be a new supplier of finance. Note that all BPAs share a
common quality; they are each interested in promoting their own selfish
interest. But allowing them to freely follow their own interest in a
corporate bankruptcy event might decrease social wealth. Corporate
bankruptcy law is necessary to properly align such interests and accurately
mold incentives so that their decisions will promote overall wealth. Of
course, this is no easy task; however, it may be possible.
Furthermore, accepting the Better Positioned Agent approach as a
possible redeployment model means accepting the problems such an
approach engenders. Indeed, corporate bankruptcy law is all about trade-
offs. A social engineer may decide to opt for the Better Positioned Agent
approach rather than a market auction solution. Doing so means that the
engineer believes that the market in which the firm's assets would be
auctioned is too thin and that coping with an agency problem, for example,
in order to harness the Better Positioned Agent approach, is preferable.
Such an engineer thus chooses to trade off the shortcomings of an auction
in a thin market with the agency problem that accompanies the Better
Positioned Agent approach.
The discussion in Part III of this Article shall demonstrate the Better
Positioned Agent approach as it can be applied in only one corporate
bankruptcy decision-making context. The possibility of applying the new
approach in other corporate bankruptcy decision-making contexts shall be
left for future discussion. Future research should examine whether an
owner/shareholder of a closely-held firm could be utilized as a BPA when a
final decision is needed regarding redeployment. Additionally, it could be
examined whether a new supplier of finance could be utilized as a BPA
once the firm enters a formal bankruptcy procedure; thus postponing final
redeployment in order to thoroughly explore possible ways to exploit the
assets of the firm.
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B. The Advantages of the New Approach
Assuming that this new approach proves feasible in the context of a
secured creditor in relation to the period of time prior to the initiation of a
formal bankruptcy procedure, one may ask what advantages the approach
might yield.
The new approach can, at a minimum, supplement either the Residual
Owner Model or the Administrative Model. The following discussion
describes the advantages using the new approach as such a supplement.
Furthermore, several of the advantages listed below may also be
implemented in other corporate bankruptcy decision-making contexts as
well.
First, the most important advantage of the Better Positioned Agent
approach lies in the fact that it undermines the assumption that making
good decisions regarding redeployment is a process that starts only after the
initiation of a formal bankruptcy procedure. On the contrary, the Better
Positioned Agent approach assumes that decision-making power should
sometimes be expropriated from the firm and its managers even sooner!
The model acknowledges the possibility of making relevant redeployment
decisions even before a formal collective procedure is commenced. While
the execution of the Administrative and the Residual Owner Models'
redeployment decision depends on the relatively arbitrary factor of the
timing of the bankruptcy filing and the initiation of a formal bankruptcy
procedure, the Better Positioned Agent approach is independent of such
arbitrariness. The new approach can result in redeployment before the
initiation of any formal bankruptcy procedure. The Better Positioned
Agent approach covers a period of time that until now has not been
considered relevant to making wealth increasing decisions. To the extent
that the firm deteriorates into insolvency, the new approach can halt the
deterioration process sooner than the other two models.
Second, for the Better Positioned Agent approach to be implemented,
no assumption is necessary regarding any agent's sophistication. Recall
that according to proposals made in the line of the Residual Owner Model,
agents participating in the schemes needed to be sophisticated enough to
know about the firm and its prospects and to perform atypical tasks such as
raising funds for investment or calculating investment possibilities. The
Better Positioned Agent approach, however, requires that each agent only
perform tasks in areas where he has specialized. Moreover, the new
approach actually seeks the agent most efficient to perform each task. The
Better Positioned Agent approach thus better confronts the risk of market
actors miscalculating the firm's true value. Indeed, the new approach
entrusts this mission only to the hands of qualified actors.
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Third, the market has no bearing on the viability of the
implementation of the Better Positioned Agent approach. The relevant
market might as well be imperfect. The Better Positioned Agent approach
relies on certain market actors known to possess required qualities, but
need not depend on the market being able to supply such actors.
Fourth, the Better Positioned Agent approach focuses directly on
shortening the length of the formal bankruptcy procedure, and the delays
that plague it, thus saving on bankruptcy costs. This characteristic flows
straight from the fact that the Better Positioned Agent approach is time-
oriented.
Fifth, the debate about corporate bankruptcy has raised doubts as to
whether a mandatory redeployment process is necessary and whether
agents are not able to independently allocate control rights efficiently to the
appropriate market agents. Still, even if this is the case, as long as there is
an opt-out opportunity for certain agents, in the form of a collective
procedure that alters pre-bankruptcy entitlements, formal bankruptcies may
ensue. In such a world, one would prefer to have an optimal decision-
making mechanism to dominate the formal bankruptcy system, rather than
putting faith solely in informal, even efficient, mechanisms. In this respect,
the Better Positioned Agent approach is necessary for any attempt to
overcome the problems of financial distress with a formal bankruptcy
procedure.
Still, the Better Positioned Agent approach does not purport to become
the center of attention during the process of redeployment. Rather, this
new approach operates as a back-up system to any simple redeployment
move deemed desirable by the bankruptcy system. For example, the new
approach can be applied along with a simple auction, and to rescue value
that otherwise would have been lost in the simple auction.
Finally, another advantage of the new approach concerns the idea that
corporate bankruptcy regimes should reduce the extent to which the
economy relies upon formal bankruptcy procedures rather than out-of-court
restructurings and reorganization to accomplish the task of solving
financial distress. Indeed, the new approach demonstrates not only the
need to rely on market mechanisms to execute the redeployment decision,
but also that reducing total reliance on formal bankruptcy proceedings is
possible. Recall, that this advantage of the Better Positioned Agent
approach suppresses two sources of efficiency costs. First, there are the
obvious costs that result from not making optimal redeployment decisions.
Second, there is the more subtle source of efficiency costs, which are
incurred when redistributive impulses are triggered during formal
bankruptcy procedures, or in other words, the costs attributed to the
problem of preservation.
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In order to highlight the insights offered by the Better Positioned
Agent approach and enhance its relevance, the following discussion adopts
as a prototypical model not the large, publicly traded company, but rather
the small- or medium-sized private company. Indeed, the latter kind, rather
than the former, occupies most of the Bankruptcy Court's docket.
Generally speaking, a typical small- or medium-sized firm is privately held,
and its debt structure consists of one senior lender, a bank, and other
unsecured creditors, most of whom are trade creditors.275
IV. DEMONSTRATING THE NEW APPROACH: THE CASE OF THE
DOMINANT SECURED CREDITOR
A. The Economic Background
1. Assignment of Control Rights
Conventional wisdom now recognizes that optimal redeployment of
the assets of a financially distressed firm emanates from proper allocation
of control rights over these assets." 6 The only issue that remains is how the
control rights are to be allocated-by contract or by law. The division
between contractual allocation and legal allocation of control rights
involves the question of whether an efficient allocation pattern of control
rights exists or is necessary.
The idea that the law should assign control rights over the assets of an
insolvent firm to qualified agents is not new;
27 7 however, commentators
have argued recently that investors can allocate successfully the rights to
control the assets of the firm in case of financial distress without needing
legal intervention.278 In accordance with this argument, control rights now
are allocated dynamically and coherently-through the corporate charter,
securities issued by the firm, debt contracts entered by the finn, and non-
bankruptcy aw27 9 -to agents that are capable and driven by appropriate
275. A recent study conducted in Britain supplies valuable data, assembled from
nonpublic information sources regarding 542 small- to medium-sized financially distressed
firms. See Julian Franks and Oren Sussman, Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of
Small to Medium Size UK Companies, 9 REV. FIN 65 (2005).
276. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 795 (2004) [hereinafter Westbrook, Control of Wealth]; Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Bankruptcy Control of the Recovery Process, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 245 (2004).
277. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and
the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921 (2001)
[hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights].
278. See Baird & Rasmussen, The End, supra note 6, at 778.
279. For examples of control rights, see Baird & Rasmussen, The End, supra note 6, at
782-85.
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incentives to make sensible redeployment decisions.28° This argument has
not been verified empirically.28" ' Nevertheless, even the most enthusiastic
supporters of this position cannot guarantee that the allocation of control
rights will always ensure optimal decision-making. Furthermore, these
scholars admit that proper allocation of control rights varies among
different corporations over time and across economic domains. 2 ' Settling
for such a vague allocation of control rights is perhaps too optimistic and
may be irresponsible. 83 For example, entrusting secured creditors with
control rights that are too broad creates problems. Moreover, secured
creditors are not incentivized to maximize value to the benefit of other
claimants during an auction of the firm's assets.284
It is not clear whether the role of corporate reorganization law has
become somewhat minor. This is a matter that should be resolved
empirically and requires careful reexamination for each jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, even as a remnant redeployment tool, the law should be
designed to promote efficiency. The following discussion assumes the
necessity of designing a specific efficient legal arrangement for the
assignment of control rights.
To whom should control rights be legally allocated? The discussion in
the preceding sections has revealed that the fundamental problem emanates
from an inability to identify the agent or agents who possess the correct set
of redeployment incentives. Claimants of the firm are aligned in a vertical
order of seniority, and identifying the particular agent-or class of
agents-with the correct incentives requires that the true value of the firm's
assets be known. Elucidation of the firm's assets is not a feasible task, so a
new approach must be designed. While the new approach recognizes that
transfer of control rights to the unattainable residual owner is not an option,
it nevertheless suggests that a market actor be assigned those rights.
2. The Role of Redistributive Impulses
The idea that redistributive impulses-for example, violating the
absolute priority rule-during a formal bankruptcy procedure could
improve corporate bankruptcy decision-making, the center of which
280. See id. at 778-82.
281. See id.; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird
and Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REv. 645 (2003); Westbrook, Control
of Wealth, supra note 276, at 829 ("There is support for the assertion that lenders have
achieved control in some very prominent recent cases, but they do not offer evidence to
support the claim that this control results from contracts that pre-date the debtor's financial
distress.").
282. See Baird & Rasmussen, The End,, supra note 6, at 779.
283. Cf Westbrook, Control of Wealth, supra note 276, at 824.
284. See id. at 843-44.
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concerns the appropriate allocation of control rights, is also a familiar
concept. For example, Professors Baird and Rasmussen recently suggested
that a formal bankruptcy procedure should allow shareholders to bargain
for equity in the reorganized firm. They argue for this type of bankruptcy
configuration despite violation of the absolute priority rule in order to
salvage the ongoing concern surplus-which depends on the shareholders'
participation in the firm-and mitigate delay attempts by these agents.
285
However, it remains to be determined whether absolute priority
violations are an ad-hoc improvement offered to lawmakers contemplating
an Administrative Model bankruptcy procedure, or if they are an integral
part of the bankruptcy endeavor that should be accepted by those
considering a formal Residual Owner Model bankruptcy. Indeed, to the
extent that they acknowledge the need to violate the absolute priority rule
in favor of shareholders of the firm, Baird and Rasmussen limit their
argument to the context of the Administrative Model. Moreover,
systematic violations of absolute priority-for example, in a context other
than that of the shareholders-are generally not part of corporate
bankruptcy theory.
The phenomenon of deviations from the absolute priority rule has
been observed and evaluated within the confines of the Administrative
Model.286 Consequently, absolute priority violations could not be described
as an integral part of the corporate bankruptcy regime. Furthermore, most
studies focused on one particular absolute priority violation-that which
guarantees shareholders of the firm a certain share in the reorganized firm
on account of creditors.
Indeed, several explanations have been offered to clarify why
shareholders of a financially distressed firm, contrary to an ex ante written
contract, exit a formal bankruptcy procedure or an informal workout with
value, while higher-ranking claimants have not been paid in full.
287 For
example, it has been argued that shareholders of financially distressed firms
enjoy considerable bargaining power because they are able to threaten
creditors with delay of the exit from the long and costly formal bankruptcy
procedure unless creditors agree to specific concessions.
28 8 Others have
argued that shareholders' considerable bargaining power derives from their
285. See Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights, supra note 277, at 952-53.
286. See Yaacov Z. Bergman & Jeffrey L. Callen, Rational Deviations from Absolute
Priority Rules, 4 INT'L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 1, 1 (1995) (containing a list of studies
documenting the phenomenon).
287. Several, although not all, explanations have focused on the shareholders' relatively
strong bargaining position in relation to creditors.
288. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of
Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 253, 255-56 (1992); Franks &
Torous, supra note 117, at 747-48.
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assumed unique ability to preserve firm value.289 Another explanation is
that creditors are complaisant to asymmetric information, which allows
shareholders to misrepresent opportunistically their true contribution to the
firm's success. 290 Still another explanation points to shareholders control-
through management-over investment decisions of the firm, which
enables them to threaten creditors with sub-optimal investment decisions
that would reduce the value of the firm during financial distress. 291 It also
has been argued that shareholders, who are given exclusivity in structuring
reorganization plans under the terms of American Chapter 11, extract
292concessions by making "take it or leave it" offers to creditors.
Recently, it has been argued that deviations from absolute priority in
favor of shareholders emanate from uncertainty over the result of a future
judicial valuation to be conducted during the bankruptcy procedure, which
in turn equips shareholders with considerable bargaining power.2 93 Another
recent study found evidence suggesting that deviations from absolute
priority in favor of shareholders mitigate an agency problem generated
when shareholders/managers are given exclusive control over the firm
294 1-haduring reorganization. It has further been argued that allowing
shareholders to receive value in bankruptcy induces ex post optimal timing
of the firm's default.295
B. Employing the Secured Creditor to Improve Redeployment
Will erosion or denial of secured creditor protection, which is an
additional violation of the absolute priority rule, improve corporate
bankruptcy decision-making?
289. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the
Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 738, 748 (1988).
290. See Ronald M. Giammarino, The Resolution of Financial Distress, 2 REV. FIN.
STUD. 25, 27 (1989).
291. See, e.g., Yaacov Z. Bergman & Jeffrey L. Callen, Opportunistic Underinvestment
in Debt Renegotiation and Capital Structure, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 137 (1991); Bergman &
Callen, supra note 286, at 2-4 (containing a list of studies arguing a similar point).
292. Pierre Mella-Barral & William Perraudin, Strategic Debt Service, 52 J. FIN. 531,
532-33 (1997). See also Ronald W. Anderson & Suresh Sundaresan, Design and Valuation
of Debt Contracts, 9 REV. FIN. STUD. 37, 44 (1996).
293. See Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation
Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930 (2006).
294. See Dina Naples Layish, A Monitoring Role for Deviations from Absolute Priority
in Bankruptcy Resolution, 12 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 377 (2003).
295. See Pierre Mella-Barral, The Dynamics of Default and Debt Reorganization, 12
REV. FIN. STUD. 535, 536-37 (1999).
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1. Literature Review
The question presented here-improving corporate bankruptcy
decision-making by specifically eroding secured creditor protection during
a bankruptcy procedure-has been indirectly discussed in the literature.
Indeed, the well-known controversy regarding the efficiency of secured
credit in general, a debate which seems to be never-ending,2 96 is relevant to
our purpose since the provision of full priority to secured creditors over
other creditors during bankruptcy came under attack. Ex post efficiency
reasons were briefly cited in this context. In other words, while erosion of
secured creditors' full priority has been acknowledged to have a certain
efficiency effect, many questions were left unanswered, including the
questions of why erosion of secured creditors' full priority in bankruptcy
improves efficiency, and how erosion of secured creditors' full priority in
bankruptcy-rather than outside bankruptcy, for example-improves
efficiency.
It is important to note that the question of eroding secured creditors'
full priority can be addressed in two contexts: with regard to firms in a
formal bankruptcy procedure, and with regard to any firm, even if its
financial difficulties do not trigger a formal bankruptcy procedure.
2 97 As
we are interested in corporate bankruptcy decision-making, we focus our
attention on the first context.
The concept of erosion of secured creditors' full priority in bankruptcy
is likely rooted in the debate over the efficiency of secured credit in
general. The general view among scholars and lawmakers is that affording
full priority to secured claims in bankruptcy is socially desirable.298
However, several commentators take a different stand. It has been
acknowledged in this context that while secured lending offers several
296. See Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1117 (2002).
297. Only two proposals seem to have been raised as general erosion-of-priority reform
for secured lending, rather than being bankruptcy-related. See Edward J. Janger, The Death
of Secured Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1759 (2004). One proposal was Professor
Elizabeth Warren's carve-out proposal, which advocated that up to 20% of the collateral be
reserved for unsecured creditors. See Kenneth N. Klee, Barbarians at the Trough: Riposte
in Defense of the Warren Carve-Out Proposal, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1466, 1469 (1997). The
other was several scholars' proposal to give tort creditors priority over secured creditors.
See David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1565, 1643-49 (1991); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L.
REV. 1887 (1994); Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured
Creditor System: Asbestos Time, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1080-85
(1984). For a general discussion of the appropriate priority for tort creditors in bankruptcy
see Note, Switching Priorities: Elevating the Status of Tort Claims in Bankruptcy in Pursuit
of Optimal Deterrence, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2541 (2003) [hereinafter Note, Switching
Priorities].
298. See Note, Switching Priorities, supra note 297, at 2551.
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efficiency advantages, debtor-firms themselves deliberately refrain from
granting security interests for all assets of the firm to lenders, even though
they will not be able to secure the "the last penny's worth," as such a
pattern of secured lending would undermine the secured creditor's
incentive to monitor the firm for management misbehavior.29 9 Monitoring
in this context has been defined as minimizing the agency costs associated
with the risk of management misbehavior. These agency costs were said to
be borne entirely by the firm, as the price of loans required by creditors
rises. It, therefore, has been argued that the firm will avoid granting
security interests in all of its assets in an attempt to obtain the lowest level
of monitoring costs and residual agency costs.300 It has been further argued
that "there is undoubtedly a correlation between the value of a secured
creditor's debt claim and the time he spends monitoring for default. . .. "'0'
As secured creditors' incentives to monitor the firm's activities and
their superior monitoring technology came under inspection, commentators
began to address, albeit with some degree of simplification, the issue of
altering secured creditors' incentives by eroding their full priority in
bankruptcy.
Michelle White argued that awarding secured creditors full priority
when the firm is liquidated may cause firms to continue operations when it
is inefficient to do so.30 2 Holding to the assumption of a coalition between
the secured creditors and shareholders of the firm, who usually favor
continuation over liquidation, White presented a model to conclude that full
priority might result in inefficient firms staying in business.3 3
Thomas Jackson and Robert Scott have pointed to the fact that, on the
eve of bankruptcy, secured creditors may have significant control over the
firm's decision-making process and that this control may be abused by the
secured creditor to improve his own position.0 For example, the secured
creditors may require the firm to sell property in order that they may be
paid.
In a discussion of the British bankruptcy system, David Webb
commented that a secured creditor
who is fully secured, is not going to worry too much if the
company is making losses, provided his own security is not in
jeopardy. By the time the bank starts worrying, any surplus there
299. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393,
1439-40 (1986).
300. See id. at 1440-41.
301. Id. at 1459.
302. Michelle J. White, Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority
Rules, 11 BELLJ. ECON. 550 (1980).
303. Id. at 563.
304. Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors'Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 170, 173 (1989).
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may have been to compensate unsecured creditors will have been
eaten up by losses and those creditors will lose far more than they
would have if the bank moved earlier.3 °5
John Hudson, relying on Webb and making his argument within the
context of the general secured credit debate, commented on the ex post
efficiency cost associated with secured credit. While secured creditors are
"principal whistle blower[s]" who can arrest the activities of failing firms at
the optimal time, "in the circumstances of a secured loan there will be no
incentive for the bank to use this knowledge optimally and will tend to
keep failing firms in existence for too long .... Hudson then reviewed
several reform proposals to address the criticism over secured credit, such
as abolishing secured credit altogether.30 ' Among other reforms, he
mentioned the Cork Committee Report of 1982, which suggested that a
10% fund be taken from the secured creditor and surrendered to unsecured
creditors to ensure that the latter enjoys a minimum value as a return.
30 8
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried argued that secured creditors' full
priority should be eroded and that secured creditors should not receive the
entire amount of their secured claim in bankruptcy. 30 9 They believe that
full priority could give rise to inefficient contracting between a borrower
and its creditors, and could create other types of efficiency costs as well.
3 10
Focusing upon the concept of "non-adjusting creditors," these authors
discussed ex ante efficiency costs generated by a full priority regime:
under full priority, security interests will be used excessively ....
[I]n a loan transaction that will go forward whether or not a
security interest is used, full priority may cause the parties to
incorporate an inefficient security interest into the arrangement, a
security interest whose use in the arrangement reduces the total
value available to all parties affected.311
Bebchuk and Fried attributed multiple efficiency costs to the full
priority rule. In regard to ex post efficiency, they stated that
full priority can inefficiently reduce the [secured] creditor's
incentive to enforce its loan contract with the borrower. In
particular, full priority can give the creditor less incentive to
enforce any loan contract covenants with the borrower or to force
305. David C. Webb, An Economic Evaluation of Insolvency Procedures in the United
Kingdom: Does the 1986 Insolvency Act Satisfy the Creditors'Bargain?, 43 OXFORD ECON.
PAPERS 139, 145-46 (1991).
306. See John Hudson, The Case Against Secured Lending, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 47,
51-52 (1995).
307. Id. at 57-62.
308. Id. at 59.
309. See Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts, supra note 11, at 1281-83.
310. Id. at 1283.
311. Id. at 1293 (internal citation omitted).
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the borrower into bankruptcy when it would be socially desirable
for the borrower to liquidate or reorganize . . . . [A] secured
creditor that is well protected by collateral does not have
sufficient incentive to call a default (or cut off funding) when the
borrower's owners attempt to continue operating inefficiently in
the hope of saving the business.312
Bebchuk and Fried's recommendation was to adopt either a "fixed-
fraction priority rule" or an "adjustable-priority" rule in place of a full
priority rule.3" 3 The "fixed-fraction priority rule" dictates that a pre-
determined fixed fraction of the collateral backing a secured claim-for
example, 10%-would be made available to pay the claims of unsecured
creditors.3 14 An "adjustable-priority" rule requires that secured claims be
afforded priority over claims of certain creditors, such as "non-adjusting
creditors" or creditors who have explicitly agreed to be subordinated.3"5
Another study indirectly acknowledged the importance of eroding a senior
creditor's claim during a formal bankruptcy procedure. It has been argued
that eroding a senior creditor's claim can affect the creditor's incentives to
monitor the firm.
3 16
Finally, a note published by the Harvard Law Review has argued that
elevating the priority of tort claims ahead of all other claims, including
those of secured creditors, can be efficient in bankruptcy and would largely
resolve the problem created when secured creditors insulate themselves
against risk.317 Indeed, the note's author argued that full priority abolishes
the secured creditor's incentive "to monitor levels of precautionary
investments taken by debtor firms,"3 8 and that:
Creditors are in a good position to elicit information regarding
levels of precaution, yet much of the incentive to do so is
undermined by the bankruptcy regime. It is likely that large
312. Id. at 1317-18 (footnotes omitted).
313. Id. at 1321.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See Comelli & Felli, supra note 79, at 477, 481-85. Note, however, that while
recognizing a possible ex ante effect upon creditors' behavior, monitoring being the altered
behavior, Cornelli and Felli's model focuses on a comparison of types of administrative
bankruptcy procedures to conclude that a trade-off exists between ex post and ex ante
efficiency. Comelli and Felli do not explain why absolute priority violations should be an
integral part of corporate bankruptcy settings. They do not connect absolute priority
deviations to a problem of asymmetric information that appears in a corporate bankruptcy
setting. They also differ in their consideration of a simultaneous change in the incentives of
both senior and junior creditors to monitor, and suggest that erosion of the senior creditor's
claim occurs as a result of lower returns to all creditors rather than as a result of a longer
formal bankruptcy procedure.
317. See Note, Switching Priorities, supra note 297, at 2542-43.
318. Id. at 2554.
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secured creditors have informational advantages over other
parties such as shareholders and consumers in determining risk
levels and discovering firm behavior.319
This survey of literature suggests that secured creditors can perform
certain tasks better than any other relevant agent. Secured creditors are
particularly adept at monitoring the firm and reversing its fortunes. It is
also thought that eroding secured creditors' full priority will improve
efficiency. However, two problems remain unresolved. First, what is the
precise goal to be accomplished by better positioned secured creditors? In
particular, what is the exact purpose of requiring secured creditors to
increase their monitoring activity during the time referred to as the "eve of
bankruptcy?" Second, what are the exact terms that make the utilization of
secured creditors efficient? For example, what is the precise mechanism by
which secured creditors decide how much to invest in "monitoring" and
how can problems of over-investment or under-investment in "monitoring"
be addressed by lawmakers?
2. Defining a New Task for the Secured Creditor
A reasonable first step in the design of a scheme that purports to
utilize secured creditors as superior decision-makers would be to clearly
define their assigned tasks. As the idea has not been previously addressed,
this section discusses the situations in which secured creditors should be
expected to take action. Collecting information about the firm and its
operations is most likely their central task because of its potential
usefulness in a formal bankruptcy procedure. It is thus suggested that prior
to the initiation of a formal bankruptcy procedure, a secured creditor should
be considered a better positioned agent because of his advantage over other
agents in monitoring the firm over relatively long periods of time. He may
also pressure the firm to take action, which reduces the length of a future
formal bankruptcy procedure.3 20 Thus, the secured creditor can either
monitor the firm and collect relevant financial data-its assets and
operations, possible redeployment options of its assets, etc.-or
alternatively, he may push the firm into a turnaround effort sooner than
would have otherwise been possible. For example, a dominant secured
319. Id. at 2555.
320. This assumption regarding the secured creditor's capabilities will be tested in Part
IV.C.2. Indeed, a different assumption (rendering the Better Positioned Agent approach
ineffective) could be that the secured creditor is not, in all possible circumstances, a better
positioned agent relative to others. However, it seems that one arguing the latter
assumption, rather than the former, would have to back his argument with convincing
empirical findings, as life experience and common sense indicate that the secured creditor
(at least occasionally) is indeed better positioned relative to other agents, as far as
performance of a certain designated task is considered.
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creditor can pressure the firm to arrange for some form of a workout that
would considerably shorten the length of any subsequent formal
bankruptcy procedure.
The latter trait attributed to the secured creditor becomes critical when
one recognizes that the timing of the firm's entrance into a formal
bankruptcy procedure is highly endogenous. Indeed, firms often hide their
financial difficulties from outsiders.32' For example, financially-distressed
firms commonly cut projects in order to free cash flows to finance losses.
Also, changes in accounting practices are often adopted to generate
additional "income." The firm's insiders-its managers and owners-
usually have strong incentives to hide the firm's state of financial distress
and to avoid a formal bankruptcy procedure.322 On other occasions,
firms-especially small- and medium-sized firms-may adopt an escapism
mentality; however, the seriousness of the firm's financial difficulties
should not be ignored.3 23 Accordingly, the secured creditor faces a relevant
redeployment decision prior to the commencement of any formal
bankruptcy procedure. Pushing the firm into a turnaround activity
sooner-when sooner is better than a late attempt to salvage leftovers-
means that the secured creditor can bring about a redeployment of the
assets.
The BPA surplus created by a better-positioned secured creditor
corresponds to their performance of two tasks. First, the secured creditor
can reduce the efficiency costs attributed to the misallocation of the firm's
assets during the period in which the financially-distressed firm is in a long
and wasteful formal bankruptcy procedure; this period is when the
appropriate redeployment decision is being contemplated by decision-
makers. For example, financially-distressed firms spend a considerable
amount of time in a formal bankruptcy proceeding while the bankruptcy
court obtains relevant information about the firm and explores alternative
redeployment paths. Second, the BPA surplus created by a better
positioned secured creditor can also include efficiency costs attributed to
321. Povel, supra note 80, at 659.
322. Id. at 660.
323. Practitioners whose expertise is reorganization of bankrupt construction companies
argue that, in most cases, owners of small- and medium-sized construction companies seek
professional help too late. Had they sought assistance six months earlier, when their firm
began to experience financial difficulties, the result might have been completely different
and perhaps insolvency could have been avoided. Amir Helmer, How To Reorganize a
Failed Construction Company, THE MARKER [an economic newspaper in Hebrew
resembling the Wall St. Journal] Nov. 10, 2004 (quoting Amir Bartov, Adv., and Haim
Kamil, CPA, two practitioners who specialize in reorganization of bankrupt construction
companies, arguing that in most cases owners of small- and medium-sized construction
companies seek professional help too late, and had they reached out six months earlier, as
their firms begin to experience financial difficulties, the result might have been utterly
different, and perhaps insolvency would not have occurred).
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the misallocation of the firm's assets during the period before the firm
enters a formal bankruptcy procedure. This can also be reduced by the
secured creditor.
It is important to note that the new task of the secured creditor does
not necessitate an assumption of excessive responsibility. In contrast to
what some commentators seem to expect, the secured creditor should not
decide whether the firm should be liquidated or reorganized; rather, the
secured creditor is expected to minimize the time required to conduct a
formal bankruptcy procedure, during which time necessary information
about the firm is acquired and alternative ways to cope with its financial
crisis are explored. In summary, instead of having a bankruptcy judge or a
trustee gather information-which often comes from interested parties-
and examine alternative redeployment paths for the firm's assets-which is
done under the straining conditions of a formal bankruptcy procedure-it is
suggested that a secured creditor be induced to assume these functions and
subsequently shorten the formal bankruptcy procedure.
The new task defined here is the first parameter on which corporate
bankruptcy procedures are evaluated. Recall that the redeployment
mechanism employed by any corporate bankruptcy system can be assessed
with regard to its costs and the quality of its decisions. The new task for
the secured creditor defined here addresses the costs parameter, as a shorter
redeployment process-a shorter formal bankruptcy procedure-reduces
the costs of a redeployment mechanism. It is possible, however, that the
quality of decisions generated when the secured creditor performs this
designated new task is also improved. For example, if one assumes that
secured creditors can access information about the firm that is not
accessible to others, then inducing the secured creditor to gather
information would improve the quality of decisions resulting from the
redeployment mechanism.
C. Impediments to Employing the Secured Creditor as a Better
Positioned Agent
Making the assumption that secured creditors are better positioned to
accomplish a designated task prior to the commencement of a formal
bankruptcy procedure is only the beginning. Indeed, several obstacles
stand in the way of any attempt to utilize secured creditors as better





Any financial relationship where one party lacks the necessary
information and control relative to the other party demonstrates the
problem of asymmetric information.324 To be sure, the uninformed agent
does not know if the relevant characteristics of the informed agent are good
or bad. Absent a means for the uninformed agent to distinguish the quality
of the informed agent, he will tend to pay the equilibrium price, which is
the average price paid for the services of agents of varying qualities. This
is a pooling equilibrium, which imposes a cost on informed agents of good
quality. The problem of asymmetric information can take several forms,
3 25
but conventional wisdom considers private information to be an
impediment to efficiency.326
The Better Positioned Agent approach-at least in the context of the
dominant secured creditor discussed here-cannot be implemented without
the social planner resolving a problem of private information.3 7 The BPA
approach assumes the possible existence of better positioned agents in
several of bankruptcy's decision-making contexts. Rather than leave
unresolved the question of who is to be considered a BPA at any point in
time during bankruptcy, a new approach is suggested in which lawmakers
presume that certain agents, in this case the abovementioned secured
creditor, may in fact possess the ability to create a BPA surplus and
increase claimants' wealth.
324. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market For "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing how the quality of goods
and uncertainty affects the market); Ricardo N. Bebczuk, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN
FINANCIAL MARKETS-INTRODUCTION AND APPLICATIONS (2003) (discussing asymmetric
information and its implications in both micro- and macroeconomic terms); Linda Schmid
Klein, Thomas J. O'Brien & Stephen R. Peters, Debt vs. Equity and Asymmetric
Information: A Review, 37 FIN. REV. 317 (2002) (reviewing information asymmetry and the
choice of debt or equity).
325. See Bebczuk, supra note 324, at 7.
326. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER, AND RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW 269-71 (1995) (applying game-theoretic models to the study of law);
ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (4th ed.,
2007) (discussing non-cooperative game theory and asymmetric information). See also
Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Asymmetric Information and the New Theory of
the Firm: Financial Constraints and Risk Behavior, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 160 (1990)
(examining the consequences of imperfect information on the behavior of firms).
327. Explaining the law in this way, as a solution to a problem of asymmetric
information rather than as a solution to a problem of minimizing social costs, is superior as
it can fit a contractual paradigm of bankruptcy law as well. Approaching the problem this
way captures both ex post efficiency considerations and ex ante efficiency traits.
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Nevertheless, even if certain agents are better positioned for the
designated task, a problem still remains: when considering whether to
apply the Better Positioned Agent approach with regard to the secured
creditor of the firm-which expects the creditor to act before a formal
bankruptcy procedure-the relevant liability decision is made ex post, as
the BPA surplus should have been generated by the time the secured
creditor's actions are reviewed. However, an ex post decision-maker, who
must impose liability for misguided actions in the past, cannot ascertain the
actions of a dominant secured creditor prior to the start of a formal
bankruptcy proceeding. In other words, while the process of determining
"BPA surplus" is highly variable, the owners of the firm's assets-its
creditors-cannot receive information about the process from the dominant
secured creditor.2 8
Thus, when a bankruptcy procedure begins, a social planner interested
in utilizing secured creditors as BPAs to shorten the formal bankruptcy
procedure has the problem of asymmetric information in his inability to
distinguish between BPAs and non-BPAs. To be sure, it is impossible to
distinguish between secured creditors who have produced a BPA surplus
by the time the formal bankruptcy procedure commences, and those agents
who have not. Note, that it is irrelevant why any particular agent did not
produce a BPA surplus. It is possible that the secured creditor was unable
to efficiently create a surplus, that a surplus could not be created at all, or
that the secured creditor simply slacked off. The problem is that the social
planner cannot distinguish between the two types of secured creditors, and
therefore cannot assign sanctions or rewards based on whether they have
generated a surplus.
As a result of this lack of reward or sanction, secured creditors do not
make any BPA effort whatsoever. After all, if a "good" secured creditor is
not being rewarded for being "good," why should he exert an effort to be
"good"? Thus, when all secured creditors face the same sanction, even
secured creditors with BPA potential will exert no effort at all to produce
the surplus. This situation arises in bankruptcy, where all types of secured
creditors receive full priority. The problem reappears at the stage of the
security contract formation; the inability to distinguish between BPAs and
non-BPAs in bankruptcy means that secured creditors and firms, or more
accurately secured creditors and other claimants of the firm, do not include
the contingency of BPA surplus production in their negotiations.
Note that even applying the most severe sanction to all secured
creditors when the firm enters a formal bankruptcy procedure cannot solve
this problem of asymmetric information. The problem always lies in the
328. ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 445-46 (1995).
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inability of agents to identify the secured creditor's type in bankruptcy. For
example, consider the possibility that the BPA surplus to be generated by
secured creditors consists only of the surplus generated when the length of
the formal bankruptcy procedure is shortened, rather than of a value
generated when the formal bankruptcy procedure is prevented altogether.
In other words, assume-very realistically-that BPAs can only efficiently
curtail the length of the bankruptcy procedure, but cannot prevent it. If all
secured creditors are denied 100% of their priority in bankruptcy (or 20%,
or 30%) then potential BPAs-secured creditors who can efficiently
shorten the length of the formal bankruptcy-will avoid taking wealth-
increasing actions. They will exert no BPA effort, and at the stage of
contract formation, the market will comprise only non-BPAs.
b. A solution: Screening enabled by the law
How can a social planner help market participants overcome this
informational asymmetry so that a successful BPA scheme is implemented?
I argue that the law can assist in devising a market-response solution to the
problem of asymmetric information.
The commencement of a formal bankruptcy procedure enables
decisions to be made on agents' past performances. The bankruptcy
process can thus be used to screen BPAs' past performances or allow BPAs
to signal the value of future projects.329 This approach is a possible
solution for the problem of asymmetric information that arises when
utilizing secured creditors as BPAs. The difference between signaling and
screening concerns the question of who moves first. In screening,
uninformed agents move first to offer a menu of choices, and the informed
agent selects the choice that yields the highest payoff. Within the menu of
choices offered by the uninformed agents, a cost can be imposed in a
manner that screens between different types of informed agents. Of course,
designing choices that would enable the uninformed agents to distinguish
between types of informed agents requires that each type of informed agent
have an incentive to select the menu choice meant for him.
Recall that if the law did not intervene, the firm, or its claimants,
would unable to contract in advance with secured creditors to generate a
BPA surplus, because claimants would not be able to review secured
creditors' actions ex post to distinguish between those who have produced
329. See generally, Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries,
Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371 (1977) (arguing that the
willingness to invest signals value); Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and
Delegated Monitoring, 51 REv. ECON. STUD. 393 (1984) (describing the role of the
bankruptcy "penalty" in debt contracts). It is a costly signal, because at equilibrium a risk-
averse BPA retains some "project specific risk" that would be avoided with full information.
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a BPA surplus (BPAs), and those who have not (non-BPAs). Indeed, the
secured creditor's type-based upon its past actions-cannot be verified.
If inducing secured creditors to act330 requires a sanction to be imposed
upon better positioned secured creditors who failed to act, then all secured
creditors will argue before the bankruptcy court that they generated a BPA
surplus in order to avoid the sanction. Of course, no one can verify either
argument in order to distinguish between types of secured creditors.
Imposing no sanction at all will result in secured creditors with BPA
potential failing to act, and not incurring any penalty as a result. The third
possibility of imposing sanctions on all secured creditors in bankruptcy
proceedings fails, at the very least, to allow a BPA surplus to be generated
from shortening a long formal bankruptcy procedure. All three of these
solutions produce no BPA effort ex post, and a market of only non-BPAs
ex ante.
Bankruptcy's inability to distinguish between types of secured
creditors makes it less efficient. The social planner cannot create proper
incentives for secured creditors who can efficiently avoid or shorten a
formal bankruptcy procedure, and for secured creditors who cannot
efficiently prevent a formal bankruptcy procedure, or curb its length. The
social planner also cannot impose a sanction only on secured creditors who
can efficiently avoid a formal bankruptcy procedure, but failed to do so.
Therefore, BPA surplus cannot be the subject of negotiation in contracts
between secured creditors and the firm.
To solve this problem of asymmetric information, bankruptcy law can
intervene and offer secured creditors two choices:
(1) When a BPA surplus exists, act in order to generate it: prior
to the commencement of a formal bankruptcy procedure, the
secured creditor should invest resources in monitoring the
firm or inspiring a turnaround process within it, as that is
when the secured creditor can efficiently do so in order to
avoid or shorten a future formal bankruptcy procedure.
(2) When a BPA surplus does not exist, do not act: the secured
creditor need not invest resources in monitoring the firm, or
in inspiring a turnaround process, when it is inefficient to do
so in order to avoid or shorten a formal bankruptcy
procedure.331
Claimants of the firm would like, in advance, to be able to contract
with secured creditors to generate a BPA surplus. The social planner
would like secured creditors with BPA potential to adhere to choice (1),
330. Appropriate actions might include monitoring the firm or intervening in its day-to-
day management.
331. In other words, secured creditors are forced to share the risks of a formal
bankruptcy procedure, and therefore are induced to minimize those risks.
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and secured creditors with no BPA potential to follow choice (2), for two
reasons. First, from an ex post perspective, inducing secured creditors with
no BPA potential to act is wasteful; if no surplus can be generated by such
secured creditors, it is preferable that they sit and do nothing. Second,
from an ex ante perspective, creating an incentive for secured creditors to
act requires that their full priority be eroded; and since any erosion of
secured creditors' full priority carries ex ante costs-for example, the price
of credit becomes more costly for all agents in society-the social planner
would like to minimize the ex ante costs of priority erosion by helping
secured creditors escape the adverse effects of the formal bankruptcy
procedure.
Consequently, in order to create a screening effect, the contract to be
made available for secured creditors should be accompanied by a cost.
Consider two possible methods of imposing such a cost: first, make the
secured creditor give up a fixed percentage of his collateral if a formal
bankruptcy procedure begins; and second, in the event of a formal
bankruptcy procedure, deny the secured creditor his protections against
collateral depreciation, both temporal and economic.
Imposing such a cost when secured creditors enter formal bankruptcy
procedures would lead them to adopt one of two patterns of behavior:
(1) Secured creditors with a potential to efficiently avoid a
formal bankruptcy procedure as they are true BPAs, will
invest resources in BPA activities-monitoring, for
example-in order to escape the cost imposed by the law.
For instance, assume that a secured creditor needs to invest a
very small sum of money ($100) in order to prevent a formal
bankruptcy procedure.
(2) Secured creditors with no potential to efficiently avoid a
formal bankruptcy procedure as they are not BPAs, will not
invest in BPA activities, nor prevent a formal bankruptcy
procedure, and thus will incur the cost imposed by the law.
For instance, assume that a secured creditor needs to invest
an infinite sum of money in order to prevent a formal
bankruptcy procedure.
Of course, making the secured creditor incur the cost imposed by the
law during a formal bankruptcy procedure separates true BPAs from non-
BPAs. Assume the cost imposed by the law is fixed at the amount $1,000.
A secured creditor corresponding to the description in behavior pattern (1)
will choose to invest the little sum of money ($100) in order to prevent a
formal bankruptcy procedure and escape the fine of $1,000. A secured
creditor corresponding to the description in behavior pattern (2) will choose
not to invest the infinite sum of money (which is higher than $1,000) in
order to avoid a formal bankruptcy procedure. He will prefer to incur the
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cost of $1,000. The screening effect separates true BPAs from non-BPAs
by creating an appropriate incentive for each secured creditor to self-select
and follow their appropriate pattern of behavior. If a certain secured
creditor can efficiently invest in monitoring in order to avoid a formal
bankruptcy procedure and avoid financial sanction, he will do so. On the
other hand, if the secured creditor cannot efficiently avoid a formal
bankruptcy procedure, he will be forced to incur the sanction.
Understanding the need to screen types of secured creditors through
appropriate financial sanctions is the key to improving efficiency. Indeed,
the cost imposed by the law during a bankruptcy procedure influences
whether the secured creditor chooses behavior (1) or (2). Since the purpose
of imposing the cost is to screen between efficient secured creditor action
and inefficient secured creditor action, the amount of the sanction needs to
reflect the efficiency criterion. It cannot be-as been implied so far by
commentators such as Professors Bebchuk and Fried-an arbitrary cost,
such as a fixed percentage of the secured creditor's collateral.
Efficient monitoring by a secured creditor means investing resources
in order to prevent greater harm. The greatest harm for secured creditors in
a formal bankruptcy procedure is the depreciation of its collateral, both
temporal and economic, that can occur for each passing day. Thus,
efficient monitoring by the secured creditor would mean investing
resources to prevent the collateral from further depreciation on each
additional day. Note that awarding the secured creditor with anti-
depreciation protection means that other claimants of the firm actually pay
the amount of depreciation to the secured creditor. Notwithstanding the
entire range of harms prevented as the formal bankruptcy procedure
becomes shorter, curbing the length of the formal bankruptcy procedure
and thereby saving this amount of money thus reveals itself as a direct
improvement such that more collateral will be available to be distributed
among the other claimants.
Thus, denying secured creditors protection against collateral
depreciation during the formal bankruptcy procedure will set the correct
sanction upon secured creditors, and screen between those secured
creditors who can efficiently shorten the length of the formal bankruptcy
procedure and those who cannot.
Consequently, the secured creditor should be forced to share the costs
of a long and costly bankruptcy procedure. I suggest that the best way to
screen secured creditors is to force them to incur any depreciation in
collateral value, whether economic or temporal, during the formal
bankruptcy procedure. The price charged to the secured creditor should
directly depend on the length of time it takes the collective procedure to
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exhaust the relevant inquiries: the longer the procedure, the higher the
price charged.332
Note that we have come full circle. Once the social planner, or other
claimants, is able to separate BPAs from non-BPAs during bankruptcy, the
creation of a BPA surplus becomes a contingency that can be contracted in
advance. A secured creditor not interested in investing effort to produce a
BPA surplus must now notify the firm, or other claimants, of the former's
desire to be "bad," in order to change the terms of the contract and abolish
the term specifying that no protections are to be awarded to the secured
creditor during a formal bankruptcy procedure. Such a requirement reveals
the secured creditor's type as a non-BPA, and the price paid for the loan by
the firm, or other claimants, can change accordingly.
The following two tables describe the relevant events along a reversed
timeline and summarize the arguments relating to a secured creditor (SC)
and his role as BPA. The first table describes the situation when the
problem of asymmetric information is not addressed; the second, when
bankruptcy law creates a screening method to resolve the asymmetric
information.
332. A possible criticism would be that the Better Positioned Agent model is helpless to
the extent that the costs incurred by society are higher than the prevention costs incurred by
the secured creditor, but the latter costs outweigh those incurred by the secured creditor
should he choose not to invest in preventative action. Screening this way fails to induce
secured creditors with BPA potential to realize when the cost of monitoring is higher than
the amount of expected collateral depreciation, but lower than the sum of all damages to
society from not curbing the length of the formal bankruptcy procedure. In such a case,
though inducing the secured creditor to invest in monitoring is efficient, the secured creditor
will not act. Indeed, one could argue that a social planner should aspire to make the secured
creditor internalize the full amount of costs incurred by society during a wasteful
bankruptcy procedure, for the cheapest cost avoider scheme to work. Such a scheme is
possible, however, as the social planner can increase the price charged from secured
creditors for each additional day spent by the firm in a formal bankruptcy proceeding (by
AX). For example, the secured creditor can be charged 0.12% for each additional day spent
by the firm in a bankruptcy procedure. The new price can then be tested empirically to
ascertain whether the measured increase in the price charged from the secured creditor has
indeed brought a certain decrease in efficiency costs. Note, however, that reducing the
secured creditor's full priority may be inefficient because of its ex ante implications on
secured credit. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3.b.
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With asymmetric information:
Time Event What Happens? Result
2 A formal bankruptcy Full priority for SC Ex post asymmetric
procedure begins information problem:
inability to distinguish
between BPAs and non-
BPAs
+ only non-BPAs exist
SC contemplates an Since all SCs are expected No SC generates BPA
investment in creating to receive the same full surplus, even if the SC
a BPA surplus priority treatment in has BPA potential
(investing in bankruptcy, SC does not
monitoring in order to invest in creating the BPA
avoid a formal surplus
bankruptcy procedure)
4 only non-BPAs exist
0 Contract between SC Only one contract is Ex ante asymmetric
and Firm is negotiated offered-full priority in information problem:
case of bankruptcy inability to distinguish
between BPAs and non-
BPAs; the creation of a
BPA surplus is not
negotiated
4 only non-BPAs exist
BETTER POSITIONED AGENTS
With a screening mechanism in place to
information:
resolve asymmetric
Time Event What Happens? Result
2 A formal bankruptcy No protection in bankruptcy SC's full priority is
procedure begins against economic or eroded when the firm
temporal depreciation of enters a formal
collateral bankruptcy procedure to




SC contemplates an SC with BPA potential is SCs with BPA potential
investment in creating willing to invest a sum of produce BPA surplus;
a BPA surplus money to avoid a formal SCs with no BPA
(investing in bankruptcy procedure up to potential, do not produce
monitoring in order to the sum of expected BPA surplus
avoid a formal depreciation of the
bankruptcy procedure) collateral during the future
procedure;
if the latter sum exceeds the
former -- SC will invest in
monitoring;
if the former sum exceeds
the latter -- SC will not
invest in monitoring
4 BPAs are separated
from non-BPAs
0 Contract between SC Two alternative contracts Each SC is forced to
and Firm is being are negotiated: choose between contract
negotiated (1) contract with no (1) or (2)
protection against economic
or temporal depreciation of
collateral in bankruptcy;
(2) contract promising full
priority in bankruptcy (i.e.,
promising these
protections)
4 SC's choice is priced
accordingly by Firm, or
Firm's other claimants
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2. Do BPAs Really Exist?
A problem facing any attempt to implement the new approach is the
assumption that there is a BPA surplus, or that a BPA even exists. When is
this assumption valid?
Of course, at least partially, this is an empirical question. Only
empirical research can actually verify the existence of BPAs in a given
decision-making context described by the Model. Such research is beyond
the scope of this article, but the following insights may prove useful for
lawmakers considering this question.
In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have begun to
hypothesize that secured creditors exert control over the assets of the firm,
particularly at times during which the firm becomes financially distressed,
regardless of whether a formal bankruptcy procedure occurs or not.
333 Yet
these models do not account for the costs of the bankruptcy proceedings, or
for the potential role of a secured creditor in shortening the process. What
is lacking is a theory that places the secured creditor's mission within a
broader framework. The following discussion attempts just that.
From the outset, it should be noted that while a secured creditor can
intervene early to help 'turn around' a firm in financial distress,
3 34 it is
worth asking whether the secured creditor can indeed be a BPA in this
context. In other words, is the secured creditor best positioned to monitor
the firm335 or best-positioned to intervene-i.e., pressure the firm to make
organizational changes or restructure its capital-in order to minimize
potential bankruptcy proceedings in the future?
333. See the review of literature, supra, in Part IV.B.l. See also Baird & Rasmussen,
Control Rights, supra note 277, at 957-58 (advocating the secured creditor's ability to
identify the existence of going concerns surplus in financially-distressed firms); Westbrook,
Control of Wealth, supra note 276, at 806 (arguing that control is a key element of secured
credit). A recent article examines whether secured creditors in certain cases are "well
positioned" to make the firm stop its operations. However, that article takes a different
approach from this one, as the secured creditor is considered as having a real option to bring
about an auction of the firm's assets. See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, Secured Credit,
Control Rights and Options, 25 CARDOzO L. REv. 1935 (2004). Although articulated in real
option terms, the decision attributed to the secured creditor (including the awards for
making a good decision) is altogether different than the one presented in this Article. For
example, while Rasmussen's secured creditor needs to possess an ability to predict the
firm's future in order to make a correct decision, the secured creditor in our essay needs
only to identify current-rather than future---events, and possess a superior monitoring
ability.
334. See, Povel, supra note 80, at 659-60 (weighing costs and benefits of delaying
bankruptcy).
335. Monitoring the firm includes the gathering of information that would be useful on a
day of reckoning when the firm enters a formal bankruptcy procedure.
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a. The monitoring task
Consider first the monitoring task. For several reasons, secured
creditors usually have a stronger incentive to monitor the borrowing firm
than unsecured creditors do: first, because of the size of the loan extended
by the secured creditor;33 6 second, because of the duration of the loan,
which allows more opportunities for the borrowing firm to misbehave; 37
and third, because at the relevant period of time-i.e., when the firm starts
its deterioration into financial distress-the secured creditor may enjoy a
comparative advantage over other creditors in monitoring a firm that is in
financial distress.338 Note that such an advantage has been forged over
time, and is certainly not obvious.339
Indeed, common sense supports a view espoused by the legal
community and financial economists: certain secured creditors-banks in
particular, but other financial institutions as well-undoubtedly possess
superior ability to monitor the borrowing firm. 3 4 0 These secured creditors
336. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1158 (1979) (arguing that creditors are expected to
spend more on monitoring for larger loans).
337. See id. at 1159 (arguing that longer duration loans require more monitoring).
338. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate
Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 53, 56 (1982) (providing examples where creditors have
comparative advantage in monitoring).
339. The literature concerning the justifications for secured credit is used to assume that
secured creditors are inferior monitors in comparison to trade creditors. See, e.g., Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 336, at 1159-61 (explaining that different creditor types have different
monitoring costs). However, as the authors themselves have implicitly indicated, the
secured creditor's monitoring inferiority is relevant "before" any of the creditors agree to
extend credit to the firm. Id. at 1160.
340. See, e.g., Anu Bharadwaj & Anil Shivdasani, Valuation Effects of Bank Financing
in Acquisitions, 67 J. FIN. ECON. 113, 114 (2003) ("According to received theory, financial
intermediaries (and banks in particular) serve as a bridge between firms and external capital
markets due to their superior information collection and evaluation capabilities .... ")
(sources omitted); Arnoud W. A. Boot, Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?, 9 J.
FIN. INTERMEDIATION 7, 7 (2000) ("[B]anks develop close relationships with borrowers over
time. Such proximity between the bank and the borrower has been shown to facilitate
monitoring and screening and can overcome problems of asymmetric information."); Oscar
Couwenberg & Abe de Jong, It Takes Two to Tango: An Empirical Tale of Distressed
Firms and Assisting Banks, 26 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 429, 429-31 (2006) (studying the
restructuring process of financially distressed small- and medium-sized firms in the
Netherlands, which were assisted by their banks in the restructuring process, and concluding
that banks appear to be informed about pre-distress indebtedness, and that a bank's
involvement is "of crucial importance"); Sandeep Dahiya, Anthony Saunders & Anand
Srinivasan, Financial Distress and Bank Lending Relationships, 58 J. FIN. 375, 376 (2003)
("[Blanks are considered insiders with significant informational advantages. This implies
that banks are likely to be better informed about the financial status of their borrowers and
thus will be able to take steps ... before the news of a borrower's distress becomes public
information."). For a list of relevant studies see Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell,
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are believed to be monitoring the firm on behalf of other investors.
34' Over
time such institutions gain access to private information about their
customers by cultivating relationships with them based on trust.342 Banks,
for example, gain access to firm-specific information unavailable to other
creditors, including trade creditors and even the employees of the
borrowing firm.343 One reason for the bank's unique position is the fact
that bank debts are usually classified as "inside debt."3 " For example,
firms consider the bank to be an entity to which secret information
("proprietary information") can be safely conveyed, without worrying
about leakage to competitors.
345  Moreover, a borrowing firm may
deliberately submit itself to monitoring by the bank in order to enhance the
firm's reputation and gain credibility when it approaches other sources of
financing, such as capital markets.3
46 Finally, banks are able to observe the
firm from a relatively wide perspective, as they can gather information
from the community in which the firm operates, and thereby gain insights
into how the firm interacts with the local community.
347 Banks tend to
have specialized knowledge about the firm's industry sector, because they
finance several other firms in that sector as well. They can therefore excel
at monitoring decisions made by the firm, such as investment in new
Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance, 68 J. Bus. 351, 352 (1995)
and Soo-Wah Low et al., The Link Between Bank Monitoring and Corporate Dividend
Policy: The Case of Dividend Omissions, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 2069, 2071-72 (2001).
341. Diamond, supra note 329, at 393. For a list of studies, see Raghuram Rajan &
Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor, 50 J. FIN. 1113 (1995).
342. Biagio Bossone, Do Banks Have a Future? A Study on Banking and Finance as We
Move into the Third Millennium, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 2239, 2242-43 (2001); Scott L.
Lummer & John J. McConnell, Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process and the
Capital-Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements, 25 J. FIN. EcON. 99, 101, 121 (1989).
For example, trust develops as the lender observes the bank as a steady and reliable source
of funding, even at times of distress.
343. See Eugene F. Fama, What's Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 29,
36-38 (1985).
344. Id. at 36 (defining inside debt as a contract where the debt holder gets access to
information not publicly available and may even participate in the firm's decision-making
process).
345. Oved Yosha, Information Disclosure Costs and the Choice of Financing Source, 4
J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 3, 4 (1995) (arguing that firms actually prefer the bank's "bilateral
financing" over the capital market's "multilateral financing," and thus reject the capital
market (rather than being rejected by the capital market)). See also Boot, supra note 340, at
10, 13.
346. Douglas W. Diamond, Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank
Loans and Directly Placed Debt, 99 J. POL. ECON. 689, 716 (1991).
347. Allen N. Berger, Leora F. Klapper & Gregory F. Udell, The Ability of Banks to
Lend to Informationally Opaque Small Businesses, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 2127, 2129-30
(2001).
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projects.34 Banks also become specialized in techniques for extracting
information directly from borrowers.349
Banks' unique monitoring position may result from the fact that they
are suppliers of short-term finance. First, loan renewal processes serve as a
mechanism that transmits information to the bank as the firm submits itself
to periodic review.35 ° Consequently, when a bank extends an additional
loan, not only does it gain access to new information, but it can also
compare the firm's current situation with its earlier situation. 351' Any
information obtained by the bank can also be used in multiple interactions
with the same firm, since the bank's services are supplied repeatedly.
352
Second, short-term finance is the only commodity the firm can use in order
to relieve itself from the pressure of other creditors.35 3 As a result, the firm
is generally quite willing to share information with the bank in order to
attain credit. Finally, monitoring collateral may give the bank valuable
information over time.354 For example, when the collateral is listed in the
firm's inventories or accounts receivable, the bank can extract intimate
information about the firm merely by monitoring its collateral.355
The literature points to other reasons why secured creditors, especially
banks, can become superior monitors. Banks are under pressure to monitor
borrowing firms effectively because the banks can suffer damage if their
clients suffer financial distress. The news of a firm's financial distress may
be construed as a sign of poor banking skills, and a bank's reputation will
be tarnished.356 This is not something to take lightly in an enterprise where
the main activity is extending loans. Moreover, the state scrutinizes a
bank's loaning activity to ensure that certain regulatory capital
requirements are met. Such scrutiny is likely to increase when a borrower
348. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 100 (1985).
349. Bossone, supra note 342, at 2243.
350. Fama, supra note 343, at 36. The relevant assumption held by Fama is that certain
bank loans usually stand last or close to last in the hierarchy of priority, thus triggering an
evaluation of the firm's ability to meet low-priority claims.
351. Id. at 37-38.
352. Boot, supra note 340, at 10, 13.
353. See Hudson, supra note 306, at 51-52 (describing the view that banks are in a
position to gather information about firm credit worthiness).
354. Randal C. Picker, Secutiry Interests, Misbehavior and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 645 (1992).
355. Boot, supra note 340, at 15 n.14. See also Rajan & Winton, supra note 341, at
1114-16.
356. See Thomas J. Chemmanur & Paolo Fulghieri, Reputation, Renegotiation, and the
Choice between Bank Loans and Publicly Traded Debt, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 475, 476-77
(1994); Dahiya et al., supra note 340, at 376.
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suffers financial distress, and this added oversight amounts to a "tax" on
the bank's activity.357
An interesting example of the possible benefits of close bank-firm
relations can be found in Japan, where the phenomenon of Keiretsu
prevails. Keiretsu, meaning "industrial group," is a feature of Japanese
industrial organization. The term describes a group of business enterprises
based in different industries but connected to one another by ties of
ownership, as well as by reliance on a large commercial bank as the major
lender.358 The bank provides debt financing to each of these firms, owns
some of their equity, and may even place bank executives in management
positions. The relationship between the firm and the bank is such that the
firm consults closely with the bank when considering new projects. Also,
through regularly submitted performance reports, the bank is able to obtain
information about the firm and its management that is otherwise
unavailable.35 9  Notwithstanding the extensive criticism of the Keiretsu
system and its economic implications,360 a recent study shows that,
although financially-distressed firms affiliated with Keiretsu banks are
more likely to be liquidated, there is no evidence to support a proposition
that the Keiretsu arrangement induces mis-deployment of these firms'
assets-that is, there is no evidence suggesting mis-deployment in the form
of excessive liquidation.36' Moreover, this study indicates that, as it
pertains to reorganizing firms, Keiretsu seems to be quite beneficial, as
Keiretsu firms show a higher level of profitability than those outside.362
When evaluating these results with a focus on the monitoring aspect of
the Keiretsu arrangement, it is important to recall that several scholars have
argued that Keiretsu banks, armed with extensive information about the
firm, actually engage in screening financially distressed firms to assess
them for reorganization. 363 Recall, however, that it has also been argued
that after extended bank loans are secured, the bank no longer has an
incentive to use its knowledge optimally, and that this results in firms that
are kept alive too long.3 64 A similar problem results from the features of
357. Dahiya et al., supra note 340, at 376.
358. Stephen D. Prowse, Institutional Investment Patterns and Corporate Financial
Behavior in the United States and Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 43, 46 (1990).
359. Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Control in
Japan, II J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 399, 403 (1989).
360. But see Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, The Role of Banks in
Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 67, 86 (1990)
(describing the positive effect of the Keiretsu system on financially-distressed firms).
361. Jean Helwege & Frank Packer, Determinants of the Choice of Bankruptcy
Procedure in Japan, 12 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 96, 97 (2003).
362. Id.
363. Sheard, supra note 359, at 403. For a list of studies, see Helwege & Packer, supra
note 361, at 102.
364. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 306, at 52.
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relationship-banking described above.365 Still, it is the very intention of the
BPA Model to create such an incentive.
b. The intervention task
Consider next the intervention task. The secured creditor's ability to
intervene and pressure the firm to take measures to prevent bankruptcy has
been acknowledged by scholars.366 Indeed, it has been argued that banks
actually take advantage of their power over borrowers to advance a self-
serving agenda. But the pressure applied by the bank can also be directed
at inducing the firm to make necessary adjustments in its business
activity-reorganization-or preparing for a restructuring of its capital.
Anecdotal evidence supporting this ability of banks is ubiquitous.3 67 For
example, a common practice among banks is to pressure deteriorating firms
to hire professional consultants to assist the firm with improvement
strategies.368 Empirical evidence supports other intervention practices, such
365. Boot, supra note 340, at 16 (describing the "soft budget constraint problem").
366. See Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case, supra note 11, at 903 ("[B]y virtue of its
sophistication, resources, and leverage, the bank will be able to exert a significant amount of
influence over the borrower. Indeed, a bank will frequently determine whether or not a
borrower files for bankruptcy and the timing of any filing. Thus, the bank is in a unique
position to control a borrower's behavior.") (internal citations omitted); Bebchuk & Fried,
Further Thoughts, supra note 11, at 1317-18, n. 118 (describing reduction in monitoring);
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 926-27
(1986) (describing leverage); Ivo Welch, Why is Bank Debt Senior? A Theory ofAsymmetry
and Claim Priority Based on Influence Costs, 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 1203, 1208-09 (1997)
(advancing the theory that banks are better lobbyists and litigants).
367. Bank managers often say that firms usually do not become insolvent at once, and
that there are always early signs to indicate the firm's financial distress. These signs are
detected by the credit-extending bank. Once a firm's financial distress is recognized, the
bank usually hires a professional to assist the firm and its managers in overcoming the
problem. At other times-when the quiet treatment is insufficient or unsuitable for the
particular firm-the bank considers a formal collective procedure for the firm. Welch,
supra note 366, at 1208-09. One CPA, whose accounting firm practices "quiet
management" of financially-distressed firms on behalf of lending banks, noted, "Once banks
recognize a cash flow problem in a borrowing company, they 'persuade' its owners to
accept our advice..." Rotem Shtarkman, 85% of Companies Inflate Their Owners Equity,
GLOBES [Israeli economic newspaper resembling the Wall St. Journal] Nov. 10, 2003
(reporting on an interview with Aliza Sharon, a CPA who specializes in advising firms in
financial distress) (on file with author).
368. Sometimes these professionals are from within the bank itself. See Franks and
Sussman, supra note 275, at 75 for a description of the special head-office unit-the
"Business Support Unit" ("BSU")-which conducts turnaround maneuvers for clients of
each of the three examined commercial banks dominating the credit market for small- and
medium-sized firms in Britain. The goal of the BSU is to "[send the firm] back to branch,"
which conducted business with the firm before the firm became financially distressed. See
also Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355,
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as the supply of emergency financing. 69 Moreover, it has been argued that
for secured creditors, debt seniority may actually facilitate timely
intervention because they can credibly threaten the firm.370 Note, in that
regard, the influence wielded by a secured creditor depends on other
factors. Creditors who are less specialized in monitoring or more
dispersed, may be less effective at applying pressure on the firm. In fact,
their smaller stakes often cause free-rider problems.37' Moreover, empirical
research reveals that, particularly with regard to small- and medium-sized
firms, once a bank decides to place a firm in a formal bankruptcy
proceeding, the court almost never contests the bank's decision.372
c. When will a secured creditor be a BPA?
When monitoring and intervening in a financially-distressed firm's
affairs, secured creditors sometimes possess a comparative advantage not
only over the firm's other creditors, but also over its owners. Managers of
financially-distressed firms can be over-optimistic in their evaluation of the
future of their firms; even when managers recognize a cash flow problem,
they tend to convince themselves that it is merely temporary. Secondly,
owners of financially-distressed firms often make self-serving decisions or
even engage in fraudulent acts that threaten their firm's viability. Simply
put, owners of small- and medium-sized companies may shamelessly leave
their firms bankrupt.
The reforms suggested in this Article aim to help identify better
positioned secured creditors and induce them to increase wealth.
Theoretically these reforms can be implemented across the board; so in
principle, lawmakers could apply them to all firms and all secured
creditors. The screening mechanism will automatically sort all secured
creditors according to their potential to increase wealth.
373-74 (1990) (discussing the possibility that bank lenders initiate senior management
turnovers in financially distressed firms).
369. See Franks and Sussman, supra note 275, at 76, n.19 (recording a study of a rescue
process that lasted on average 7.5 months, and resulted in a mean of 75% of the companies
being turned around). See also Gilson, supra note 368, at 362 (indicating that bank lenders
exercise significant influence over resource allocation in financially distressed firms).
Finally, for evidence from the Keiretsu context, see Sheard, supra note 359, at 408.
370. See Boot, supra note 340, at 16 (explaining that without collateral, the borrower
may anticipate that a bank's calling a loan due would have adverse effects on the bank as
well, and thus not take such threats seriously. Such reaction would change once the
collateral exists and the adverse affects over the bank are not anticipated). See also Gilson,
supra note 368, at 365-68, (describing the use of restrictive covenants).
371. Boot, supra note 340, at 17.
372. Franks and Sussman, supra note 275, at 73 (examining a data set of 542 companies;
the authors, surprisingly, found only one case in which the bank's action was challenged
through litigation).
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From a practical point of view, however, even if the screening solution
described above would resolve the problem of identifying which particular
secured creditor who has loaned money to the firm is in fact a BPA, one
question remains: For what categories of cases should the screening
solution be used? This question becomes relevant as the implementation of
the BPA scheme, which requires an erosion of the secured creditor's full
priority in bankruptcy, carries with it certain ex ante efficiency costs.373 As
a result, lawmakers might be interested in a selective implementation of the
BPA scheme described above, rather than an absolute, across-the-board
implementation.
Selective implementation requires identifying those categories of
firms for which the secured creditor will surely be able to generate a
surplus, as well as differentiating the categories of firms for which the BPA
scheme is less effective. A selective implementation also entails the
identification of categories of secured creditors. Secured creditors with
confirmed ability to generate a BPA surplus must also be distinguished
from categories of secured creditors whose ability is yet unproven.
Consider first the types of borrowing firms. Indeed, the quest to
articulate the secured creditor's mission as a better positioned agent must
begin by assuming a particular prototypical model firm serves as a basis for
analysis. I have noted that the typical firm for which the secured creditor
can perform as a BPA is not a large, publicly traded company, but rather a
small- to medium-sized firm, since such firms occupy most of the
bankruptcy court's docket.37 4 For example, many closely-held firms have
an institutional lender: in one study, about half of the firms surveyed had
loans from financial institutions.37 5 Of these firms, roughly two-thirds have
borrowed from a single institution.3 76  Over 90% of this borrowing was
done on a secured basis.377 Literature has shown that the benefits of a close
relationship between secured creditors and borrowing firms are likely to
increase as the size of the firm decreases.378 This reflects not only the fact
that smaller firms need to rely more on financial intermediaries such as
banks instead of public debt,37 9 but that asymmetric information problems
tend to be more severe in smaller firms. This means that the case for a
373. See infra Part IV.C.3.b.
374. See supra text accompanying note 275 (referring to Franks and Sussman's study of
542 small- to medium-sized financially distressed firms).
375. See Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Economics of Small Business
Finance: The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, 22
J. BANKING & FIN. 613, 636-38 (1998) (providing statistics regarding financial institution
debt).
376. Id. at 638.
377. Id. at 637.
378. Boot, supra note 340, at 20.
379. Berger & Udell, supra note 340, at 351.
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Better Positioned Agent model, in the context of the secured creditor-
again, much like in analyses of the owner-shareholder context-is stronger
where small- to medium-sized firms are concerned.
Consider next the types of secured creditors. The aforementioned
comparative advantage enjoyed by secured creditors over other creditors
does not necessarily derive from the mere existence of a collateral
agreement involving the firm, but it can also be attributed to the simple fact
that the secured creditor is a financial institution-the classic example
being a bank. In reality, however, the existence of a secured claim
generally coincides with the nature of the creditor as a financial institution.
Of course, when implementing the BPA model in a specific jurisdiction,
this assumption needs to be reexamined.
3. The Ex Ante-Ex Post Trade-Off
It is conventional wisdom in economic and financial theory that
bankruptcy modification of pre-bankruptcy entitlements is prohibited
unless such modification is necessary to accomplish better redeployment of
the firm's assets.3" ° However, in order to accomplish the improved
redeployment goal, the Better Positioned Agent approach clearly results in
a serious adjustment of pre-bankruptcy entitlements. Importantly, the
adjustment of pre-bankruptcy entitlements prescribed by the Better
Positioned Agent approach includes intentional, and carefully guided,
deviations from the absolute priority rule.
Bankruptcy scholars have recognized that the legal treatment of
financially-distressed firms cannot be examined independent of the
implications that the law carries for agents' behavior in "ex ante" time
period. 8' From the perspective of bankruptcy law, the "ex ante" chapter in
the firm's existence is distinguished from the "ex post" period of time,
during which the firm becomes financially-distressed and legal intervention
is considered. The phenomenon of deviations from the absolute priority
rule has been examined in both the ex ante and ex post contexts. The ex
ante/ex post distinction merits discussion in terms of the benefits and costs
of both periods.
All explanations offered to rationalize absolute priority rule violations
have assumed that these violations occur in a formal bankruptcy procedure
that follows the Administrative Model-type procedure, e.g., the American
380. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 14, at 104 ("Changes in nonbankruptcy rights
should be made only if they benefit all those with interests in the firm as a group.").
381. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Ex Ante Costs, supra note 80; Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects,
supra note 1.
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Chapter 1 .182  Although the Better Positioned Agent approach may
coincide with a different type of corporate bankruptcy procedure, absolute
priority rule violations induced by the Better Positioned Agent approach
nevertheless require that all ex ante and ex post costs be evaluated.
Thus, implementing the Better Positioned Agent approach involves a
trade-off that should draw the attention of lawmakers. The trade-off is a
direct result of using the tool of bankruptcy redistribution to promote ex
post efficiency. It is well established that bankruptcy redistribution, which
is an ex post phenomenon, influences the ex ante decisions of investors as
well as the ex ante decisions of other agents, such as managers.383
Therefore, the benefits and costs of ex post and ex ante periods are
relevant.
a. Ex post effects
The Better Positioned Agent approach has beneficial ex post effects.
The reasons for these beneficial effects are the subject of this Article and
were discussed in the previous sections. The Better Positioned Agent
approach has been suggested to directly improve the redeployment
decision. In this context, other indirect positive effects on redeployment
should be mentioned. Indeed, it has been argued that a particular absolute
priority violation, towards shareholders, creates several positive ex post
effects. The following effects are general rather than specific to a Chapter
1 1 procedure. First, the timing of filing for bankruptcy is improved
because it creates an incentive for owners/shareholders to file for
bankruptcy.384 Second, excessive risk taking during periods of financial-
distress is discouraged because owners/managers do not fear bankruptcy as
much.385  Third, underinvestment in financially-distressed firms is
mitigated.386
382. Indeed, the American Chapter 11 was constantly compared to a procedure that does
not usually bring about absolute priority rule violations, the British Receivership. The rules
governing Receivership dictate an auction of the assets of the firm. See Bebchuk, Ex Ante
Costs, supra note 80, at 446; supra text accompanying note 4 (describing what it means to
restructure a firm's capital). See also Hansen & Thomas, supra note 158 (comparing
procedures).
383. Hansen & Thomas, supra note 158, at 176-77.
384. Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
223 (1991); Elazar Berkovitch & Ronen Israel, The Bankruptcy Decision and Debt Contract
Renegotiations, 2 EUR. FIN. REv. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Berkovitch & Israel, The Bankruptcy
Decision]; Berkovitch & Israel, Optimal Bankruptcy, supra note 162; Robert Heinkel &
Josef Zechner, Financial Distress and Optimal Capital Structure Adjustments, 2 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRAT. 531 (1993); Povel, supra note 80. See also Hansen & Thomas, supra note
158, at 177 (discussing "the delay effect").
385. Allan C. Eberhart and Lemma W. Senbet, Absolute Priority Rule Violations and
Risk Incentives for Financially Distressed Firms, 22 FIN. MGMT. 101 (1993); Gertner &
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The ex post costs of corporate bankruptcy redistribution can also be
immediately removed from the table. The redistributive benefits of the
Better Positioned Agent approach seem to outweigh any ex post costs, such
as those from forum shopping. This might occur once the firm experiences
financial distress and pre-bankruptcy entitlements are expected to be
altered by bankruptcy law. Otherwise, the bankruptcy intervention would
be considered inefficient. However, this is not what happens in reality.
Formal mandatory bankruptcy proceedings exist in almost every Western
jurisdiction in the world. While the ex post costs resulting from the forum
shopping problem may need to be minimized, the mere existence of the
bankruptcy redistribution tool in many economies around the world is a
strong indicator that the problem is rather small.
The Better Positioned Agent approach eliminates another possible
source of ex post efficiency costs:, a-priori costs. These are the costs of
inefficient redeployment decisions made during the bankruptcy procedure
because a whole new decision-making process is utilized instead of the
processes dictated by the Administrative Model. For example, it has been
argued that eroding the secured creditor's protections during an
administrative-like bankruptcy procedure may bring about an inefficient
redeployment of the assets of the firm as junior claimants, unsecured
creditors and shareholders would choose to delay a final redeployment
decision that would wipe out their claims, preferring an unjustified
reorganization to a justified liquidation.38 Recall that the Better Positioned
Agent approach requires a different redeployment mechanism from the law
during a formal bankruptcy procedure. Thus, the junior claimants do not
decide the fate of the firm's assets, and hence this source of ex post
inefficiency is abolished.
Finally, when considering possible ex post costs of the Better
Positioned Agent approach, the specific attempt to utilize the secured
creditor as a BPA may raise concerns. One might argue that the secured
creditor may respond to possible erosion of his protections in an expected
bankruptcy proceeding by prematurely liquidating the firm, outside formal
bankruptcy, either secretly or consensually. 88  However, the secured
Scharfstein, supra note 123. See also Hansen & Thomas, supra note 158, at 177 (discussing
"the gambling effect").
386. Berkovitch & Israel, The Bankruptcy Decision, supra note 384; Gertner &
Scharfstein, supra note 123; M. White, Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 119.
387. Baird & Jackson, supra note 14, at 121-25.
388. Cf, Lynn M. LoPucki, Should the Secured Credit Carve Out Apply Only in
Bankruptcy? A Systems/Strategic Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1483, 1489, 1498-1503
(1997) (determining that "either of two strategies would enable secured creditors to defeat
the bankruptcy-only carve out under consideration;" and concluding "that a bankruptcy-only
carve out would not change significantly the asset distributions of collapsing debtors or
lending practices.").
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creditor's ability to effectuate an inefficient liquidation in this manner is
quite limited. First, liquidation may be impossible or costly for the secured
creditor as asset sales may be limited, for example, by industry factors.
3 89
Indeed, it has been argued that secured creditors are very reluctant to
pursue liquidation of the collateral.3 90 Second, and more importantly, since
an attempt by the secured creditor to prematurely liquidate the firn is
"noisy," in the sense that it either alerts owners of the firm or unsecured
creditors,39' any attempt made by the secured creditor to privately-and
inefficiently-liquidate the firm would result in an immediate filing of a
bankruptcy petition. Filing for bankruptcy under these circumstances
results in a long waiting period during which the fate and potential of the
firm are sorted out, along with a stay of the secured creditor's right to
foreclose on the collateral. During this interim period, the secured creditor
does not enjoy any protections and he bears the risks of collateral
depreciation. Because premature liquidations are quite "noisy," and since
such noise threatens secured creditors with costly bankruptcy procedures,
secured creditors are expected to avoid them.
Another expected response by the secured creditor is a demand that
the firm holds collateral equal to more than 100% of the debt. In other
words, secured creditors might insist on borrowers maintaining an equity
cushion in the collateral, in a manner sufficient to remove any danger
resulting from depreciation of the collateral. However, even this form of
strategic behavior does not pose a threat. First, insisting on an equity
cushion might not insulate the secured creditor from certain unexpected
events that would physically depreciate the collateral and, with it, the
secured claim. Second, a possible response that would easily overcome
such strategic behavior by the secured creditor would be to allow the firm,
at the beginning of the bankruptcy procedure, to expropriate any such
equity cushion and use it as free collateral to obtain additional financing.392
Third, the strategy of over-securing the loan cannot overcome the problem
389. See Paul Asquith, Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, Anatomy of Financial
Distress: An Examination of Junk-Bond Issuers, 109 QUAT. J. EcON. 625, 626-27 (1994).
390. Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 159, 164 (1997) (studying three cases and noting that "a consistent belief by loan
officers that a decision to repossess collateral and liquidate was tantamount to accepting a
loss on the loan. Those officers generally believed that they could not hope to liquidate
collateral at a value that would be sufficient to pay off the nominal loan balance and, more
importantly, to cover the costs of repossession and liquidation, including the risks of
litigation associated with any adversarial response.").
391. It is important to note that the law of preferences actually extends the period of time
during which interested parties, such as unsecured creditors, can be alerted and retroactively
turn around an inefficient liquidation up to a period of several months (usually three
months). See Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts, supra note 11, at 1342 (suggesting ways
to increase the "noise" made by such premature liquidations).
392. Cf, e.g., J. White, Death, supra note 15, at 146.
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of the temporal depreciation of the collateral. Indeed, lawmakers could
easily dictate that no interest be paid to the secured creditor for the time of
the formal bankruptcy procedure and that the secured creditor cannot avoid
such a sanction or insulate themselves from this risk.
Ex post obstacles, therefore, would probably not impose significant
costs, and the Better Positioned Agent approach would increase overall ex
post efficiency. It is only upon consideration of the ex ante costs and
benefits of violating the absolute priority rules, as induced under the terms
of the Better Positioned Agent approach, that the plot thickens. Indeed, the
ex ante benefits incurred by implementing the Better Positioned Agent
approach must be weighed against the ex ante costs generated by it.
Moreover, it should be noted that from the perspective of bankruptcy
theory, ex ante costs, or benefits, are expected to be incurred by all firms in
the economy, not only those in a state of financial distress. This is in
contrast to the behavior of ex post costs and benefits.
What precise ex ante effects, both positive and negative, are expected
to result from implementation of the Better Positioned Agent? The
following discussion attempts to answer this difficult question.3 93
b. Ex ante effects
Consider the case of the eroding protections enjoyed by secured
creditors against economic (physical) and financial (temporal) depreciation
of the collateral during attempts to reorganize the firm. Recall that the
Better Positioned Agent approach holds in such a case, as lawmakers are
encouraged by the terms of the model to consider denial of these
protections to the secured creditors. Denying secured creditors their
protections against economic and financial depreciation of collateral is
equivalent to applying a regime of partial priority for secured claims
instead of a full priority regime.394 Indeed, during a bankruptcy procedure,
these protections guarantee the integrity of the specific collateral in two
dimensions: the physical and temporal dimensions. To the extent that such
erosion is rendered efficient, from an ex post perspective, by the Better
Positioned Agent model, the question remains: Can we endure the ex ante,
economy-wide ramifications of eroding the secured creditor's protections?
393. Cf, Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra note 1, at 1206 (noting the problem in
attempting to characterize the ex ante effects of different bankruptcy reform proposals). See
generally Barry E. Adler & George G. Triantis, The Aftermath of North LaSalle Street, 70
U. CIN. L. REV. 1225, 1235 (2002) ("The weighing of the positive and negative ex ante
incentive effects of deviations from absolute priority is complex and we do not know of any
sustained theoretical or empirical attempt to specify the conditions under which the prospect
of deviation in bankruptcy optimizes incentives on balance.").
394. Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case, supra note 11, at 911-13.
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Scholars have argued, although for quite different reasons than those
advocated here,3 95 that provision of full priority to secured creditors, rather
than partial priority, may be inefficient, particularly when considering the
ex ante costs of a full priority regime.396 First, decisions by borrowers with
regard to potential tort liability are distorted under a full priority regime. 97
In the presence of full priority to secured creditors' claims, and as a
precaution to improve their products' safety, borrowers will invest even
less than is possible under a partial priority regime. Indeed, better
protection is given to the secured creditor's claim in the form of full
priority with a lower interest rate charged by the borrower, and vice versa.
Limiting the secured creditor to less than full priority of his claim activates
the interest rate charged on the loan to induce borrowers to consider the
scope of tort liability that is incurred, because such liability under the
partial priority regime dilutes the secured creditor's claim.3 98 Second, full
priority reduces the secured creditor's incentive to incorporate efficient
covenants into the loan contract.399  Third, the full priority regime may
encourage loan transactions that enable borrowers to fund inefficient
projects.4 °° Making use of a security interest when some of the other
creditors of the firm are "non-adjusting, '" '° creates a value transfer in
bankruptcy from the non-adjusting creditors to the secured creditor. This
value transfer subsidizes the transaction for the secured creditor and the
borrower.4 2 Finally, and most importantly, under a full priority regime, the
secured creditor's incentive to monitor the firm and control the
commencement time of a bankruptcy is not efficiently reduced.4 3
395. So far, proposals in literature to replace full priority for secured creditors' claims
with partial priority have focused on the ex ante effects of such a change, and ignored the ex
post benefits of such a change during a formal bankruptcy (provided it is implemented
correctly). For a list of studies discussing secured credit priority alterations in the
bankruptcy context, see Julia Patterson Forrester, Bankruptcy Takings, 51 FLA. L. REV. 851,
852-53, n.5, 862-63 (1999).
396. See Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case, supra note 11, at 898-903; Bebchuk & Fried,
Further Thoughts, supra note 11, at 1314-2 1. Note that only priority-dependent efficiency
costs are considered here, and that priority-independent costs are not considered.
397. See Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case, supra note 11, at 898-900 ("The first priority-
dependent efficiency cost of security interests is that their use under full priority may distort
a borrower's choice of investments and level of precaution.").
398. For a different view, and the responses to it, see Bebchuk & Fried, Further
Thoughts, supra note 11, at 1319-20.
399. Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case, supra note 11, at 900-02.
400. Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts, supra note 11, at 1320-21.
401. For the definition of "non-adjusting creditors," see supra note 12.
402. See Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts, supra note 11, at 1293-94 (arguing that
the value transfer acts as a subsidy for the use of a security interest by reducing the apparent
cost to the borrower and the secured creditor).
403. Id. at 1315-18. This conclusion is not without its doubters, as the literature is split
on the issue. See the discussion in Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case, supra note 11, at 913-17.
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Of course, a partial priority regime may be costly, as it carries with it
the danger that the firm may not receive adequate financing from secured
creditors in the first place.4°4 For example, it has been argued that, absent
full priority, some lenders may be unwilling to lend money to borrowers,
even at a high interest rate.40 5  However, scholars are still very much
divided on the question of the partial priority regime's effect on the cost
and availability of credit.40 6  For example, it has been argued that the
aggregate cost of credit in the economy may be lower under a partial
priority regime, as voluntary unsecured creditors would reduce the interest
rate that they charge to reflect the lower risk that they face.407 It thus seems
that only extensive empirical research-which is far beyond the scope of
this Article-can resolve the debate.
Other possible ex ante costs may emerge from an increase in the level
of monitoring exerted by secured creditors. For example, it has been
argued that the relationship between a firm with a monitoring bank creates
a trade-off between reduced agency costs associated with lending to small-
and medium-sized firms and distortions in such firm's owner's incentives
to exert effort.40 8  In other words, a secured creditor that is excessively
involved in the day-to-day management of the firm can discourage efficient
management decisions. Again, this is an issue that can only be resolved
with empirical research.
It is therefore possible that the abrasion of the secured creditor's full
priority in bankruptcy is efficient. Still, considering the ex ante effects of
the Better Positioned Agent approach against this background raises two
However, it seems that scholars are more inclined to conclude that monitoring behavior is
not efficiently reduced. See Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts, supra note 11, at 1315
n.109 (reporting the conventional wisdom in a symposium held on the full vs. partial
priority: "During the Symposium, no one expressed support for full priority on these
grounds...").
404. See Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts, supra note 11, at 1328-36 for a discussion
and a list of critics of the partial priority concept.
405. See, e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of
Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2036-37
(1994).
406. See Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts, supra note 11, at 1329 (arguing that "on
an aggregate basis, the availability and cost of credit need not change substantially under a
rule of partial priority").
407. See id. at 1331-32 (presenting different arguments for how a partial priority rule
could either "increase or decrease the aggregate cost of credit in the economy").
408. See, e.g, Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between
Informed and Arm's-Length Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1367, 1368 (1992) ("An informed bank will be
able to control an owner's decision such that the project is continued only if it has a positive
NPV. In the process of doing so, however, it adversely affects the owner's incentive to
exert effort.")
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questions.409 First, what is the optimal way to deny secured creditors the
full priority of their claims? Will denial of anti-depreciation protections to
secured creditors, rather than application of other strategies that result in
partial priority, create a problem? Second, should the secured creditor be
denied only its bankruptcy protection against financial depreciation, only of
its bankruptcy protection against economic depreciation, or both?
Professors Bebchuk and Fried have suggested two prototypical partial
priority rules to replace the conventional full priority rule.4 0 The "fixed-
fraction priority rule" dictates that a pre-determined fixed fraction of the
collateral backing a secured claim-for example, 25%-would be made
available to pay the claims of the unsecured debt. An "adjustable-priority"
rule orders that secured claims be afforded priority only over claims of
certain creditors, including "non-adjusting creditors" or creditors who have
explicitly agreed to be subordinated. 41 1 The Better Positioned Agent model
introduces a third prototypical partial priority rule for bankruptcy
procedures: a "self-dependent priority rule." According to the "self-
dependent priority rule," the extent to which a secured claim is afforded
full priority depends upon the actions of the secured creditor. In fact, the
secured creditor can maneuver in such a way that his full priority status
either survives the bankruptcy procedure or is significantly eroded. Thus,
the secured creditor can "decide" whether his claim is afforded full priority
if a bankruptcy proceeding commences or whether his claim's full priority
status is to be eroded.
It is reasonable to assume that a partial priority regime resorting to the
self-dependent priority rule is likely to increase the ex ante efforts that
secured creditors invest in sorting borrowers. Indeed, under a self-
dependent partial priority regime, secured creditors realize that a full
priority outcome is obtainable and that achieving this outcome depends on
the secured creditor's ex post efforts to monitor the borrowing firm and
induce action when necessary, and on the secured creditor's ex ante efforts
409. One additional question has already been answered by the Better Positioned Agent
model: should the denial of full priority be restricted to formal bankruptcy proceedings
only, or apply also in cases where a collective procedure is not initiated at all and the
secured creditor is exercising his rights in an individual collection procedure? The Better
Positioned Agent model applies in formal bankruptcy proceedings only and is thus
uninterested in what happens outside of bankruptcy.
410. See Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts, supra note 11, at 1321 (explaining the
fixed-fraction and adjustable priority rules). A third rule, a consensual priority rule, would
give a secured creditor priority in the collateral only over the claims of consenting creditors.
See id. at 1327. This third rule does not solve the problem which is addressed here-of
asymmetric information-and as a matter of convenience will be ignored.
411. Note that the rules offered by Professors Bebchuk and Fried dictate that secured
creditor claims receive at least as much as unsecured creditor claims. In other words, these
rules are not subordination rules. See Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts, supra note 11, at
1322.
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to properly sort his borrowers. "Good" borrowers would be expected to
either completely avoid bankruptcy or enable the secured creditor to
effectively monitor their business in preparation for incidents of financial
distress. These borrowers may also apply pressure to induce a timely
workout or a pre-packaged bankruptcy, or accurately time the
commencement of a formal bankruptcy proceeding. The ex ante result is
expected to be beneficial, as "good" borrowers would be distinguished
from "bad" borrowers, and financing would be extended only to "good"
borrowers.
Finally, consider the question of which protection should be eroded
during bankruptcy-the protection against temporal depreciation of the
collateral and/or the protection against physical depreciation of the
collateral. To the extent that the self-dependent priority rule aims to induce
secured creditor action by threatening the secured creditor with partial
priority over unsecured creditors, there seems to be a reason to deny both
protections. They represent the value of the collateral in two different
dimensions: the physical dimension, in which the required protection is
against economic depreciation of the collateral, and the temporal
dimension, in which the required protection is against financial
depreciation of the collateral.
In conclusion, the Better Positioned Agent approach would probably
not incur high ex post or ex ante costs. The new approach's non-systematic
tendency to deviate from the absolute priority rule contributes to the ex
ante overall positive result. However, in light of the identified ex ante
costs, which need to be added to the ex post costs, the question to be posed
to policymakers should be one of magnitude and scope: which effect of
absolute priority violations is stronger-the negative or the 
positive? 4 2
Only empirical data can answer this question without casting doubt.
41 3
D. The Normative Argument
The preceding sections have put forward a new approach according to
which decision-making mechanisms in corporate bankruptcy settings ought
to be crafted with the goal of increasing efficiency. What should
lawmakers do in order to implement the Better Positioned Agent approach,
as far as the dominant secured creditor of a small- to medium-sized firm is
concerned?
412. Bebchuk, ExAnte Costs, supra note 80, at 457.
413. For example, consider Professor's Bebchuk's argument: "One causal observation
that is consistent with the view that [absolute priority] is overall desirable is that, in
countries like the United Kingdom in which insolvency law does not produce significant
deviations from [absolute priority], parties do not generally provide for such deviations in
their contracts." See id.
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Secured creditors should be considered better positioned agents.
However, the Administrative Model-the basis of bankruptcy regimes
around the world-and the Residual Owner reform proposals do not
include instructions for deliberate erosion of secured creditors' protections
or full priority. On the contrary, two doctrines-the doctrine of adequate
protection and the doctrine of post-petition interest, for over-secured
creditors414-have always been considered to be central to any
reorganization attempt. They require that assets held as collateral by
secured creditors be available to the firm for its success. Thus, except for
sporadic and unintentional erosion of secured creditors' protections,
secured creditors have enjoyed their full entitlements during formal
bankruptcy proceedings. Unfortunately, in doing so legal systems have not
taken advantage of the opportunity to utilize these secured creditors as the
cheapest cost avoiders.
The Better Positioned Agent approach recommends that the doctrine
of adequate protection and the doctrine of post-petition interest be
abrogated whenever lawmakers identify dominant and influential secured
creditors. Alerting such secured creditors to the cost of delays during a
formal bankruptcy procedure that prohibits them from exercising their
entitlement to foreclose on the collateral will subsequently induce them to
work in advance in order to curtail any expected delay period. Moreover,
in addition to improving redeployment prior to the commencement of a
formal bankruptcy procedure, the new reform proposed here would also
greatly simplify the complicated process of ensuring that secured creditors
are adequately protected. Most importantly, the new reform renders the
valuation of the collateral in order to appreciate its value-and the value to
be adequately protected-unnecessary.
Thus, any additional protection derived from the adequate protection
doctrine should be abolished as well. For example, American bankruptcy
law dictates that where adequate protection proves ex post facto to be
inadequate, the secured creditor has a right to treat the resulting loss as an
administrative expense, with super-priority status.415 Adopting the Better
Positioned Agent approach in the secured creditor's context should lead
lawmakers to reject such protection.
Moreover, should future empirical data reveal that eliminating
adequate protection and post-petition interest is an insufficient means of
inducing better positioned secured creditors to act as cheapest cost
avoiders, an additional restriction of their bankruptcy entitlements would
have to be considered. Lawmakers would have to consider further changes
to the full priority of the secured creditors regime into a partial priority
414. See supra notes 14-16.
415. See II U.S.C. § 507(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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regime that applies a self-dependent priority rule but this time increases the
"price" collected from secured creditors for each additional time unit spent
by the firm in a formal bankruptcy proceeding.
Still, a question arises concerning the possible costs of applying the
proposed reform, as the new reform requires that two seemingly important
doctrines be abolished: the adequate protection doctrine and the doctrine of
post-petition interest for secured creditors. Two rationales are
conventionally considered to support these doctrines. First, secured
creditors are perceived to be entitled to protection of their property rights in
the collateral. Second, the requirement to extend secured creditors
adequate protection and post-petition interest on their secured claim has
been considered to engender a screening device, which enables elimination
of inefficient reorganization attempts. This device comes into action once
a new supplier of finance arrives, usually when the firm enters a formal
bankruptcy procedure, and conditions that the extension of new credit to
the firm already in a formal reorganization procedure be backed with a
security interest in the assets of the firm. Indeed, it is not easy to persuade
someone to lend money to a financially-distressed firm, let alone a firm in a
formal bankruptcy procedure. However, requiring that new finance be
extended subject to the secured creditor being afforded adequate protection
and post-petition interest, in a manner that enables new suppliers of finance
to effectively enjoy a security interest only in the surplus to exceed the
secured creditors' share, brings about the result that only value-enhancing
reorganizations are facilitated.
The two rationales are thus future facing. They seem to contradict the
rationale derived from the Better Positioned Agent approach, which hopes
to improve the decision-making process that precedes the initiation of a
formal bankruptcy procedure. While the first rationale to support
protections for secured creditors against physical and financial depreciation
of their secured claim is deontological and thus irrelevant for the current
efficiency investigation, the second rationale raises a query regarding the
inefficiency of denying secured creditors their protections. Will
application of the Better Positioned Agent approach, and denial of the
adequate protection and post-petition interest of the better positioned
secured creditors, sacrifice the screening mechanism described above?
The answer is no. Application of the Better Positioned Agent
approach in the context of the secured creditor, which aims to improve
decision-making prior to the commencement of a formal bankruptcy
procedure, does not need to come at the expense of making efficient
decisions during the formal procedure. Indeed, the above-mentioned
screening mechanism is associated with administrative bankruptcy
decision-making. Replacing the administrative procedure with a different
bankruptcy decision-making mechanism-a reform advocated by
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proponents of the Residual Owner Model-would render the adequate
protection and post-petition interest doctrines irrelevant for the purpose of
screening efficient reorganizations. Even in a setting that follows, more or
less, the contours of the Administrative Model, the new reform does not
necessarily hinder the screening effect attributed to the adequate protection
and post-petition interest doctrines.
Consider an example: As soon as a formal bankruptcy procedure
commences, the firm--holding a debt load of $200, $150 of which is a
secured claim-is auctioned. The auction serves to create a benchmark
valuation of the firm's assets. The highest bid in the auction stands on
$160. A new supplier of finance, joining those who argue that the firm
ought to be given breathing space for six months in order to explore its true
potential, is asked to back up his request with a loan to the firm in the sum
of $15, which would keep the firm alive for the coming six months. In
exchange, the new finance supplier's resulting claim against the firm would
be ranked in the order of priorities for distribution behind claims at the total
amount of $160. In other words, the new supplier of finance would be
ranked after claims at the amount of $160, and before other claims at the
amount of $40. Of course, without subjecting the entire scenario to the
adequate protection and post-petition requirements, an incentive is created
for the new supplier of finance to choose reorganization, even in cases
where this choice is not value-enhancing. Indeed, without adequate
protection and post-petition interest payments, the collateral is actually
being given for free to the firm.
A possible solution to fight the tendency to reorganize the firm in such
a situation-even if reorganization does not create value-would be to
require that the value of $150 be protected against financial and physical
depreciation, as a condition for the new supplier of finance to be repaid, but
the relevant benefits of such protections should be denied to the secured
creditor. In other words, upon liquidation, after the reorganization attempt
fails and the assets of the firm are sold for $130-less than the $160 that
would have been collected had the firm been auctioned at the onset-the
new supplier of finance would be able to collect his claim only after the
secured creditor is repaid $130. The unsecured creditors are repaid, first, a
sum of $10, reflecting their initial share had the assets been sold in the
auction for $160; and second, an additional sum of $20, reflecting the
adequate protection requirement plus a market interest accrued over the
sum of $150 (value of the collateral at the beginning), reflecting the post-
petition interest requirement. In short, while the new supplier of finance
has been subjected to the screening effect of the adequate protection and
post-petition interest doctrines, the secured creditor was still denied these
protections, and unsecured creditors enjoyed the benefits of these
protections in his stead.
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V. CONCLUSION
Efficiency in corporate bankruptcy is based upon making good
decisions in the redeployment of a distressed firm's assets. Lawmakers and
scholars contemplating an appropriate approach for redeployment have
ignored an efficient hidden structure for legal rules in corporate bankruptcy
settings. The building blocks of that structure have been introduced by this
Article. The new approach is based upon the assumption of a certain better
positioned agent (BPA) in several of bankruptcy's decision-making
contexts, who ought to be entrusted with making a market-oriented
redeployment decision. This Article demonstrated the feasibility of the
new approach in one such context. I have argued that the Better Positioned
Agent approach improves upon the redeployment decisions as it calls for
utilization of dominant secured creditors of small- to medium-sized firms
to increase wealth by forcing them to monitor the firm or push it into a
turnaround effort, even prior to the commencement of a formal bankruptcy
procedure. To that end, the protections afforded to such a better positioned
secured creditor-adequate protection and post-petition interest-should be
denied.
The advent of a Better Positioned Agent is an imperfect solution,
much like the two model solutions currently dominating corporate
bankruptcy settings worldwide. However, lawmakers need to familiarize
themselves with this new solution, as it offers a chance to carefully and
knowingly weigh the benefits and shortcomings of each solution, as well as
expose bankruptcy's relevant trade-offs. Future research should focus on
devising schemes for BPAs other than the dominant secured creditor of a
small- to medium-sized firm, e.g., the new finance supplier. Moreover,
empirical and theoretical comparisons of all three decision-making models
are needed.
